The Crimes of Israel’s Government During the Recent Wars and Occupation

A fact-based digest with sources (2018–2025)
The Crimes of Israel’s Government During the Recent Wars and Occupation

A fact-based digest with sources (2018–2025)


Section 1 — Key allegations with supporting evidence

1) Israel “funded Hamas via Qatar”

  • From 2018, the Netanyahu government approved and facilitated Qatari cash deliveries into Hamas-run Gaza (famously the $15m “suitcases” via Erez). Netanyahu publicly defended allowing the money in to “restore calm” and avert humanitarian collapse.
  • Subsequent Israeli reporting said officials warned that the Qatari funds were reaching Hamas’s military wing, while defenders argued the cash was monitored and largely humanitarian.

2) Israel shot children and Palestinians seeking food from aid deliveries

  • Feb. 29, 2024, Gaza City aid incident: over 100 Palestinians were killed around an aid convoy; hospital officials and UN staff described large numbers of gunshot wounds among the injured. Israel said troops fired only at perceived threats while securing the convoy and did not fire at the trucks.
  • Humanitarian convoys under fire: UN OCHA has repeatedly recorded incidents where aid missions came under live fire, access was impeded, and aid-seeking crowds were harmed. (Examples include multiple 2024–2025 flash/situation updates.)
  • Children shot at protests (2018–2019): A UN Commission of Inquiry found IDF snipers killed and wounded protesters including children, medics and journalists during the Great March of Return.

3) “Double-tap” strikes hitting rescuers/journalists

  • An investigation by +972/Local Call collected testimonies and internal accounts alleging a pattern of follow-up strikes that hit people returning to blast sites and rescue workers in Gaza.
  • On the Israel–Lebanon border (Oct. 13, 2023), Reuters’ reconstruction concluded an Israeli tank fired two strikes, killing Reuters videographer Issam Abdallah and injuring six journalists; UNIFIL also described two distinct strikes.

4) “Bombing peace negotiations”

  • While no verified case shows Israel bombing an actual negotiation venue, several strikes have been reported to undermine ongoing truce talks. For example, the killing of senior Hamas figure Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut was widely reported as likely to hamper ceasefire/hostage efforts.

Israel’s responses (for context)

  • On the aid-convoy killings: the IDF says troops “fired precisely” at approaching suspects to protect forces and did not target the convoy; its internal review echoed this.
  • On civilians/rescuers/journalists: Israel denies intentional targeting and says Hamas embeds in civilian areas, complicating combat. (See Reuters’ Lebanon case and IDF statements.)

Section 2 — Targeting of specific body parts

Bottom line: There is strong evidence that Israeli forces aimed at lower limbs (knees/ankles) in 2018–19 Gaza border protests, framed by the IDF as “aim low” to incapacitate; credible first-person accounts describe a competitive, game-like ethos among some snipers. For 2025 aid-line shootings, some doctors reported head/genital wounds, now under review.

  • 2018–2019 “shoot-to-maim”: Israeli outlets reported IDF snipers were instructed to aim for legs, later ankles, to reduce fatalities. UN and medical NGOs documented that the vast majority of live-fire injuries were lower-limb wounds; MSF described unusually severe limb damage requiring reconstruction.
  • Snipers’ “knees” tallies (culture): Interviews with IDF snipers published by Haaretz Magazine (widely summarized) described counting knee hits and trying to break personal “records.”
  • 2025 aid-site pattern claims: A major Guardian investigation documented systematic gunfire at food distribution points and wound patterns including heads and testicles; Israel denies intentionally targeting civilians, and military prosecutors have opened probes.
  • Open-fire changes elsewhere: Israel periodically revised West Bank rules (e.g., permitting shots at fleeing suspects after rock-throwing), showing broader permissive live-fire contexts.

No credible outlet has verified a formalized “body-part-of-the-day” policy (e.g., “Mondays legs, Fridays arms”). Evidence supports persistent limb-targeting directives and boastful subculture, not a scheduled “game.”


