{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@type":"Periodical","version":"1.0","generatedAt":"2026-11-17T01:31:05+00:00","magazine":{"id":"72cdf565e3633044c4ebd2e87ea6eb52ab2a308c07516242fb66f725e4445ff0","slug":"nokycswap-me","title":"nokycswap.me \u2014 the no-KYC watch","summary":"An independent watcher of no-KYC services: scams and clones, thefts and where the coins went, monthly reports. Measured, sourced, no affiliate links. https:\/\/nokycswap.me","image":null,"language":null,"pubkey":"d27cb1137d3c6e1e2b132eb802db2175524c11c0bf71b1ff753c0369a706e04d","createdAt":"2026-11-16T23:19:01+00:00","url":"https:\/\/decentnewsroom.com\/mag\/nokycswap-me"},"categories":[{"slug":"nokycswap-scams-clones","title":"Scams and clones","summary":"Fake sites, clone exchanges and pay-first \u00abservices\u00bb we documented, each with sources and what to check.","image":null,"url":"https:\/\/decentnewsroom.com\/mag\/nokycswap-me\/cat\/nokycswap-scams-clones","articleCount":2,"articles":[{"title":"Warning: changenow.my is a copy of ChangeNOW that keeps your deposit","slug":"changenow-my-phishing-clone","summary":"changenow.my is a full copy of the ChangeNOW website. Orders are created on the clone\u0027s own server, and the deposit address comes from the clone\u0027s own wallet, set up to be swept onward. ChangeNOW\u0027s only site is changenow.io.","content":"Our watch over look-alike domains flagged changenow.my on 31 October. On 7 November we looked at it and recorded it as a likely phishing clone. Today we checked what happens to the money.\n\n## What the site is\nchangenow.my shows the ChangeNOW website almost exactly: the same menu, texts, logos and links to ChangeNOW\u0027s other products. Two things give it away:\n\n- the page names changenow.my, not changenow.io, as its own address;\n- the exchange form does not talk to ChangeNOW. It runs a small script of its own that sends every order to the clone\u0027s server (\/api\/exchange\/create). The script names its own parts \u00abreplica\u00bb and notes that a widget is built \u00ab1:1 with the original\u00bb.\n\nThe site runs on a server in Germany (AS202226).\n\n## What happens to the money\nWe created one order on the clone without paying: 0.01 BTC to XMR, over Tor, with the public Monero General Fund address as the payout address \u2014 not an address of ours.\n\nThe clone\u0027s server returned a ChangeNOW-style order with a Bitcoin deposit address. The same reply showed where that address comes from:\n\n- it is address number 14 of the clone\u0027s own wallet (derivation path m\/84\u0027\/0\u0027\/0\u0027\/0\/14);\n- it is marked to be swept to another address controlled by the same backend: bc1pq7hc77cjsjzh64emnmv57s4kh049mx3x4ujc7vuafu32wsd537qqnksz5t.\n\nNothing in the reply points to ChangeNOW. A real ChangeNOW order is created by ChangeNOW and its deposit address belongs to ChangeNOW.\n\n## Has anyone lost money?\nWe cannot see the clone\u0027s other deposit addresses. The deposit address we were given and the collection address above had received nothing as of 9 November 2026. The wallet index 14 suggests that at least 14 orders were created before ours; some of them may have been tests. We are watching both addresses.\n\n## How to protect yourself\n- ChangeNOW\u0027s site is **changenow.io**. Type it or use a bookmark; do not follow links to \u00abChangeNOW\u00bb from ads, search results or messages.\n- Before sending, paste the order ID into the tracker on changenow.io. A real order is found there. If it is not, stop.\n- The same applies to any exchange: a copy of the site is cheap; the domain and the order trail are what you can check.\n- If you already sent funds to an order from changenow.my, write down the order ID, the deposit address and the transaction, and tell ChangeNOW support \u2014 they cannot recover it, but the addresses help others.\n\n## What we did\n- changenow.my is in our scam registry and in our public domain lists (\/data\/scam-domains.txt and .json), which wallets and blocklists can use.\n- Both addresses above are added to the evidence of the registry entry.\n- A second look-alike, changenowdex.org, has no website yet; we keep watching it.\n\n*Sources: our look-alike domain watch (31 Oct 2026); our test order on changenow.my via Tor (9 Nov 2026, unfunded); public Bitcoin chain via mempool.space (9 Nov 2026).*\n\n---\nOriginally published on nokycswap.me: https:\/\/nokycswap.me\/blog\/changenow-my-phishing-clone\/","image":null,"pubkey":"d27cb1137d3c6e1e2b132eb802db2175524c11c0bf71b1ff753c0369a706e04d","kind":30023,"createdAt":"2026-11-09T20:41:00+00:00","publishedAt":"2026-11-09T00:00:00+00:00","topics":["nokycswap","privacy","investigation"],"url":"https:\/\/decentnewsroom.com\/mag\/nokycswap-me\/cat\/nokycswap-scams-clones\/d\/changenow-my-phishing-clone"},{"title":"Silent Node: how a pay-first \u00aboffshore host\u00bb fakes its way to your deposit","slug":"silent-node-scam-pay-first-hosting","summary":"Silent Node sells anonymous offshore servers, but its live status page is drawn with random numbers, its company and history do not check out, and every door \u2014 servers, support, even a pre-sales question \u2014 opens only after a deposit into a balance with no withdrawal. We walked through it as a user, without paying.","content":"Silent Node presents itself as an anonymous offshore host: a 16-digit token instead of an account, servers in fifteen \u00abprivacy jurisdictions\u00bb, crypto only. It entered our watch list on 8 October, like every service we observe before our catalog opens. On 25 October it was flagged in review, and we went through it as a customer would, stopping only at the moment of paying. What follows is what we saw, and what we checked behind it.\n\n## The scheme, step by step\n\n**1. A site that looks like a mature provider.** Thirty-one languages, product pages for VPS, dedicated, GPU and object storage, a status banner reading \u00abAll systems operational \u00b7 0 incidents \u00b7 99.99% uptime \u00b7 31,815 checks\/min \u2014 LIVE\u00bb, and \u00ab13,068 machines online, counted live by the status API\u00bb.\n\n**2. An account in one click.** You get a 16-digit token and a warning: lose it and \u00abyour account and balance are gone forever\u00bb. No email, no recovery. That is normal for privacy services \u2014 and it is also a ready explanation for any balance that later disappears.\n\n**3. Every door opens only after a deposit.** The order page lists plans from $6.99 a month, but a server is \u00abpaid straight from your crypto balance\u00bb. Support tickets \u2014 including the Sales category for pre-sales questions \u2014 answer \u00abYou need money in your balance to open a ticket\u00bb. The reseller programme asks you to \u00abadd at least $25 so we can open your application\u00bb. There is no trial and no way to ask anything before paying.\n\n**4. The deposit page is the bait.** Top-ups come with a bonus: $50 becomes $75, $100 becomes $175, $250 or more becomes $500. The money goes to a balance that \u00abnever expires\u00bb. Nowhere does the site say how to take it back out.\n\n**5. A \u00abpayment processor\u00bb that is their own page.** The top-up leads to \u00abBDK Pay \u2014 Crypto processor, Secured by BDK Pay\u00bb, hosted on Silent Node\u0027s own domain (`app.silentnode.host\/pay\/\u2026`), with a 60-minute countdown and a Monero address. We found no public trace of a processor called BDK Pay.\n\n**6. A referral reward for bringing others.** $10 for every referred account that tops up at least $25 \u2014 an incentive to praise the service in places where new users look.\n\n## What is drawn, and how we checked\n\n| What the site shows | What we checked | What we found |\n|---|---|---|\n| \u00abLive\u00bb latency per region, changing every few seconds | the site\u0027s own `status.js` | the numbers are moved by \u00b11 ms with `Math.random()` in your browser |\n| \u00abTelemetry\u00bb and \u00abchecks\/min\u00bb from a status API | the API endpoint | a synthetic random walk between 503 and 535, not measurements |\n| Support reply time | the same page, loaded twice a minute apart | \u00abwithin ~8 h\u00bb, then \u00abwithin ~4 h\u00bb |\n| 99.99% uptime | our own monitor, 72 days | **82.9%** |\n| \u00abSince 2021 \u00b7 Silent Node O\u00dc \u00b7 Estonia\u00bb | RDAP; Estonian e-Business Register | domain registered **22 July 2026**; no company of that name found |\n| Founder \u00abkern\u00bb with a PGP fingerprint | keys.openpgp.org, keyserver.ubuntu.com | the key is on neither |\n| \u00ab48-hour money-back guarantee\u00bb (later \u00ab7-day\u00bb) | the Terms of Service and refund pages linked at sign-up | both return **404** |\n| 13,068 machines, owned EPYC hardware in 15 regions, B300 GPUs | the domain\u0027s age and the company\u0027s traces | an anonymous three-month-old domain behind Cloudflare |\n\n## Who sends people to it\n\nTwo \u00abhand-curated directories\u00bb, kycnothanks.com and nokycdirectory.com, rank Silent Node first in hosting, \u00abFeatured, 10\/10\u00bb, \u00abthe reference no-KYC host\u00bb. They use the same tagline, were registered on the same day (31 May 2026) at the same registrar, and sit on the same pair of Cloudflare nameservers \u2014 which Cloudflare assigns per account. That points to one operator for both; we have not proven who it is, so we keep them on a private watch list rather than in the public registry. Around Silent Node they list well-known honest services, which makes the ranking look credible.\n\n## Were we the first?\n\nAs far as we can find, nobody had published the scheme before. A LowEndTalk thread a month ago asked \u00abis this for real?\u00bb and got a one-line \u00abyes\u00bb about a site created in July 2026, and Scamadviser gives the domain a trust score of 0 from automated checks. We found no write-up of how it works, no entry in other directories\u0027 scam lists, and no reports in phishing blocklists. That is why we publish this in full.\n\n## What we did\n\n- Took Silent Node off our watch list for good and made the review page of any removed service unreachable.\n- Removed it from our comparison of no-KYC VPN, hosting and eSIM services, in all four languages.\n- Added it to our scam registry with nine pieces of evidence and their sources, and to our public scam-domain feed.\n- Reported both of its domains to MetaMask, Google Safe Browsing, Chainabuse and PhishTank, and warned other directories.\n\nThis is what the observation period before launch is for: every service is watched, measured and checked for weeks before it can be listed. On paper, Silent Node\u0027s own claims and the directories praising it looked convincing; our uptime measurements and a walk-through as a customer did not. Our checks now also look for the signals below.\n\n## How to spot this pattern elsewhere\n\n1. **Live numbers that are drawn, not measured** \u2014 counters that change between two loads, status pages with no history you can verify.\n2. **A history older than the domain** \u2014 \u00absince 2021\u00bb on a domain from this summer.