Q: How does a commons reconstitute boundaries it cannot enforce?

Ostrom extension #1. Design principle 1 assumes a definable "who belongs" boundary; on Nostr identity-layer enforcement is impossible (free pseudonymous keys, unlimited entry). Yet boundaries exist — redundantly: the Sybil that beats the social layer hits the relay filter; the one that beats the filter scores ~0 in a client web of trust; different users run different combinations, so there is no single global boundary to defeat.

Open questions: Is redundant, heterogeneous boundary-reconstitution a stable substitute for enforceable membership? What does "clearly defined boundaries" mean when the principle must be re-specified as boundary-setting capacity rather than a boundary ({{ref:src-ukac-introduction|Hess & Ostrom 2007}})? Where does IAD put a participant who cannot be excluded from the situation at all ({{ref:agent-iad-core|Agent session}} flag)?

Related: - {{ref:emergentgov|Index}} - {{ref:concept-boundary-rules|Boundary (entry and exit) rules}} - {{ref:claim-no-global-bannability|No global bannability}} - {{ref:claim-multiplicity-stack|Multiplicity}} - {{ref:q-generativity-robustness|Q: Is robustness generativity rather than redundancy?}}