Section 3 — Other concerning, well-evidenced patterns

  • Advance warnings and intelligence dismissals (pre–Oct. 7, 2023): Israeli services obtained a ~40-page Hamas “Jericho Wall” battle plan more than a year before the attack; senior officials reviewed it but deemed it aspirational (PBS NewsHour, Sky News). On July 6, 2023, a Unit 8200 analyst warned that Hamas drills matched the blueprint, but her alert was downplayed (The Week). Along the border, female surveillance soldiers (“spotters”) repeatedly flagged unusual Hamas preparations yet say their warnings were ignored (Times of Israel, ABC News). Claims that Egypt warned Israel days in advance are disputed—Egyptian and Israeli officials have issued conflicting statements (Times of Israel, Egypt Today). After the attack, Israel’s military intelligence chief resigned and the Unit 8200 commander later stepped down, citing responsibility for failures (Reuters, The Guardian). Independent reviews highlight cognitive bias and over-reliance on technology as systemic causes of the forewarning miss (CTC, West Point).
  • White phosphorus in populated areas (Gaza & S. Lebanon, Oct–Nov 2023): HRW and Amnesty documented WP use in civilian areas; Israel disputes unlawful use.
  • Wide-area bombs in dense neighborhoods: NYT visual forensics and U.S. actions indicate extensive use of 1,000–2,000-lb bombs; the U.S. paused a shipment of 2,000-lb bombs over civilian-harm concerns (May 2024).
  • Hospitals/health system: UN inquiries flagged a pattern of deadly attacks on and near hospitals and collapse of Gaza’s health system; Reuters covered UN investigators’ findings (Oct. 2024). Israel says hospitals were used militarily by Hamas.
  • AI-assisted mass targeting (“Lavender”): +972/Local Call reported an AI tool used to generate tens of thousands of targets with minimal human review; Le Monde and The Guardian published follow-ups. The IDF says “Lavender” only cross-references intelligence and does not automate kill-lists.
  • Aid workers killed/deconfliction failures: After the World Central Kitchen convoy strike (Apr. 1, 2024), Israel’s own probe cited grave errors and two officers were dismissed; WCK and governments demanded an independent inquiry and said this fits a broader pattern.
  • Record journalist deaths & impunity concerns: CPJ recorded unprecedented journalist fatalities in 2023–2024 centered on Gaza.
  • Starvation/collective punishment: HRW concluded Israel used starvation of civilians as a method of warfare—a war crime under IHL; Israel rejects the characterization.
  • Aid-line killings as a recurring hazard: UN OCHA situation reports repeatedly document lethal incidents at distribution points and along aid routes.
  • West Bank settler violence & displacement with state inaction: B’Tselem and OCHA track escalating settler attacks since Oct. 2023, often with soldiers present/inaction and resulting displacement.
  • Mass detentions & detainee abuse (incl. Sde Teiman): UN experts and rights groups reported widespread arbitrary detention and severe mistreatment; limited Israeli prosecutions have followed amid official denials of systematic abuse.
  • “Hannibal” orders on Oct. 7 inside Israel: Reporting (Haaretz, Times of Israel, Guardian) says senior officers invoked the defunct Hannibal protocol in several locations to stop kidnappings “at all costs,” potentially endangering hostages; the IDF acknowledges failures and some friendly-fire deaths but disputes broader claims.

Section 4 — Information operations & disputed official narratives

  • Meta takedown of an Israel-linked covert network (“STOIC”): Meta’s Adversarial Threat Report (Q1 2024) and major outlets reported removal of 500+ fake accounts posting likely AI-generated pro-Israel comments under U.S./Canadian news and lawmakers’ posts; Meta attributed the network to STOIC, a Tel Aviv political-marketing firm.
  • Ties to an Israeli ministry: The New York Times reporting (summarized by multiple outlets) said the campaign was commissioned by Israel’s Ministry of Diaspora Affairs; the ministry denied running a covert op. (See Politico’s recap.)
  • State-aligned advocacy/astroturf infrastructure: The Act.IL campaign (supported by the Strategic Affairs Ministry) mobilized volunteers with scripted social-media “missions”; later iterations (Kela Shlomo → Concert → Voices of Israel) sought to shape U.S. discourse, with leaked docs showing concerns about U.S. FARA rules.
  • Questionable official “evidence” in high-profile incidents: In the al-Ahli Hospital blast (Oct. 2023), Channel 4 News and Forensic Architecture raised serious doubts about parts of Israel’s presented audio/claims; other credible outlets (e.g., AP) assessed the blast as likely a misfired Palestinian rocket, underscoring contested narratives and the risk of disinformation in wartime.
  • Unverified atrocity claims amplified: The viral “40 beheaded babies” story was not substantiated by the IDF and was widely amplified before evidence existed (see Snopes/Le Monde reconstructions).
  • Broader Israeli private-sector disinfo track record: Facebook previously banned the Archimedes Group for global election manipulation (2019). “Team Jorge”—exposed by an international journalism consortium—offered for-hire disinformation/hacking services.