\n3. **An identity you cannot check** \u2014 a company name missing from the register it claims, a PGP key that no keyserver knows.\n4. **Everything behind a deposit** \u2014 no trial, no pre-sales answer, no partner programme until you pay.\n5. **Bonuses on deposits into a balance with no withdrawal**, and a countdown on the payment page.\n6. **Terms and refund pages that do not exist**, while the home page promises your money back.\n7. **Uptime claims far above what an independent monitor sees.**\n8. **Rankings from directories nobody had heard of**, especially when several of them look alike.\n\n## If you already paid\n\nWrite down the transaction ID, the amount, the address you paid to and the time. Report the address and the domain on Chainabuse. Do not pay anyone who offers to \u00abrecover\u00bb the funds for a fee \u2014 that is the next scam in line. If you have a ticket or chat history with them, keep it; we will add verified losses to our records if you send them through the contact page.\n\n---\nOriginally published on nokycswap.me: https:\/\/nokycswap.me\/blog\/silent-node-scam-pay-first-hosting\/","image":null,"pubkey":"d27cb1137d3c6e1e2b132eb802db2175524c11c0bf71b1ff753c0369a706e04d","kind":30023,"createdAt":"2026-10-25T23:32:25+00:00","publishedAt":"2026-10-25T00:00:00+00:00","topics":["nokycswap","privacy","investigation"],"url":"https:\/\/decentnewsroom.com\/mag\/nokycswap-me\/cat\/nokycswap-scams-clones\/d\/silent-node-scam-pay-first-hosting"}]},{"slug":"nokycswap-thefts-incidents","title":"Thefts and incidents","summary":"Hacks, exploits, leaks and closures in the no-KYC niche, and where the stolen coins went \u2014 from our own on-chain tracking.","image":null,"url":"https:\/\/decentnewsroom.com\/mag\/nokycswap-me\/cat\/nokycswap-thefts-incidents","articleCount":8,"articles":[{"title":"Binance theft, week one: 71 BTC through THORChain, and one address shared with the Bitget case","slug":"binance-week-one-thorchain-bitget-link","summary":"What our own tracking of the Binance theft shows after a week: the Bitcoin leg went into THORChain as soon as it reopened, one step went through a CoinJoin, nothing we follow reached Monero \u2014 and one consolidation address received steps from both our Binance and our Bitget cases.","content":"A week ago we wrote about the Binance theft from the custody side. This is the follow-up from the tracking side: where the money we can follow went, and one detail we have not seen written up elsewhere.\n\n## Where Binance stands\nBinance published its post-mortem on 3 November: attackers posed as recruiters, planted malware on an engineer\u0027s work computer and used a compromised internal AI tool to reach the service that signs withdrawals. By 4 November it had replenished about 98% of the stolen tokens from company funds, and about $2.85 billion had been frozen or intercepted \u2014 mostly USDT and USDC frozen by Tether and Circle. Withdrawals for six remaining assets are due to reopen by 13 November.\n\n## What our tracking shows\nWe follow the Bitcoin leg of the theft step by step on the public chain. It started moving on 1 November.\n\n- **THORChain.** The protocol halted trading on most of its chains on 31 October after an Ethereum reorganisation and resumed late on 3 November. From 5 November, 28 of the steps we follow went straight into it: 18 steps and about 47.3 BTC on 5 November, 10 steps and about 23.9 BTC on 6 November.\n- **CoinJoin.** One step, 1.07 BTC, went through an equal-output CoinJoin.\n- **No Monero.** None of the steps we follow went to a route that ends in XMR.\n\nThese are the steps our tracker follows, not the whole flow. Elliptic counts more: about 1,650 BTC converted from other stolen assets by 6 November, and The Crypto Times reports about $242 million moved through Tron in two days via Relay, THORChain, Chainflip and Symbiosis.\n\n## The address shared with the Bitget case\nWe have also been tracking the September Bitget theft. On 6 November one consolidation address \u2014 `bc1q82cksuj36wfc2khdpmhlk0szxv7u8fe894t4zw` \u2014 received a step from our Binance case (1.712 BTC) and, the same day, a step from our Bitget case (1.2406 BTC). On the public chain the address has about 95 transactions and has received about 56.6 BTC, gathering deposits and passing them on in larger amounts.\n\nOne shared address does not prove one operator. It fits what Elliptic reports independently: part of the Binance money went to wallets that hold proceeds of the Bitget exploit, which is also attributed to the TraderTraitor group.\n\n## What it means if you use these protocols\nNothing here put ordinary users\u0027 funds at risk. But three protocols in our catalog carried stolen money this week, and they handle it very differently:\n\n- **Relay** screens addresses when a quote is requested and again before a fill, and refuses flagged addresses.\n- **Chainflip** brokers can reject deposits they flag as high-risk and send them back to the refund address.\n- **THORChain** has no address screening in the protocol itself; its terms only exclude sanctioned persons. Some interfaces built on it screen addresses on their side.\n\nIf you swap through these routes, your coins may share pools with stolen funds. That is a property of permissionless liquidity, not a sign of wrongdoing by the users.\n\n*Sources: Binance post-mortem (3 Nov) as reported by TRM Labs and The Coin Republic; Elliptic via The Crypto Times (7 Nov); THORChain status; our own flow cases for the Binance and Bitget thefts.*\n\n---\nOriginally published on nokycswap.me: https:\/\/nokycswap.me\/blog\/binance-week-one-thorchain-bitget-link\/","image":null,"pubkey":"d27cb1137d3c6e1e2b132eb802db2175524c11c0bf71b1ff753c0369a706e04d","kind":30023,"createdAt":"2026-11-07T13:41:01+00:00","publishedAt":"2026-11-07T00:00:00+00:00","topics":["nokycswap","privacy","investigation"],"url":"https:\/\/decentnewsroom.com\/mag\/nokycswap-me\/cat\/nokycswap-thefts-incidents\/d\/binance-week-one-thorchain-bitget-link"},{"title":"Wagyu\u0027s order data leaked: deposits, Monero addresses and IPs from July to October","slug":"wagyu-data-leak-2026-10-27","summary":"An extortion group published Wagyu.xyz order data after the operator refused to pay. About 38,600 orders and 10,100 IP addresses from 18 July to 26 October 2026; the operator confirmed it. What leaked, who is affected and what to do.","content":"Wagyu.xyz is a no-account swap service that routes trades through Relay solvers; we tested it with our own money on 30 October and it paid. Three days earlier its order database had already been published.\n\n## What happened\nOn 27 October the WhiteArmor extortion group published order data it attributed to Wagyu.xyz, after the operator declined a demand of $5 million. Hudson Rock analysed the files: 38,628 order records and 10,139 distinct IP addresses, covering 18 July to 26 October 2026. In 4,580 completed cross-chain orders, one row ties together the incoming deposit transaction, the Monero address that received the payout and the IP address of the client.\n\nAccording to xmr.club, the operator confirmed on 28 October that the last three months of data had leaked and that no funds were lost. The operator called keeping IP addresses standard practice. Orders that users had deleted were still in the data.\n\n## Who is affected\nAnyone who swapped through Wagyu between 18 July and 26 October 2026. Our own test swap on 30 October falls after the leaked window.\n\nMonero itself is not broken by this. What leaked is the record around it: which deposit paid for which XMR address, and from which IP the order was placed.\n\n## What to do if you used Wagyu in that window\n- Treat the Monero address that received the payout as linked to your deposit and your IP. Receive future payments on a new address.\n- If the IP was your home or work connection, assume it is now tied to that swap.\n- For future swaps, prefer services that state they keep no IP logs, and use Tor. Our scores take a service\u0027s IP logging and how long it keeps order data into account.\n\n## What we changed\n- Wagyu\u0027s status is now **caution**, and the leak is in our incident registry with its sources.\n- Its score dropped: a data leak counts \u22121.0 under our methodology for twelve months.\n- xmr.club lowered its grade for Wagyu from A- to C for the same reason.\n\n*Sources: Hudson Rock analysis as reported by Cyberpress; xmr.club review of Wagyu (operator statement of 28 October); our own test swap of 30 October.*\n\n---\nOriginally published on nokycswap.me: https:\/\/nokycswap.me\/blog\/wagyu-data-leak-2026-10-27\/","image":null,"pubkey":"d27cb1137d3c6e1e2b132eb802db2175524c11c0bf71b1ff753c0369a706e04d","kind":30023,"createdAt":"2026-11-07T14:41:00+00:00","publishedAt":"2026-11-07T00:00:00+00:00","topics":["nokycswap","privacy","investigation"],"url":"https:\/\/decentnewsroom.com\/mag\/nokycswap-me\/cat\/nokycswap-thefts-incidents\/d\/wagyu-data-leak-2026-10-27"},{"title":"Binance lost ~$6.3B to one compromised laptop. What it means if you swap without KYC","slug":"binance-hack-6-3b-what-it-means-for-no-kyc-users","summary":"Binance says a compromised DevOps engineer\u0027s laptop let an attacker submit withdrawals worth about $6.3 billion. What is confirmed, what our monitoring of no-KYC swaps showed in the hours after, and the custody lesson.","content":"On 29 October 2026, large unauthorised withdrawals left Binance. By the next morning the exchange had put a number and a likely cause on it.\n\n## What Binance has confirmed\n\nIn a statement on X at 02:25 UTC on 30 October, Binance said its initial investigation suggests the incident \u00abmay involve a compromised DevOps engineer\u0027s laptop\u00bb, which let an attacker reach a service container and submit unauthorised withdrawal transactions. It said it had found no evidence that wallet private keys leaked, and estimated the total impact at about **$6.3 billion** \u2014 the largest crypto theft on record.\n\nAbout **$3 billion** of the affected assets has been frozen on-chain, including roughly $2.3 billion in USDT and USDC frozen by their issuers. Other platforms joined the response: Aave froze its Avalanche markets and Arbitrum locked about $30.5 million. Binance says it will cover all losses from its SAFU fund and company funds. Deposits and withdrawals are paused while it rebuilds the withdrawal service.\n\nNobody has claimed the attack and Binance has not named a culprit; blockchain-analytics firms, TRM among them, have said North Korea is almost certainly behind it. The attacker has been moving funds through decentralised exchanges and lending protocols.\n\n## Update, 30 October\n\n- **Attribution:** crypto investigators link the attack to the North Korean group TraderTraitor, citing links to a previous hack (as reported by Cointelegraph). Binance has not named a culprit.\n- **Speed:** most of the funds left within about 20 minutes, according to TRM Labs (as reported by VPNLab).\n- **Withdrawals:** Binance says it aims to resume withdrawals within 48 hours (as reported by Seeking Alpha).