• Context
• The Problem
• Current State
• DoS and Resource Exhaustion Concerns
• Analysis Request

§Context

In the Stratum V2 mining protocol, miners open channels with pools and can update channel parameters during operation. The relevant messages are:

OpenStandardMiningChannel (downstream → upstream):

• nominal_hash_rate: f32 - Expected hashrate in h/s

• max_target: U256 - Maximum (easiest) difficulty the miner will accept

UpdateChannel (downstream → upstream):

• nominal_hash_rate: f32 - Updated expected hashrate

• maximum_target: U256 - Updated maximum target

The pool uses these to calculate an appropriate difficulty target. The protocol currently treats nominal_hash_rate as an advisory hint—pools typically use vardiff algorithms that adjust difficulty based on observed share submission rates rather than trusting the claimed value.

§The Problem

Miners may legitimately need to signal intentional hashrate changes:

• Underclocking due to thermal throttling

• Power curtailment during demand response events

• Scheduled maintenance reducing capacity

• Dynamic scaling based on electricity prices

Fast, accurate signaling would reduce stale shares during transitions and enable more intelligent pool-side resource allocation. However, the signal is trivially gameable: a miner claiming lower hashrate receives easier difficulty, potentially gaining unfair reward share if the pool uses share-counting economics.

§Current State

The protocol makes no distinction between:

1. Advisory hints for target calculation

2. Commitments that affect reward accounting

This conflation means the signal must be treated adversarially, limiting its utility for legitimate dynamic hashrate management.

§DoS and Resource Exhaustion Concerns

Difficulty signals directly impact pool-side resource consumption. When a pool assigns an easier target:

• More shares satisfy the difficulty requirement

• Each share requires validation (hash verification, merkle proofs, etc.)

• Share metadata must be stored and processed for accounting

Attack vector: A miner claims low hashrate → receives easy difficulty → submits shares at a much higher rate than expected. This creates:

1. Compute exhaustion: Share validation is not free. A miner with 100 TH/s claiming 1 TH/s could generate 100x the expected share volume, potentially overwhelming validation infrastructure.

2. Accounting manipulation: Share-based reward schemes may over-credit miners who artificially inflate their share count through difficulty manipulation.

3. Amplification: Unlike network-level DoS, this attack does “useful” work (valid shares), making it harder to distinguish from legitimate high-volume miners.

4. Cascading effects: Pool infrastructure sized for expected share rates may degrade under load, affecting all connected miners.

The pool must balance:

• Responsive difficulty adjustment for good UX

• Protection against share flooding

• Fair accounting that isn’t gameable

• Resource allocation across many concurrent miners

§Analysis Request

Explore protocol extensions or modifications that address this tension. Consider:

§For Adversarial Environments (anonymous/untrusted miners):

• Can the signal be made useful without being gameable?

• What verification mechanisms could bound the damage from false signals?

• Are there cryptographic commitments that make lying costly?

• How do vardiff algorithms interact with claimed vs observed hashrate?

§For Trusted Environments (authenticated/known miners):

• What additional signals would be valuable if trust is established?

• How might reputation systems or escrow arrangements change the calculus?

• Could tiered trust levels offer different signaling capabilities?

• What’s the value of predictive signals (e.g., “I will underclock in 10 minutes”)?

§DoS Protection Mechanisms:

• How should pools rate-limit share submissions relative to claimed hashrate?

• What’s the appropriate response to share rate significantly exceeding expectations? (disconnect, difficulty adjustment, throttling, penalty accounting?)

• Can the protocol encode share rate expectations or commitments?

• How do you distinguish malicious flooding from legitimate hashrate variance?

• Should there be protocol-level backpressure signals from pool to miner?

• How do batched share submissions (share aggregation) change the calculus?

§Protocol Design Trade-offs:

• Simplicity vs expressiveness in the message format

• Backward compatibility with existing implementations

• Privacy implications of richer signaling

• Centralization risks from trust/reputation requirements

• Latency impact of additional validation or rate-limiting logic

§Economic Considerations:

• How do different pool reward schemes (PPS, PPLNS, etc.) affect gaming incentives?

• Could the protocol itself encode reward-relevant commitments?

• What’s the cost/benefit of false signals under different models?

• Should share validation cost be reflected back to miners somehow?

• How do you price the “right to submit shares at rate X”?

• Could escrow deposits back hashrate claims, with forfeiture for violations?

Propose concrete protocol extensions where appropriate, with message formats and behavioral specifications. Identify which trust model each extension assumes and what DoS protections it provides or requires.