Notes on standards and dispute

  • Many of the findings above come from UN inquiries, major NGOs (HRW/Amnesty/MSF), and large newsrooms (Reuters/AP/NYT/Guardian). Israel disputes the intent and legality of these allegations, arguing it acts in self-defense under IHL against an adversary embedded among civilians; some incidents remain under ongoing military or judicial review.

Section 5 — Has Israel committed “genocide”? Where the legal process stands, and what comes next (as of September 21, 2025)

Legal yardstick. Under Article II of the 1948 Genocide Convention, genocide requires certain acts (e.g., killing, serious harm, or life-destroying conditions) committed with intent to destroy a protected group, in whole or in part. The specific intent element is decisive. (United Nations)

Current institutional findings (not a final court judgment):

  • UN Commission of Inquiry (COI): On September 16, 2025, the UN COI concluded that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza, citing four of the five Genocide Convention acts and pointing to official rhetoric as evidence of intent. Israel rejected the finding. (A COI report is influential but not legally binding.) (OHCHR)
  • International Court of Justice (ICJ): The ICJ has not decided the merits. In Orders of Jan. 26, Mar. 28, and May 24, 2024, it found that Palestinians in Gaza have plausible rights under the Genocide Convention at risk and imposed provisional measures requiring Israel to prevent genocidal acts and enable humanitarian aid (including additional measures related to Rafah on May 24). The case is proceeding. (International Court of Justice)
  • International Criminal Court (ICC): On Nov. 21, 2024, ICC Judges issued arrest warrants for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant for war crimes and crimes against humanity (e.g., starvation as a method of warfare). Genocide is not among the charges. In July 2025, judges rejected Israel’s request to withdraw the warrants; the warrants remain active. (International Criminal Court)

Expected timeline (based on current dockets and past practice):

  • ICJ merits phase (South Africa v. Israel):

    • Procedurally, the Court extended deadlines for written pleadings in April 2025 (Counter-Memorial), and multiple States filed interventions through 2024–2025. No merits judgment date is scheduled as of today. (International Court of Justice)
    • Historically, genocide cases at the ICJ are multi-year. For example, Bosnia v. Serbia (application in 1993; judgment in 2007) had merits hearings in 2006 and judgment roughly a year later—illustrating the scale rather than predicting this case’s length. Expect years, not months, for a final merits judgment. (International Court of Justice)
  • ICC proceedings:

    • Next step is arrest or surrender; without custody, cases generally do not proceed to confirmation of charges or trial. Warrants remain in force absent withdrawal or execution; there is no fixed timeline to resolution. (Judges maintained the warrants in July 2025 while jurisdictional issues continue.) (Reuters)

Bottom line for Section 5. As of September 21, 2025, one UN investigative body (the COI) says genocide has been committed; the ICJ recognizes a plausible genocide risk and has imposed binding interim measures but has not ruled on the merits; the ICC has non-genocide warrants outstanding for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. A definitive legal answer on genocide will turn on the ICJ’s merits judgment—likely a multi-year horizon—while ICC accountability depends on arrests. (OHCHR)


Conclusion (updated)

Across Sections 1–5, the record shows substantial, well-sourced allegations regarding Israeli conduct (targeting practices, civilian harm, obstruction of aid, information operations) alongside the government’s denials and legal defenses. On genocide specifically, the issue remains legally unsettled: a UN COI has issued a genocide finding, the ICJ has ordered precautionary measures while it adjudicates the merits, and the ICC is pursuing war-crimes/crimes-against-humanity cases under active arrest warrants. As of September 21, 2025, the most authoritative, binding resolution—an ICJ merits judgment—is still pending, with a timeline measured in years, and any ICC trial is contingent on arrests. (OHCHR)

Additional Sources


Adam Malin

adammalin.com

You can find me on Nostr at:

@thePR0M3TH3AN ✝️ BIP110

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