\n- **Binance\u0027s founder:** Changpeng Zhao confirmed on X that the incident appears to be a hack and said the company would survive it.\n\n## What our monitor saw in no-KYC swaps\n\nMany instant exchangers rely on liquidity from large exchanges, so a pause at the biggest one could, in theory, ripple into delays, paused pairs or missing quotes. We checked our own data for the 18 hours after the incident and compared it with the same hours of the week before.\n\n- **All 13 services we quote every minute kept quoting.** None stopped, and none lost a meaningful share of its quotes.\n- **Every service in our catalog stayed reachable on clearnet** over those 18 hours.\n\nThat is a narrow measurement: it says the services answered and quoted, not that every rate was as good as usual \u2014 we did not compare rates for this note.\n\n## What it means for you\n\n- **A balance on an exchange is a claim, not coins.** Binance\u0027s users are covered, by Binance\u0027s promise \u2014 but today they cannot withdraw. Keep on any exchange only what you are actively trading.\n- **Non-custodial swaps keep you out of this class of risk most of the time:** your coins are in your wallet before and after the swap. During the swap you still trust the service with your deposit \u2014 check its status, and prefer fixed-rate orders for larger amounts.\n- **Expect impersonation after large hacks.** \u00abRefund\u00bb, \u00abcompensation\u00bb and \u00abrecovery\u00bb offers that ask you to connect a wallet or pay a fee are a common pattern after incidents of this size. Binance announces through its own channels; nothing legitimate asks you to send coins to get coins back.\n\nWe keep a case file on the incident and will report where the funds move.\n\n## Sources\n\n- Binance statement on X, 30 October 2026, 02:25 UTC (quoted in the outlets below).\n- CoinDesk: Binance loses over $6 billion in the largest crypto hack to date.\n- Fortune: What we know about the Binance hack.\n- CryptoBriefing: Binance says compromised DevOps engineer\u0027s laptop may have enabled $6.3B security incident.\n- The Crypto Times: frozen amount rising from $2.54B to $3B; Aave and Arbitrum freezes.\n- Cointelegraph: North Korea\u0027s TraderTraitor linked to $6.3B Binance hack.\n- VPNLab, citing TRM Labs: most funds left in about 20 minutes.\n- Seeking Alpha: Binance aims to resume withdrawals in 48 hours.\n- Kenya Today (and others): Changpeng Zhao on X \u2014 the company will survive.\n\n---\nOriginally published on nokycswap.me: https:\/\/nokycswap.me\/blog\/binance-hack-6-3b-what-it-means-for-no-kyc-users\/","image":null,"pubkey":"d27cb1137d3c6e1e2b132eb802db2175524c11c0bf71b1ff753c0369a706e04d","kind":30023,"createdAt":"2026-10-30T10:41:00+00:00","publishedAt":"2026-10-30T00:00:00+00:00","topics":["nokycswap","privacy","investigation"],"url":"https:\/\/decentnewsroom.com\/mag\/nokycswap-me\/cat\/nokycswap-thefts-incidents\/d\/binance-hack-6-3b-what-it-means-for-no-kyc-users"},{"title":"Where stolen coins went in October 2026: four routes in one week","slug":"where-stolen-coins-went-october-2026","summary":"Between 20 and 21 October, four sets of stolen funds moved through four different routes \u2014 a mixer, a stablecoin rail to TRON, a cross-chain hop into a privacy pool and a laundering desk on Hyperliquid. Why it matters for anyone who swaps without KYC.","content":"Stolen crypto has to go somewhere. In the week of 20 October we logged four cases in our coin-flow notes, and each one took a different road out. Together they are a fair map of how laundering works this autumn \u2014 and of why an ordinary user\u0027s swap can get caught in the net.\n\n## Route 1: back into the mixer (Drift)\n\nThe Drift Protocol hack in April took about $295 million. For two months the exploiter\u0027s wallets were quiet. On 20 and 21 October they sent about 44,510 ETH \u2014 roughly $109 million \u2014 into Tornado Cash in two tranches, and still held around $138 million in ETH afterwards ([Crypto Briefing](https:\/\/cryptobriefing.com\/drift-exploiter-tornado-cash-109m-ether\/)). The Drift Foundation had said on 1 October that about $9.2 million had been frozen ([The Crypto Times](https:\/\/www.cryptotimes.io\/2026\/10\/21\/drift-protocol-exploiter-moves-61-5m-in-eth-to-tornado-cash-after-2-months\/)).\n\nA mixer is the oldest route and still the biggest by volume. It does not make money clean; it makes the trail expensive to follow.\n\n## Route 2: mixer, then a stablecoin rail to OTC desks (SquidSquad)\n\nZachXBT reported on 21 October that an institution lost about $2.84 million on BNB Smart Chain on 8 October, in a theft he attributes to the North Korea-linked group SquidSquad. The funds sat for 12 days. Then, on 20 October: 1,111.2 ETH into Tornado Cash, out to three addresses, converted to USDT and bridged from Ethereum to TRON, gathered on two TRON addresses, and passed through intermediaries to Chinese OTC desks \u2014 within minutes ([crypto.news](https:\/\/crypto.news\/north-korea-linked-squidsquad-suspected-in-2-84m-bnb-chain-theft\/), [ChainCatcher](https:\/\/www.chaincatcher.com\/en\/article\/2297812)).\n\nThe speed is the point. A stablecoin can be frozen by its issuer, so the money spends as little time as possible as USDT. It is the same pattern AMLBot describes in its 2026 investigations report: stolen stablecoins are turned into assets nobody can freeze, fast ([our summary](\/blog\/amlbot-2026-report-no-kyc\/)).\n\n## Route 3: a cross-chain hop into a privacy pool (MORPHO)\n\nOn 21 October ZachXBT reported that two addresses of one institution lost 973,000 MORPHO, about $2.3 million, which went straight into Tornado Cash. Both thefts used EIP-7702 account delegation \u2014 a newer way for an attacker to act on behalf of a compromised wallet. One of the addresses had already been drained on 9 October: about $3.5 million in old bridge claims moved from Ethereum to Zcash through NEAR Intents and into Zcash\u0027s Ironwood shielded pool ([Lookonchain](https:\/\/www.lookonchain.com\/feeds\/77968)).\n\nNEAR Intents is a cross-chain swap service we track in our catalog. Appearing on a route does not mean a service did anything wrong \u2014 routes use whatever is fast and liquid \u2014 and we do not mark its review for it. But it shows how ordinary swap infrastructure becomes part of laundering logistics.\n\n## Route 4: a laundering desk with a ticker (FreedomXMR)\n\nOn 20 October ZachXBT described FreedomXMR (ticker FXMR), a swap service that appeared on Hyperliquid Core in August 2026, as a centralized laundering service: by his review, more than 87% of its inflow volume was tied to illicit activity, with over $20 million traced to ransomware, exploits, malware and social engineering. Its operator sources Monero from KuCoin, bought the FXMR ticker at Hyperliquid\u0027s permissionless auction for 518.28 HYPE, and likely runs a swap model similar to Wagyu\u0027s, he wrote; he named b1exch as another such service on the same venue ([crypto.news](https:\/\/crypto.news\/zachxbt-freedomxmr-hyperliquid\/), [Crypto Briefing](https:\/\/cryptobriefing.com\/zachxbt-freedomxmr-illicit-inflows-hyperliquid\/)).\n\nNeither FreedomXMR nor b1exch is in our catalog, and they will not be. The comparison with Wagyu describes how the service is built, not an accusation against Wagyu.\n\n## What does this mean for an ordinary swap?\n\nMost swap services screen incoming coins, and the routes above are exactly what screening tools watch. If coins you receive passed close to one of them \u2014 through a mixer withdrawal, a TRON consolidation address or a flagged hot wallet \u2014 a service that screens may **hold your swap after the deposit** and ask where the funds came from. That is the most common complaint we read, and it is rarely the user\u0027s fault.\n\n1. **Read the service\u0027s screening and KYC terms before you send.** We quote them word for word in each review, with the date we last read them.\n2. **Keep your own history** \u2014 where your coins came from, transaction hashes, order IDs. It is what support will ask for.\n3. **Prefer short custody.** The less time a service holds your coins, the less a screening hit can cost you.\n4. **If a swap is held,** follow our guide [What to do if a no-KYC exchange freezes your funds](\/guides\/frozen-funds\/), and write things down at once: the window for any recovery is measured in hours.\n\n---\nOriginally published on nokycswap.me: https:\/\/nokycswap.me\/blog\/where-stolen-coins-went-october-2026\/","image":null,"pubkey":"d27cb1137d3c6e1e2b132eb802db2175524c11c0bf71b1ff753c0369a706e04d","kind":30023,"createdAt":"2026-10-26T04:41:00+00:00","publishedAt":"2026-10-22T00:00:00+00:00","topics":["nokycswap","privacy","investigation"],"url":"https:\/\/decentnewsroom.com\/mag\/nokycswap-me\/cat\/nokycswap-thefts-incidents\/d\/where-stolen-coins-went-october-2026"},{"title":"NEAR Intents exploit: $3.8M drained a week after it blocked $50M of Bitget funds","slug":"near-intents-exploit-3-8m","summary":"On Oct 1, 2026 NEAR Intents lost about $3.8M through a bug between its Omni deposit and withdrawal system and its contract. What happened and what it means.","content":"## What happened\n\nNEAR Intents lets you swap a token on one blockchain for a token on another. Users state what they want \u2014 an *intent* \u2014 and solvers fill it, with assets moving in and out through the **Omni** deposit and withdrawal infrastructure and its hot wallets.\n\n| time (UTC, Oct 1, 2026) | event |\n|---|---|\n| morning | NEAR Intents\u0027 status page opens incidents for its HOT bridge and for deposits and withdrawals on BNB Smart Chain, Avalanche, Optimism, Polygon, TON, Stellar, Scroll, Plasma, ADI, X Layer and, later, Monad \u2014 about 5\u20137 hours before 13:00 UTC. |\n| ~13:00 | ZachXBT [reports](https:\/\/t.me\/investigations\/365) irregular outflows from NEAR Intents\u0027 BSC hot wallet `0x233c\u2026`, which then stops processing transactions. Funds go to KuCoin and are bridged to Bitcoin. BSC theft address: `0x09fd1f5d9f185067a92493e43aa259ea4ab3ad37`. |\n| afternoon | NEAR Intents [confirms](https:\/\/www.theblock.co\/news\/ecosystems\/2026-10-01-near-intents-halts-services-after-3-8-million-exploit-promises-full-compensation-417404) the incident: a bug in the Omni infrastructure\u0027s interaction with its contract, about $3.8M lost, the contract flaw patched, core services back within about an hour, 11 chains paused for about 12 more hours, full compensation, law enforcement notified. |\n| Oct 2 | The team says it has identified the attacker and posts return addresses with a 48-hour deadline. The funds come back in full the same day; a BNB Chain transaction carries the message \u0022We\u0027ve returned all the funds, we were in the wrong\u0022, and the team closes its investigation ([Cointelegraph](https:\/\/cointelegraph.com\/news\/near-intents-recovers-entire-stolen-38m-after-ultimatum-to-exploiter), [Unchained](https:\/\/finance.yahoo.com\/markets\/crypto\/articles\/near-intents-says-exploited-3-094252429.html)). |\n\nWe read the status page ourselves on October 1. Ethereum, Solana and NEAR were not among the chains with open incidents at that point.\n\n## What is known \u2014 and what is not\n\n**Known:** the loss is a preliminary figure of about $3.8 million; the cause is described as a bug between the Omni deposit\/withdrawal infrastructure and the NEAR Intents contract; the BSC hot wallet was drained; the funds moved to KuCoin and on to Bitcoin; on October 2 the attacker returned the full amount after the team said it had identified them.\n\n**Not known:** the exact mechanism, whether other hot wallets lost funds, who the attacker is and how the team identified them (neither executive has said), why they returned the money, and whether KuCoin froze anything. NEAR Intents promised a post-mortem in the coming days; we could not find it published as of October 8, and we will update this article when it is out.\n\n## The irony that is not a contradiction\n\nA week before its own exploit, NEAR Intents was the protocol that said **no** to the Bitget hackers: its screening layer, SHIELD, [rejected more than $50 million](https:\/\/cointelegraph.com\/news\/near-intents-says-it-blocked-50m-tied-to-bitget-hackers) in attempted transfers. Some commentators now point at the gap.\n\nIt is worth being precise. **Screening** decides whose money a protocol accepts. **Security** is whether the protocol\u0027s own contracts, bridges and hot wallets can be tricked. A protocol can be strict at the door and still have a bug in the wiring \u2014 as NEAR Intents now says it had.\n\n## Three incidents, three kinds of failure\n\n| | Chainflip (Sept 12) | Bitget (Sept 24) | NEAR Intents (Oct 1) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| What it is | Cross-chain swap protocol | Centralized exchange with KYC | Cross-chain intents protocol |\n| Loss | 736,442 USDT | about $387.5M | about $3.8M (preliminary) |\n| Weak point | How it read TRON memos after signing | Internal approval system, reached via a zero-day in third-party software | Interaction between its Omni deposit\/withdrawal infrastructure and its contract |\n| Keys stolen? | No | No | Not reported |\n| Who carries the loss | TRON USDT liquidity providers (repayment pending) | Bitget\u0027s protection fund | Returned by the attacker (Oct 2) |\n\nIn all three, the keys were not the problem. The failures were in the code that decides **when and how** funds move. Our earlier analyses: [Chainflip\u0027s TRON memo exploit](\/blog\/chainflip-tron-memo-exploit\/) and [the Bitget hack](\/blog\/bitget-hack-387m-cross-chain\/).\n\n## What it means if you swap without KYC\n\n- **Check the status page before you deposit.** NEAR Intents publishes one per chain; so do many protocols. An open incident on your chain means wait.\n- **Assets \u0022inside\u0022 a protocol are not in your wallet.** If you hold balances in NEAR Intents \u2014 directly, through HOT Wallet or near.com \u2014 they depend on the protocol\u0027s hot wallets and bridges.\n- **Prefer routes that settle to your own wallet quickly**, and set a refund address where the interface allows it.\n- **Screening and security are separate questions.** Our catalog labels screening for every service; incidents like this one are recorded separately, with sources, on each service\u0027s page.\n\n## Frequently asked questions\n\n**How much was stolen from NEAR Intents?**\nAbout $3.8 million, according to the team\u0027s preliminary report on October 1, 2026. The figure may change when the full technical report is published.\n\n**What caused the NEAR Intents exploit?**\nThe team says it was a bug in how its Omni deposit and withdrawal infrastructure interacted with the NEAR Intents smart contract. Investigator ZachXBT reported irregular outflows from its BNB Chain hot wallet. Technical details have not been published yet.\n\n**Was the stolen money returned?**\nYes. On October 2 the team said it had identified the attacker and set a 48-hour deadline; the funds were returned in full within about a day, and the team closed its investigation. NEAR Intents had also pledged to compensate affected users in full.\n\n**Is it safe to use NEAR Intents now?**\nThe team says the contract flaw is patched. Deposits and withdrawals on 11 chains stayed paused for about 12 more hours after the core service returned on October 1. Check its status page before you deposit. The team promised a post-mortem; we could not find it published as of October 8, so wait for it if you move large amounts.\n\n**Isn\u0027t NEAR Intents the protocol that blocked Bitget\u0027s stolen funds?**\nYes. A week earlier its screening layer, SHIELD, rejected more than $50 million in transfers linked to the Bitget hack. Screening decides who may use a protocol; it does not protect the protocol\u0027s own code and wallets.\n\n## Sources\n\n- NEAR Intents statement on X, October 1, 2026 \u2014 as reported by [The Block](https:\/\/www.theblock.co\/news\/ecosystems\/2026-10-01-near-intents-halts-services-after-3-8-million-exploit-promises-full-compensation-417404), [Crypto Briefing](https:\/\/cryptobriefing.com\/near-intents-bsc-hot-wallet-exploit\/), [ChainCatcher](https:\/\/www.chaincatcher.com\/en\/article\/2293521), [BeInCrypto](https:\/\/beincrypto.com\/near-intents-hacked-3-8-million\/)\n- ZachXBT, [Investigations channel, post 365](https:\/\/t.me\/investigations\/365)\n- NEAR Intents [status page](https:\/\/partners.near-intents.org\/shield\/status), read by us on October 1, 2026\n- Return of the funds: [Cointelegraph](https:\/\/cointelegraph.com\/news\/near-intents-recovers-entire-stolen-38m-after-ultimatum-to-exploiter) \u00b7 [Decrypt](https:\/\/decrypt.co\/380014\/near-intents-recovers-3-8-million-after-48-hour-ultimatum) \u00b7 [Unchained](https:\/\/finance.yahoo.com\/markets\/crypto\/articles\/near-intents-says-exploited-3-094252429.html)\n- Our records: the incident on NEAR Intents\u0027 page in our catalog, and the [losses ledger](\/niche\/losses\/)\n\n*First written on the day of the incident; updated on October 8, 2026 with the return of the funds. It will be updated again when NEAR Intents publishes its post-mortem.*\n\n---\nOriginally published on nokycswap.me: https:\/\/nokycswap.me\/blog\/near-intents-exploit-3-8m\/","image":null,"pubkey":"d27cb1137d3c6e1e2b132eb802db2175524c11c0bf71b1ff753c0369a706e04d","kind":30023,"createdAt":"2026-10-26T01:41:00+00:00","publishedAt":"2026-10-01T00:00:00+00:00","topics":["nokycswap","privacy","investigation"],"url":"https:\/\/decentnewsroom.com\/mag\/nokycswap-me\/cat\/nokycswap-thefts-incidents\/d\/near-intents-exploit-3-8m"},{"title":"LetsExchange has closed: what we measured, and what to do if you used it","slug":"letsexchange-closed","summary":"LetsExchange stopped exchange operations on October 1, 2026 at 07:00 UTC. Our last quote came at 06:59:57. What is known, and what to do with an open order.","content":"## What happened\n\nLetsExchange was an instant exchange and aggregator. It routed swaps to liquidity from centralized and decentralized exchanges. It was in our catalog, with history at the directories we count: xmr.club graded it A, kycnothanks placed it at L3 (tiered KYC), and its own terms allowed KYC on transactions flagged as suspicious.\n\nOn October 1, 2026 its pinned post on X read that LetsExchange \u0022is closing\u0022 and that the team \u0022will fulfill our remaining obligations to users and partners\u0022. Alex J., who earlier spoke for the company as its chief product officer, opened a 12-post thread: \u0022On October 1, 2026, at 07:00 UTC, LetsExchange.io ceases its exchange operations. All exchanges initiated before that time will continue to be processed.\u0022 Its website now shows a closure notice instead of the exchange form.\n\n## What we measured\n\nWe collect quotes from LetsExchange every minute. The record is simple:\n\n| time (UTC, Oct 1) | quotes received |\n|---|---|\n| 00:00\u201306:59 | 336\u2013348 per hour, as on any other day |\n| last quote | 06:59:57 |\n| after 07:00 | none |\n\nOne lesson for anyone who monitors services: the LetsExchange **website still answers normally** \u2014 it now serves the closure notice. A check that only asks \u0022is the site up?\u0022 would still say yes. A service is alive when it quotes and swaps, not when its homepage loads.\n\n## If you used LetsExchange\n\n1. **An exchange started before 07:00 UTC on October 1:** the operator says it will be processed. Keep your order ID and the transaction hash of your deposit.\n2. **Nothing has arrived:** write to support@letsexchange.io, from an address you are comfortable using, with the order ID and the deposit transaction hash. Support is available until November 30, 2026.\n3. **Do not send anything to an old deposit address.** Addresses from earlier orders are no longer watched.\n4. **Watch for impostors.** Closures attract fake \u0022recovery\u0022 services and clone sites. LetsExchange support is only the address above; nobody needs your seed phrase to return funds.\n5. **Through an aggregator or a wallet?** If you reached LetsExchange through another service, that service now routes elsewhere \u2014 check which exchange is executing your swap.\n\n## Where it sits in our records\n\nLetsExchange is moved to our [archive](\/archive\/), with the closure date, our last quote and the sources. Its review page stays online as a record. It no longer appears in our catalog or in rate comparisons, and we have stopped requesting its quotes.\n\n## Frequently asked questions\n\n**Is LetsExchange closed?**\nYes. LetsExchange stopped its exchange operations on October 1, 2026 at 07:00 UTC, after five and a half years. Its website now shows a closure notice.\n\n**What happens to an exchange I started before the closure?**\nThe operator says that all exchanges initiated before 07:00 UTC on October 1, 2026 will continue to be processed. If yours has not arrived, contact support@letsexchange.io.\n\n**How long is LetsExchange support available?**\nUntil November 30, 2026, according to the notice on its website.\n\n**Why did LetsExchange close?**\nThe posts we could read do not give a reason. The operator\u0027s full announcement is a 12-post thread on X, which we could not read without an account.\n\n## Sources\n\n- LetsExchange [website notice](https:\/\/letsexchange.io\/), read by us on October 1, 2026\n- LetsExchange [pinned post on X](https:\/\/x.com\/letsexchange_io) and the [first post of Alex J.\u0027s thread](https:\/\/x.com\/3jalex\/status\/2105554228257149207)\n- Our own quote log for LetsExchange, October 1, 2026\n\n*Written on the day of the closure. We will update it if the operator publishes a reason or anything changes for users with open orders.*\n\n---\nOriginally published on nokycswap.me: https:\/\/nokycswap.me\/blog\/letsexchange-closed\/","image":null,"pubkey":"d27cb1137d3c6e1e2b132eb802db2175524c11c0bf71b1ff753c0369a706e04d","kind":30023,"createdAt":"2026-10-26T02:41:05+00:00","publishedAt":"2026-10-01T00:00:00+00:00","topics":["nokycswap","privacy","investigation"],"url":"https:\/\/decentnewsroom.com\/mag\/nokycswap-me\/cat\/nokycswap-thefts-incidents\/d\/letsexchange-closed"},{"title":"Bitget hack: how $387.5M moved through cross-chain swaps \u2014 and what it means if you swap without KYC","slug":"bitget-hack-387m-cross-chain","summary":"Bitget lost $387.5M on Sept 24, 2026. How attackers got in, how the funds moved through THORChain and NEAR Intents, and how to avoid tainted coins.","content":"## What happened at Bitget\n\nBitget is a large centralized exchange that requires KYC \u2014 it is not a service we review. We cover this breach because of where the stolen funds went next: through the same cross-chain swap infrastructure our readers use every day.\n\n| date (UTC) | event |\n|---|---|\n| Aug 31 | The earliest malicious activity SlowMist and Mandiant found in Bitget\u0027s logs: a zero-day vulnerability in a service on a third-party security product ([Cointelegraph](https:\/\/cointelegraph.com\/news\/bitget-hack-zero-day-slowmist-investigation)). |\n| Sept 24, 18:31\u201321:23 | Unauthorized transfers run for about three hours \u2014 02:31 to 05:23 on Sept 25 in UTC+8, the time zone of [SlowMist\u0027s report](https:\/\/www.bleepingcomputer.com\/news\/security\/bitget-hacked-via-zero-day-in-third-party-security-products\/). Bitget halts withdrawals and reports $351.6 million affected. |\n| Sept 25 | Bitget [revises the total to about $387.5 million](https:\/\/panews.io\/articles\/01a0d8ea-bdbf-7271-99ff-a6a61d327005) after counting Zcash and TRON transfers, launches a recovery bounty and a live tracking dashboard. ZachXBT [says he has no plans to monitor](https:\/\/www.cryptotimes.io\/2026\/09\/25\/security-researcher-zachxbt-says-he-will-not-monitor-bitget-hack-incident\/) the case. |\n| Sept 26\u201328 | THORChain declines Bitget\u0027s request to refuse the attacker\u0027s addresses; NEAR Intents reports blocking over $50 million in attempted transfers. |\n| Sept 28 | ZachXBT [publishes five accounts](https:\/\/www.cryptotimes.io\/2026\/09\/28\/zachxbt-exposes-5-launderers-moving-387-5m-bitget-hack-funds-for-north-korea\/) he says are laundering the funds. Bitget restarts Bitcoin withdrawals. |\n| Sept 30 | Bitget [restores BTC, ETH and USDT withdrawals](https:\/\/www.bitbase.com\/news\/bitget-brings-back-usdt-withdrawals-after-387m-hack) and publishes a proof of reserves showing a 131% reserve ratio across 19 assets. It also says its protection fund is [back above $300 million](https:\/\/www.cryptotimes.io\/2026\/09\/30\/bitget-protection-fund-back-above-300m-after-387-5m-hack-p2p-withdrawals-return-october-2\/), restored with its own capital. |\n| Oct 1 | Chainalysis [attributes the theft to North Korea-linked actors](https:\/\/www.chainalysis.com\/blog\/387m-bitget-theft-2026\/) and reports that $387 million left Bitget in 23 transfers during the first three hours. |\n| Oct 2 | Bitget\u0027s CEO tells [CNBC](https:\/\/www.cnbc.com\/2026\/10\/02\/bitget-crypto-stolen-hack-recovery.html) that about $1.1 million has been frozen and that she does not expect to recover much. The last withdrawal phase \u2014 other tokens, fiat and P2P \u2014 is scheduled for 08:00 UTC. |\n\nThe affected assets included ETH, XRP, BNB, AVAX, USDT and USDC on Ethereum, XRP Ledger, Arbitrum, Avalanche, Optimism, BNB Chain and Base, [CEO Gracy Chen said](https:\/\/www.bleepingcomputer.com\/news\/security\/bitget-hacked-via-zero-day-in-third-party-security-products\/).\n\n## How the attackers got in\n\nThis was not a stolen-key hack. According to Bitget\u0027s own account, relayed by [Fortune](https:\/\/fortune.com\/2026\/09\/25\/north-korea-bitget-387-million-crypto-attack) and [BleepingComputer](https:\/\/www.bleepingcomputer.com\/news\/security\/bitget-hacked-via-zero-day-in-third-party-security-products\/), and the findings of the two firms it hired, SlowMist and Mandiant:\n\n1. The attackers exploited a **zero-day vulnerability in third-party security software** used by the exchange. The earliest malicious activity in the logs dates to **August 31** \u2014 more than three weeks before any money moved.\n2. They reached the management platform of a second security product by **impersonating an internal employee**, and obtained **internal credentials**.\n3. Mandiant found that on September 24 the attacker had privileged access to both security appliances and, through one of them, **moved to the production wallet job server and deployed malicious packages**.\n4. With a **custom withdrawal tool** they **forged transfer data** so that fraudulent withdrawals looked legitimate, and Bitget\u0027s **approval process signed them**. SlowMist also found attempts to tamper with withdrawal records and to trigger additional BTC withdrawals ([Odaily](https:\/\/www.odaily.news\/en\/newsflash\/521500)).\n5. The transfers came only from **hot and warm wallets**. Bitget says its cold wallets and the separate Bitget Wallet product were not affected.\n\nBitget says the flaw is fixed and that there have been no further unauthorized transfers ([The Block](https:\/\/www.theblock.co\/news\/business\/2026-09-28-bitget-starts-phased-withdrawal-resumption-416965)).\n\nThe lesson is uncomfortable for every custodial service: an approval system is only as strong as the software it trusts. The keys were never touched \u2014 the process that decides when to use them was.\n\n## Who was behind it?\n\nBitget says it suspects North Korean attackers; its CEO cited IP addresses matching the VPN infrastructure of a North Korea-linked group. Since then, analytics firms have gone further: **Elliptic** assessed a link as highly likely, citing on-chain overlaps with earlier North Korea-attributed thefts, and on **October 1 Chainalysis [attributed the theft to North Korea-linked actors](https:\/\/www.chainalysis.com\/blog\/387m-bitget-theft-2026\/)**, saying it pushes thefts by North Korea-linked groups in 2026 past $1 billion. These are assessments by private firms. **As far as we can find, no government has formally attributed the attack.**\n\nWhat has been published concerns the laundering, not the breach itself. On September 28, ZachXBT named five accounts he says are moving the stolen funds on behalf of the suspected attackers, and matched each to a transaction. He says they asked for help with stuck transactions in the public Discord and Telegram channels of services they were using. One of them \u2014 known as \u0022lolo\u0022, also referred to as \u0022Alias 4\u0022 \u2014 [also laundered funds](https:\/\/en.cryptonomist.ch\/2026\/09\/28\/bitget-hack-investigation\/) from the $292 million Kelp DAO exploit in April. ZachXBT says he has seen the same pattern after several exploits attributed to the North Korea-linked group known as TraderTraitor, and plans to publish more data.\n\nAs [one analysis notes](https:\/\/finance.yahoo.com\/markets\/crypto\/articles\/387m-bitget-hack-trail-leads-121038471.html), this evidence does not by itself prove who carried out the breach.\n\n## Where the money went\n\nThe stolen funds were split across chains and services. ZachXBT and others report movement through **cross-chain bridges and swap protocols, including THORChain**, and into the bitcoin mixer **Wasabi**.\n\nTwo kinds of freezes have happened so far:\n\n- **Stablecoin issuers** froze about $318,000: Tether [roughly 218,000 USDT](https:\/\/www.chaincatcher.com\/en\/article\/2292403) and Circle about 100,000 USDC.\n- **NEAR Intents** froze about **$503,000** during execution and rejected the rest of more than $50 million it flagged.\n\nThat is less than 0.3% of the total.\n\n**Update, September 30:** ZachXBT [reports](https:\/\/t.me\/investigations\/364) that about **18,900 ZEC (around $28.3 million)** of the stolen funds came from Bitget\u0027s Zcash hot wallet, and that the suspected attackers began moving about 2,700 ZEC into Zcash\u0027s shielded **Ironwood** pool. Blockchain tracker MistTrack reported on October 1 that addresses linked to the attackers were still converting DAI and bridging it to TRON.\n\n**Update, October 2 \u2014 where the money went.** Blockchain security firm BlockSec traced the funds using Bitget\u0027s published attacker addresses and a September 29 snapshot ([BlockSec](https:\/\/blocksec.com\/blog\/bitget-hack-laundering-fund-tracing), as reported by [crypto.news](https:\/\/crypto.news\/bitget-hack-where-did-the-stolen-387m-go\/)):\n\n- **First 41 minutes:** about $75.5 million in freezable stablecoins (USDT, USDC, USDT0) was swapped into ETH and AVAX through Uniswap, UniswapX, 1inch and MetaMask\u0027s built-in swap \u2014 before Bitget announced the breach.\n- **Cross-chain:** about **$269 million in pass-through value moved through THORChain** (7,804 transactions) and about **$37.3 million through Chainflip**; other routes included USDT0\/LayerZero, Circle\u0027s CCTP, Across and Stargate. The figures overlap: the same funds can pass through several protocols.\n- **Still with the attacker:** about $342 million (88.3% of the total) five days in, roughly 83.7% of it in bitcoin (about 3,386 BTC). About $3.9 million had entered CoinJoin transactions.\n- **Frozen in public: about $840,000 \u2014 0.2%.** Tether and Circle immobilized about $340,000; NEAR Intents stopped about $503,000 during execution while about $166,000 passed through (its own disclosure gives an error margin of up to 10%).\n- THORChain declined Bitget\u0027s request to reject the attacker\u0027s addresses, saying its emergency halts protect the protocol and are not selective freezes.\n- BlockSec cautions that the overlaps with earlier DPRK-attributed attacks point to reused laundering groups rather than proof of who the attacker is; no law-enforcement agency has attributed the breach.\n\nFor readers comparing cross-chain services: Chainflip lets brokers and whitelisted screeners reject flagged deposits, and about $37 million still passed through it \u2014 screening narrows a route, it does not close it. Gracy Chen has said she is [not very optimistic](https:\/\/www.hokanews.com\/2026\/09\/bitget-ceo-says-recovery-of-388-million.html) about recovery: once funds have crossed chains, freezing gets hard.\n\n**Update, October 8.** Chainalysis says the first wave \u2014 $387 million in 23 transfers over three hours \u2014 landed on Ethereum (49.7%), the XRP Ledger (40.8%), Zcash (7.6%) and Tron (1.8%), and that tens of millions of dollars in stolen XRP were fed into cross-chain liquidity protocols and came out as bitcoin over about a day and a half ([CoinsPress](https:\/\/coinspress.com\/chainalysis-maps-how-north-korean-hackers-moved-bitgets-387m\/), summarizing the report). In the same coverage, TRM Labs traced BNB and TRX through THORChain and smaller amounts through Across, Bridgers, Chainflip and FixedFloat. FixedFloat is one of the services in our catalog; sitting on a laundering route is not a finding about a service\u0027s own conduct, and we note it only so that readers can see the route. About **$1.1 million** has now been frozen \u2014 under 0.3% \u2014 according to Bitget\u0027s CEO; frozen is not the same as returned.\n\n## NEAR Intents vs THORChain: two answers to the same question\n\nThe Bitget hack turned a long-running debate into a live test. What should a cross-chain protocol do when stolen money arrives?\n\n| | NEAR Intents | THORChain |\n|---|---|---|\n| What it did | Its screening layer **SHIELD** flagged and rejected more than **$50 million** in attempted transfers; froze about **$503,000** during execution; about **$166,000** passed through | **Declined** Bitget\u0027s request to refuse service to the attacker\u0027s addresses |\n| Stated position | Will actively fight the laundering of hacked funds; frozen funds to be returned through a legal process; **waived** Bitget\u0027s 5% + 5% bounty | It is \u0022decentralized and permissionless like Bitcoin, Ethereum, and BNB Chain\u0022 |\n| Where screening sits | On integrated quote flows, before the swap; its documentation says coverage can vary by flow | Not at protocol level; interfaces built on top may screen |\n| Sources | [Cointelegraph](https:\/\/cointelegraph.com\/news\/near-intents-says-it-blocked-50m-tied-to-bitget-hackers), [NEAR Intents docs](https:\/\/docs.near-intents.org\/security-compliance\/risk-and-compliance) | [Cointelegraph Magazine](https:\/\/cointelegraph.com\/magazine\/does-thorchain-face-a-criminal-reckoning-near-intents-bitget) |\n\nNote what happened to the money NEAR Intents rejected: it [moved to other providers](https:\/\/cointelegraph.com\/news\/near-intents-says-it-blocked-50m-tied-to-bitget-hackers). Screening at one door does not stop the money; it changes which door it uses.\n\nTHORChain has been here before. It was used to swap a large share of the funds from the $1.46 billion Bybit hack in 2025. Lawyers [now argue](https:\/\/cointelegraph.com\/magazine\/does-thorchain-face-a-criminal-reckoning-near-intents-bitget) over whether \u0022decentralized\u0022 is a defense, and over whether NEAR\u0027s blocking shows that its system can be made to block in other situations too.\n\n## What our own data shows\n\nWe label screening for every service in our catalog: what is checked, when, and by whom, quoted from each service\u0027s own terms or documentation. As of October 8, 2026:\n\n- **Cross-chain protocols:** Relay, NEAR Intents and Garden screen **addresses before the swap starts**; deBridge checks the country you connect from. THORChain and Maya do not screen at protocol level. At Chainflip, brokers \u2014 and whitelisted screeners acting through any broker \u2014 can reject flagged deposits.\n- **Instant exchanges:** of the 20 in our catalog, **11 risk-score incoming coins after your deposit arrives** \u2014 all 8 that are listed and 3 of the 12 still under review. Two check the country you connect from, one screens addresses, and for five we found no screening mentioned in their terms. For one we could not read the terms at all.\n\nIn other words, \u0022no KYC\u0022 rarely means \u0022no checks\u0022. The checks have moved: from your identity to your coins.\nSee the [catalog](\/reviews\/) \u2014 each service shows its screening label, with the full quote and source on its review page.\n\n## If you swap without KYC: how to avoid tainted coins\n\nAfter a hack of this size, stolen coins spread. Most of them will never touch you, but here is how to keep it that way.\n\n**Before you swap**\n\n- **Know where your coins came from.** If someone sends you funds with no clear history, do not swap them straight away.\n- **Read the screening label** of the service. A service that screens before the swap rejects you early; one that screens after your deposit can hold your coins.\n- **Always set a refund address** when the service allows it, so a rejected swap comes back to you, not into a support queue.\n- **Check large incoming payments** against public lists. Bitget published an attacker-address dashboard and API; ZachXBT\u0027s posts list transaction hashes.\n\n**If your swap is held**\n\n1. Do **not** send more funds to \u0022unlock\u0022 it.\n2. Ask support **in writing** which clause of their terms they rely on.\n3. Keep your **order ID**, deposit and payout transaction hashes, and screenshots of the quote.\n4. Read what the service\u0027s own terms say about holds and refunds \u2014 we quote them, with paragraph numbers, in our [frozen-funds guide](\/guides\/frozen-funds\/).\n5. If you do not want to publish your evidence, you can still prove later that you had it today: submit only its sha256 hash in the comment form of the service\u0027s review \u2014 we timestamp it in Bitcoin.\n\n## Will Bitget users get their money back?\n\nBitget says user balances were unaffected and that its user protection fund covers the loss. The fund held about **$465 million** when the incident was disclosed. It fell below $200 million, according to [Bloomberg\u0027s calculation](https:\/\/www.cnbc.com\/2026\/10\/02\/bitget-crypto-stolen-hack-recovery.html) from the fund\u0027s published addresses, and Bitget says it has since restored it to more than **$300 million** (about $309 million) with its own capital. The fund is separate from the reserves behind customer balances, which Bitget reports at 131%; users can check their balances through its Merkle-tree tool. Withdrawals were restored in stages from September 28. The last phase \u2014 other tokens, fiat and P2P \u2014 was scheduled for October 2, and we could not find Bitget\u0027s own confirmation that it completed, so check its status page.\n\nRecovering the stolen funds themselves is another matter. Bitget\u0027s recovery bounty pays 5% for helping freeze funds and another 5% for recovering them. About **$1.1 million** has been frozen so far, and Bitget\u0027s CEO told CNBC on October 2 that she does not expect to recover much.\n\n## Frequently asked questions\n\n**How much was stolen in the Bitget hack?**\nAbout $387.5 million. Bitget first reported $351.6 million on September 24, 2026, and raised the figure after counting Zcash and TRON transfers it had missed; it says the increase reflects fuller accounting, not a second theft.\n\n**Were Bitget users\u0027 funds lost?**\nBitget says user balances were unaffected and its protection fund covers the loss. The fund held about $465 million when the incident was disclosed, fell below $200 million according to Bloomberg\u0027s calculation, and has been restored to more than $300 million with Bitget\u0027s own capital. Withdrawals were restored in stages from September 28; the last phase was scheduled for October 2.\n\n**Was North Korea behind the Bitget hack?**\nBitget suspects North Korean attackers, and analytics firms now agree: Elliptic calls a link highly likely, and Chainalysis attributed the theft to North Korea-linked actors in a report on October 1. As far as we can find, no government has issued a formal attribution. ZachXBT\u0027s published evidence concerns the people laundering the funds, not the people who carried out the breach.\n\n**Has any of the stolen money been recovered?**\nVery little. Bitget\u0027s CEO said on October 2 that about $1.1 million had been frozen \u2014 under 0.3% of the total \u2014 and that frozen funds had not necessarily been returned to the exchange. She said she does not expect to recover much.\n\n**Why did NEAR Intents block the funds while THORChain did not?**\nNEAR Intents runs a screening layer called SHIELD on its quote flows and rejected more than $50 million in attempted transfers. THORChain says it is decentralized and permissionless and does not selectively refuse transactions.\n\n**Could I receive stolen Bitget coins in a no-KYC swap?**\nIt is possible if you swap with someone who received them. Most instant exchanges we track risk-score incoming coins after your deposit, so tainted funds can lead to a hold or a request for source-of-funds information.\n\n**What should I do if my swap is held after a big hack?**\nDo not send more funds to unlock it. Ask support in writing which clause they rely on, keep your order ID and transaction hashes, and read what that service\u0027s own terms say about holds and refunds.\n\n## Sources\n\n- Bitget and Gracy Chen, incident updates on X and Bitget Support, September 24\u201330, 2026 \u2014 via [PANews](https:\/\/panews.io\/articles\/01a0d8ea-bdbf-7271-99ff-a6a61d327005), [Fortune](https:\/\/fortune.com\/2026\/09\/25\/north-korea-bitget-387-million-crypto-attack), [Crypto Briefing](https:\/\/cryptobriefing.com\/bitget-reveals-attack-path-behind-387-5m-breach-as-bitcoin-withdrawals-restart)\n- [BleepingComputer: zero-day in third-party security products](https:\/\/www.bleepingcomputer.com\/news\/security\/bitget-hacked-via-zero-day-in-third-party-security-products\/)\n- [Cointelegraph: NEAR Intents blocked $50M](https:\/\/cointelegraph.com\/news\/near-intents-says-it-blocked-50m-tied-to-bitget-hackers) \u00b7 [Cointelegraph Magazine on THORChain](https:\/\/cointelegraph.com\/magazine\/does-thorchain-face-a-criminal-reckoning-near-intents-bitget)\n- ZachXBT\u0027s findings, as reported by [Crypto Times](https:\/\/www.cryptotimes.io\/2026\/09\/28\/zachxbt-exposes-5-launderers-moving-387-5m-bitget-hack-funds-for-north-korea\/) and [The Cryptonomist](https:\/\/en.cryptonomist.ch\/2026\/09\/28\/bitget-hack-investigation\/)\n- [NEAR Intents: Risk \u0026 Compliance](https:\/\/docs.near-intents.org\/security-compliance\/risk-and-compliance)\n- SlowMist and Mandiant findings: [Cointelegraph](https:\/\/cointelegraph.com\/news\/bitget-hack-zero-day-slowmist-investigation) \u00b7 [Crypto Times](https:\/\/www.cryptotimes.io\/2026\/09\/30\/bitget-387-5m-hack-slowmist-and-mandiant-say-zero-day-attack-began-weeks-before-theft\/)\n- [Chainalysis: the $387 million Bitget theft](https:\/\/www.chainalysis.com\/blog\/387m-bitget-theft-2026\/), October 1 \u00b7 [CoinsPress summary](https:\/\/coinspress.com\/chainalysis-maps-how-north-korean-hackers-moved-bitgets-387m\/) \u00b7 [Beinsure on Elliptic\u0027s assessment](https:\/\/beinsure.com\/news\/bitgets-357-mn-crypto-hack-linked-to-north-korea\/)\n- [CNBC: Bitget CEO on recovery and the protection fund](https:\/\/www.cnbc.com\/2026\/10\/02\/bitget-crypto-stolen-hack-recovery.html), October 2\n- Our own screening labels: [catalog](\/reviews\/) \u00b7 [methodology](\/methodology\/)\n\n*This article is updated as the investigation continues; last updated October 8, 2026. We do not review Bitget and have no commercial relationship with it, THORChain or NEAR Intents.*\n\n---\nOriginally published on nokycswap.me: https:\/\/nokycswap.me\/blog\/bitget-hack-387m-cross-chain\/","image":null,"pubkey":"d27cb1137d3c6e1e2b132eb802db2175524c11c0bf71b1ff753c0369a706e04d","kind":30023,"createdAt":"2026-10-25T23:41:00+00:00","publishedAt":"2026-10-01T00:00:00+00:00","topics":["nokycswap","privacy","investigation"],"url":"https:\/\/decentnewsroom.com\/mag\/nokycswap-me\/cat\/nokycswap-thefts-incidents\/d\/bitget-hack-387m-cross-chain"},{"title":"Chainflip\u0027s $736K TRON exploit: how one signed transaction got paid twice","slug":"chainflip-tron-memo-exploit","summary":"On Sept 12, 2026 an attacker drained 736,442 USDT from Chainflip\u0027s TRON vault by adding a memo to already-signed transactions. What happened, who pays, what it means.","content":"## What Chainflip is\n\nChainflip is a cross-chain swap protocol: it moves value between blockchains such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana and TRON **without wrapped tokens or traditional bridges**. Liquidity providers deposit assets into vaults that a set of validators control, and swaps are settled from those vaults. TRON \u2014 with native TRX and USDT on TRON (TRC-20) \u2014 went live on Chainflip in [mid-June 2026](https:\/\/www.cryptotimes.io\/2026\/09\/13\/chainflip-halts-network-after-736k-tron-usdt-exploit-users-to-be-made-whole\/).\n\n## What happened, in order\n\n| date (UTC) | event |\n|---|---|\n| Aug 2026 | Chainflip contains a separate exploit attempt on Ethereum\u0027s cross-chain messaging and refund logic; [no user losses](https:\/\/blockfence.io\/chainflip-loses-736k-in-tron-usdt-memo-exploit-pauses-network-wide-swaps\/). |\n| Sept 10 | USDT on TRON is added to Chainflip Lending. |\n| Sept 12, 01:44\u201303:10 | The attacker removes USDT from the TRON vault: eight attempts over about 90 minutes, starting small and roughly doubling; six produce unauthorized payouts. Chainflip notices when later USDT payouts start to fail, and pauses swaps. |\n| Sept 13 | Chainflip publishes an [incident report](https:\/\/twitter.com\/Chainflip\/status\/2099080597281145040): 736,442.17 USDT lost, the vulnerability is in its own processing of TRON memos, other funds are secure. |\n| Sept 16 | Swaps and quoting [resume across the rest of the network](https:\/\/cryptoslate.com\/chainflip-to-reset-tron-usdt-provider-balances-to-zero-following-736000-exploit\/), TRON excluded. |\n| Sept 17 | Restart plan: TRON USDT liquidity-provider balances are set to zero, what each is owed is copied into a separate on-chain record. |\n\nOne report says the TRON route itself has since restarted with the new accounting; others describe it as still excluded. We could not confirm either from Chainflip directly, so check the route\u0027s status in Chainflip\u0027s own interface before you send TRON USDT.\n\n## How the memo bug worked\n\nOn most chains Chainflip supports, a swap instruction goes into a **dedicated contract function** \u2014 the instruction is part of what gets checked and signed. On TRON, Chainflip instead reads the instruction from a **memo**, a free-text field attached to a transaction.\n\nThat difference is the whole story:\n\n1. Chainflip\u0027s validators sign a payout transaction on TRON \u2014 an ordinary liquidity-provider withdrawal.\n2. Before it settles, the attacker **attaches a new memo** to that already-signed transaction. The memo is not covered by what the validators approved.\n3. Chainflip\u0027s software, watching the transfer, reads the memo as an instruction: **a swap that failed**.\n4. It **issues a refund** for that \u0022failed swap\u0022 \u2014 on top of the withdrawal it had already paid.\n\nRepeat it six times and 736,442.17 USDT is gone. Chainflip\u0027s fix [limits which TRON transfers can carry swap instructions in a memo](https:\/\/cryptoslate.com\/chainflip-to-reset-tron-usdt-provider-balances-to-zero-following-736000-exploit\/).\n\nThe general lesson is older than this incident: **any instruction read after the signature can be changed after the signature.** If a protocol trusts data that its signers never saw, the signature protects less than it seems.\n\n## Who pays\n\nChainflip says the loss falls on **liquidity providers in TRON USDT**. The vault now holds much less USDT than they are owed, so at restart Chainflip closed every open order, strategy and lending position tied to TRON USDT, set those balances to zero and kept the amounts owed in a separate on-chain record. Chainflip has [pledged to make them whole](https:\/\/unchainedcrypto.com\/chainflip-plans-to-restart-with-tron-paused-and-provider-balances-reset\/) but has not said when, or from which funds.\n\nOne user swap of **115,654.41 USDT** that could not be paid during the incident [remained in the vault](https:\/\/blockchainreporter.net\/chainflip-loses-736k-tron-usdt-exploit) and was described as payable after the restart. Chainflip has also flagged the stolen funds with exchanges and other parties in case they surface.\n\n## Chainflip and Bitget: two different failures\n\nTwo weeks after Chainflip, the centralized exchange Bitget lost about $387.5 million \u2014 and part of that money was laundered through cross-chain protocols. The two incidents are often mentioned together, but they are different:\n\n| | Chainflip (Sept 12) | Bitget (Sept 24) |\n|---|---|---|\n| What it is | Cross-chain swap protocol | Centralized exchange with KYC |\n| Loss | 736,442.17 USDT | about $387.5 million |\n| Weak point | How the protocol read TRON memos after signing | Internal approval system, reached through a zero-day in third-party software |\n| Keys stolen? | No | No |\n| Who carries the loss | TRON USDT liquidity providers (repayment pending) | Bitget\u0027s protection fund |\n\nIn both cases the keys were never touched. What failed was the code that decides **when** to use them. Our full analysis of the Bitget case: [Bitget hack: how $387.5M moved through cross-chain swaps](\/blog\/bitget-hack-387m-cross-chain\/).\n\n## What it means if you swap without KYC\n\nCross-chain protocols are often discussed in terms of screening \u2014 whether they block addresses. Chainflip\u0027s case is a reminder of a second, separate risk: **the protocol\u0027s own code**. A route can pause, and liquidity providers can be left waiting, for reasons that have nothing to do with you or your coins.\n\n- **Check the route, not just the protocol.** A protocol can be live while one chain\u0027s route is paused or excluded.\n- **Do not send during a pause.** If a protocol announces an incident, wait for its \u0022resumed\u0022 message before depositing.\n- **Always set a refund address** where the interface allows it.\n- **Liquidity is a loan to the protocol.** If you provide liquidity, you carry the protocol\u0027s bugs \u2014 as TRON USDT providers at Chainflip now do.\n\nChainflip has a separate, screening-related story. Its protocol does not screen addresses; brokers \u2014 and whitelisted screeners acting through any broker \u2014 can reject flagged deposits. We label this for every service in our catalog, with the source quoted on each review page.\n\n## Frequently asked questions\n\n**How much was stolen from Chainflip?**\n736,442.17 USDT, taken from Chainflip\u0027s TRON vault through six unauthorized payouts on September 12, 2026. Chainflip says all other funds were unaffected.\n\n**How did the Chainflip TRON exploit work?**\nOn TRON, Chainflip reads swap instructions from a memo attached to a transaction. The attacker attached a new memo to transactions that Chainflip validators had already signed; Chainflip\u0027s software read it as a failed swap and refunded on top of the ordinary payout, so six withdrawals were paid twice.\n\n**Who lost money in the Chainflip exploit?**\nLiquidity providers in TRON USDT. Chainflip reset their live balances to zero and recorded what each is owed in a separate on-chain balance. It has pledged to make them whole but has not disclosed when or from which funds.\n\n**Is Chainflip working again?**\nChainflip said swaps and quoting resumed across the rest of its network by September 16, 2026, with the TRON route excluded at that point. Check the route\u0027s status before sending TRON USDT.\n\n**Is this the same as the Bitget hack?**\nNo. Bitget, a centralized exchange, lost about $387.5 million when attackers tricked its internal approval system. Chainflip\u0027s loss came from a bug in how its protocol read TRON memos. Both show that the weak point is often the code around the keys, not the keys.\n\n## Sources\n\n- Chainflip, [incident report on X](https:\/\/twitter.com\/Chainflip\/status\/2099080597281145040), September 13, 2026\n- [crypto.news](https:\/\/crypto.news\/chainflip-loses-736442-usdt-in-tron-exploit\/) \u00b7 [CryptoSlate](https:\/\/cryptoslate.com\/chainflip-to-reset-tron-usdt-provider-balances-to-zero-following-736000-exploit\/) \u00b7 [Unchained](https:\/\/unchainedcrypto.com\/chainflip-plans-to-restart-with-tron-paused-and-provider-balances-reset\/) \u00b7 [Crypto Times](https:\/\/www.cryptotimes.io\/2026\/09\/13\/chainflip-halts-network-after-736k-tron-usdt-exploit-users-to-be-made-whole\/) \u00b7 [Blockchain Reporter](https:\/\/blockchainreporter.net\/chainflip-loses-736k-tron-usdt-exploit) \u00b7 [Blockfence](https:\/\/blockfence.io\/chainflip-loses-736k-in-tron-usdt-memo-exploit-pauses-network-wide-swaps\/)\n- Our records: the incident on Chainflip\u0027s page in our catalog, and the [losses ledger](\/niche\/losses\/)\n\n*We do not have a commercial relationship with Chainflip. This article is updated when Chainflip publishes its full post-mortem or a repayment plan.*\n\n---\nOriginally published on nokycswap.me: https:\/\/nokycswap.me\/blog\/chainflip-tron-memo-exploit\/","image":null,"pubkey":"d27cb1137d3c6e1e2b132eb802db2175524c11c0bf71b1ff753c0369a706e04d","kind":30023,"createdAt":"2026-10-26T00:41:00+00:00","publishedAt":"2026-10-01T00:00:00+00:00","topics":["nokycswap","privacy","investigation"],"url":"https:\/\/decentnewsroom.com\/mag\/nokycswap-me\/cat\/nokycswap-thefts-incidents\/d\/chainflip-tron-memo-exploit"}]},{"slug":"nokycswap-reports","title":"Monthly reports","summary":"State of no-KYC \u2014 our monthly report \u2014 and readings of third-party crime reports for people who swap without KYC.","image":null,"url":"https:\/\/decentnewsroom.com\/mag\/nokycswap-me\/cat\/nokycswap-reports","articleCount":2,"articles":[{"title":"State of no-KYC \u2014 October 2026: a $6.3B hack, eleven swaps with our own money, and who screens addresses","slug":"state-of-no-kyc-october-2026","summary":"Our October report on the no-KYC exchange niche: the Binance and NEAR Intents incidents, nine new scam-registry entries, what eleven test swaps with our own funds showed, which services screen sanctioned addresses, terms changes and availability.","content":"October was the month the largest exchange in the world lost more than six billion dollars \u2014 and the month we started paying for our own tests.\n\n## At a glance\n- **54 live services** under observation; 35 have passed our checks, 19 are still being checked. **[LetsExchange stopped operating on 1 October](\/blog\/letsexchange-closed\/).**\n- **One critical incident in the niche:** NEAR Intents lost about **$3.8 million** from its BSC hot wallet.\n- **Nine new entries in our scam registry**; 189 changes in the terms of 51 services, ten of them material.\n- **Median clearnet availability 92.8 %**; twelve services stayed at 99 % or above.\n\n## The month\u0027s thefts\n**Binance**, outside our niche but felt by everyone in it, put the damage of its 29 October incident at about $6.3 billion and said a compromised DevOps engineer\u0027s laptop reached the service that submits withdrawals; about $3 billion was frozen, and Binance says it will cover the losses. We wrote it up separately: [what it means if you swap without KYC](\/blog\/binance-hack-6-3b-what-it-means-for-no-kyc-users\/). In the hours after it, every no-KYC swap on our monitor kept quoting.\n\n**NEAR Intents**, inside the niche, had [about $3.8 million drained](\/blog\/near-intents-exploit-3-8m\/) from a hot wallet and halted services; we keep it under \u00abcaution\u00bb.\n\n## Scams and withheld funds\nWe added nine entries to our scam registry this month: exit scams by **El Capo**, **XMR Escrow** and **Silent Node** (a pay-first \u00aboffshore host\u00bb with fabricated live monitoring, [confirmed after our own walk-through](\/blog\/silent-node-scam-pay-first-hosting\/)), withheld funds at **Swapter** (confirmed) and **GhostSwap** and **OctoSwap** (likely), likely thefts at **RuneSwap** and **KycNot.cc**, and a **disputed** case at Lizex. Each entry shows what we verified and what we did not.\n\n## Eleven swaps with our own money\nFor the first time we funded tests ourselves: small swaps of $37\u201349 through Maya, THORChain, Bitania, BitcoinVN, PegasusSwap, SageSwap, Flashift, CypherGoat, Wagyu, Exolix and Relay. A few results:\n- **Bitania** paid its fixed quote exactly; **BitcoinVN** paid 51 seconds after our deposit confirmed and re-priced in our favour.\n- **SageSwap** works with no JavaScript and no trackers and paid in three minutes, 1.28 % below the market.\n- **PegasusSwap** executed cleanly but at about 12 % below the market \u2014 and **through the CypherGoat aggregator the same desk paid us 9.3 % more**.\n- **Flashift**\u0027s recommended offer failed, and the refund address we gave was dropped from the order twice.\n- **Relay** delivered ETH about one minute after we sent; **Exolix** paid 1.8 % more for the same TRX but took 23 minutes.\n- Three seconds after one payout, a look-alike address sent us dust \u2014 an address-poisoning attempt. Always copy addresses from your wallet, never from your history.\n\nFull findings go into each service\u0027s review as a \u00abTested by a swap\u00bb block.\n\n## Who screens addresses\nWe created orders without funding them, using an address from the US OFAC sanctions list. **All six instant exchanges we checked \u2014 Wagyu, SageSwap, Bitania, BitcoinVN, PegasusSwap and Exolix \u2014 accepted a sanctioned payout address at order creation.** **Relay refused it outright.** **NEAR Intents** refused both a sanctioned payout and a sanctioned refund address before handing out a deposit address, and **LI.FI** refused a sanctioned sender or recipient before returning a route. Accepting at order creation does not show what happens on deposit \u2014 several services say they screen incoming funds, which an unfunded test cannot reveal.\n\n## Terms of service\nOur archive caught **189 changes on 51 services**. Ten were material: two KYC changes, two data-disclosure changes, one jurisdiction change, two major rewrites and three other substantive edits; fifteen were page noise.\n\n## Availability\nThe median service was reachable on clearnet **92.8 %** of October; **twelve stayed at 99 % or above**. Our own checker failed on several days this month (most of 24\u201326 October after a change in our code); those checks are excluded, not counted against services, and we published the correction. Five services block automated checks on some days; they show as \u00abnot measurable\u00bb, never as 0 %.\n\n## Following stolen funds\nWe follow public cases on chain. In the **[Bitget theft](\/blog\/bitget-hack-387m-cross-chain\/)** (about $387 million), at least **$8.27 million** of the funds we track reached a **Binance hot wallet** in three transfers \u2014 Binance is a KYC exchange that can freeze. We also follow Binance itself, Morpho, the SquidSquad BSC theft, NEAR Intents, a [Chainflip-related TRON case](\/blog\/chainflip-tron-memo-exploit\/), EagleSwap and KycNot.cc.\n\n## Method and limits\nEverything here comes from our monitoring, from swaps we paid for, and from the public sources named above. We name services because of what we measured, not to accuse. Corrections are published, not hidden.\n\n---\nOriginally published on nokycswap.me: https:\/\/nokycswap.me\/blog\/state-of-no-kyc-october-2026\/","image":null,"pubkey":"d27cb1137d3c6e1e2b132eb802db2175524c11c0bf71b1ff753c0369a706e04d","kind":30023,"createdAt":"2026-11-01T09:41:01+00:00","publishedAt":"2026-11-01T00:00:00+00:00","topics":["nokycswap","privacy","investigation"],"url":"https:\/\/decentnewsroom.com\/mag\/nokycswap-me\/cat\/nokycswap-reports\/d\/state-of-no-kyc-october-2026"},{"title":"What AMLBot\u0027s 2026 crime report means if you swap without KYC","slug":"amlbot-2026-report-no-kyc","summary":"AMLBot investigated 250+ crypto crime cases this year with $291.6M in reported losses. Hacks dominate exchange cases, and stolen stablecoins are swapped into BTC and ETH within hours, which is why honest swaps get frozen too.","content":"On 16 October AMLBot, a blockchain-analytics company, published a summary of its **Crypto Investigations Report 2026**. It covers more than 250 crypto crime cases the company investigated from 1 January to 13 October 2026, with **$291.6 million** in reported losses: $227.5 million for January\u2013September and $64.1 million in cases opened in the first 13 days of October ([AMLBot](https:\/\/blog.amlbot.com\/crypto-crime-investigation-report-q3-2026\/)).\n\nWhat makes it different from the usual yearly tallies is where the numbers come from. Most of the cases were brought by victims themselves \u2014 individuals, businesses and exchanges \u2014 so the report shows how crypto crime reaches ordinary users, not only the hacks that make headlines. AMLBot itself notes the limits: the losses are what victims reported when a case opened, and people who pay for an investigation tend to have lost more than average.\n\n## What did the report find?\n\n- **Reported losses keep growing, the typical case is getting smaller.** Losses rose from $62.9 million in Q1 to $75.9 million in Q2 and $88.7 million in Q3, while the median loss fell from $223,000 in Q2 to $113,000 in Q3. A few very large cases drive the total.\n- **Hacks are rare but expensive.** In Q3 hacks were 19% of cases but 40% of reported losses ($35.9 million). The median hack was $359,000, against $85,000 for phishing and wallet compromise.\n- **People are the main target.** Phishing, wallet compromise, scams and social engineering made up 72% of cases from January to September. Individual users were the target in 77% of cases.\n- **For exchanges, the threat is hacks.** Centralized exchanges were 7% of cases but 18.8% of reported losses, and 81% of cases involving exchanges and other custodial services were hacks or exploits.\n- **Bitcoin cases are fewer but bigger.** Bitcoin was involved in 20% of cases and had the highest median loss of the four most-involved networks, $364,000. Ethereum (36%) and TRON (33%) \u2014 the two main USDT networks \u2014 appeared most often.\n\n## Why does this matter if you swap without KYC?\n\nOne finding is about money moving, not money lost: AMLBot\u0027s investigators saw **stolen stablecoins converted into BTC and ETH quickly**, through decentralized exchanges and cross-chain routes, so that no issuer could freeze them. The report\u0027s advice to victims is to file freeze requests within hours, because that window closes fast.\n\nThose routes \u2014 a stablecoin in, a native coin out, sometimes across chains \u2014 are exactly what an instant swap does for everyone else. That is why many swap services screen incoming coins, and why a perfectly ordinary swap can be **held after the deposit**: if your coins passed close to a hacked or flagged address, the service\u0027s screening partner may stop the order and ask where the funds came from. It is the most common complaint we read, and it is the reason we quote each service\u0027s KYC and screening terms word for word in its review.\n\nThe report\u0027s exchange numbers point the same way from the other side. If 81% of exchange cases are hacks, then **who holds your coins during a swap** matters. A non-custodial route keeps the window short; a custodial one asks you to trust the operator\u0027s wallets for as long as the order runs.\n\n## What else happened in the niche this week?\n\n- **Pirate Chain (ARRR), 14\u201315 October.** An attacker used two validation flaws in the network\u0027s Ironwood upgrade (activated on 3 October) to create about 39.8 million ARRR \u2014 roughly a fifth of the supply \u2014 inside the coin\u0027s own shielded pool. The team first proposed rolling the chain back to 14 October, then dropped the plan the same day, saying a decentralized network cannot roll back unilaterally ([Startup Fortune](https:\/\/startupfortune.com\/pirate-chain-hack-mints-398-million-arrr-into-its-own-untraceable-pool\/)). If you hold or swap ARRR, check whether your exchange has paused it before you send.\n- **Drift Protocol, 20\u201321 October.** Wallets linked to the April hack of the Solana exchange moved about 44,510 ETH, roughly $109 million, into Tornado Cash over two days; the Drift Foundation said on 1 October that about $9.2 million of some $295 million stolen had been frozen ([Crypto Briefing](https:\/\/cryptobriefing.com\/drift-exploiter-tornado-cash-109m-ether\/), [The Crypto Times](https:\/\/www.cryptotimes.io\/2026\/10\/21\/drift-protocol-exploiter-moves-61-5m-in-eth-to-tornado-cash-after-2-months\/)). Large flows like this are what screening tools watch for \u2014 and what can make coins that later pass nearby look risky.\n- **PHP2Shell, from 21 October.** Two critical flaws in PHP (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, CVSS 9.2) allow remote code execution on PHP servers, with exploitation attempts reported before patches were out ([CoinGape](https:\/\/coingape.com\/crypto-firms-say-they-dont-use-php-after-critical-php2shell-flaw\/)). Smart contracts and cold wallets are not affected; web front ends and dashboards of swap services built on PHP may be. Our site does not run PHP.\n\n## What should you do before your next swap?\n\n1. **Read the service\u0027s KYC and screening terms first** \u2014 in our reviews they are quoted verbatim, with the clause number and the date we last read them.\n2. **Prefer a short custody window.** Non-custodial routes and services that say who holds coins during a swap carry less of the risk the report describes.\n3. **Send a small amount first** on a service you have not used, and keep the order ID and transaction hashes until the coins arrive.\n4. **If a swap is held,** see our guide [What to do if a no-KYC exchange freezes your funds](\/guides\/frozen-funds\/) \u2014 and record everything at once, because, as the report says, the window for any recovery is measured in hours.\n\n---\nOriginally published on nokycswap.me: https:\/\/nokycswap.me\/blog\/amlbot-2026-report-no-kyc\/","image":null,"pubkey":"d27cb1137d3c6e1e2b132eb802db2175524c11c0bf71b1ff753c0369a706e04d","kind":30023,"createdAt":"2026-10-26T03:41:00+00:00","publishedAt":"2026-10-22T00:00:00+00:00","topics":["nokycswap","privacy","investigation"],"url":"https:\/\/decentnewsroom.com\/mag\/nokycswap-me\/cat\/nokycswap-reports\/d\/amlbot-2026-report-no-kyc"}]}],"chapters":[],"stats":{"totalCategories":3,"totalArticles":12,"totalChapters":0}}