Chapter 2: Two Traditions, One Conclusion
- Chapter 2: Two Traditions, One Conclusion
- Introduction
- 2.1 The Austrian Approach: Deduction from Action
- 2.2 The Cypherpunk Approach: Building What Theory Requires
- David Chaum and Privacy by Design
- Software Freedom and Verifiability
- Timothy May and the Politics of Anonymous Commerce
- Eric Hughes and Selective Disclosure
- From Cyberspace Independence to Parallel Institutions
- Digital Cash Precursors and the Cypherpunk Method
- What the Cypherpunk Tradition Contributes
- 2.3 Independent Convergence: Why Both Reached the Same Place
- Chapter Summary
- Endnotes
Chapter 2: Two Traditions, One Conclusion
“In a crypto-anarchy the government is not temporarily destroyed but permanently forbidden and permanently unnecessary.”
Wei Dai, “b-money” (1998)^1^
Introduction
This book joins two traditions that developed apart from each other and still arrived at the same place.
The Austrian tradition approached privacy through logic, starting from the fact of human action and working toward conclusions about property, exchange, calculation, and coercion. The cypherpunk tradition approached privacy through engineering, starting from the technical possibility of secure communication and building tools that let people act without asking permission. One tradition explained why privacy matters; the other showed how privacy can be defended in practice.
Their agreement is not accidental. Both were forced to confront the same problem, which is how human beings coordinate when they act on their own plans and when other people try to interrupt, tax, monitor, or control those plans. Austrians met that problem through praxeology, and cypherpunks met it through code. They reached the same answer because they were studying the same reality from different angles.
Chapters 3 through 5 develop the axiomatic core; this chapter shows why the two traditions belong in the same book and why their synthesis produces something stronger than either line alone.
2.1 The Austrian Approach: Deduction from Action
Carl Menger and Methodological Individualism
The Austrian School begins with the acting individual. Carl Menger’s Principles of Economics broke with the historical school by refusing to treat collective abstractions as primary.^2^ Only individuals act. Markets, societies, and states are the patterns their actions produce.
That commitment is methodological, not rhetorical. If social phenomena arise from the choices of individuals, analysis must begin there; prices, institutions, and monetary arrangements are all downstream of action, and whatever stability and scale they acquire, they remain the cumulative result of many separate decisions.
The same methodology applies to privacy. If action begins in the person, then knowledge relevant to action also begins there. Plans form inside minds before they appear in speech or trade, and preferences are not public facts waiting to be collected but interior judgments that actors reveal only under chosen conditions.
Menger also identified spontaneous order. Money, language, and market coordination do not need a designer standing above the process; they emerge through repeated interaction, and the point will matter later when this book turns to the parallel economy. If order can emerge without a central architect, then privacy-preserving order can emerge without state supervision as well.
Ludwig von Mises and Praxeology
Mises turned these insights into a method. Praxeology begins from a simple fact, namely that human beings act purposefully, and the claim is not statistical but built into the act of trying to deny it: anyone who argues that action is not purposeful is still using purposeful behavior to make the case.
From that starting point, Mises derived a body of economic reasoning without waiting for surveys or laboratory confirmation. Action implies choice, preference, and opportunity cost. Exchange implies expected gain, while calculation requires meaningful signals. The whole structure unfolds from the inner logic of action itself.
That structure has direct consequences for privacy. Deliberation is internal before it is external; preferences are subjective before they are observed; plans exist before they are disclosed. A world in which every choice were visible before it was made would not be a world of free action. It would be a world where every plan could be blocked or exploited by anyone strong enough to observe it.
Chapter 3 develops this argument fully. The point here is simpler: the Austrian method treats privacy as built into the conditions of action, not as an optional sentiment or bourgeois preference.
Property and Argument
Rothbard extended praxeology into political theory by linking action to self-ownership and property^16^, then to aggression.^3^ Hoppe later showed that some of the same conclusions are already presupposed in argumentation itself.^17^ Their routes differ, but their destination overlaps.
For this book, the key point is that surveillance is not neutral observation. When a state compels disclosure, searches a house, monitors correspondence, or builds a dossier from the traces of ordinary life, it enters domains the actor did not offer for public use. It turns private judgment into an object of appropriation.
Rothbard framed this through natural rights; Hoppe framed it through the presuppositions of discourse. Chapter 4 takes the Hoppean route because it fits the book’s method more tightly. The Hoppean argument begins from what a person must already presuppose when entering argument and making claims on others, not from moral intuition.
The institutional implication is already visible. A society built on action and exchange, then willing to argue about rules, sits uneasily with universal observation. A regime that treats every transaction and every message, along with the associations they expose, as inspectable by default moves away from order by consent and toward domination.
Konkin and Counter-Economics
Samuel Edward Konkin III translated Austrian analysis into strategic practice. He asked the question that many theorists avoid: if the state is parasitic, what do free people do before it disappears?
His answer was counter-economics^18^: build outside the channels the state can easily see and tax, trade where surveillance is weak, use forms of money the state cannot freeze at will, and shift production and exchange into spaces where voluntary order can prove itself in practice.^4^
This move brought Austrian theory to the edge of cypherpunk strategy even though Konkin wrote before Bitcoin, Nostr, or modern anonymous networks existed. The logic is already there in his argument. If the state feeds on visibility, then unseen exchange weakens it; if regulation depends on chokepoints, then systems that route around chokepoints loosen its grip; and if markets can solve coordination problems on their own, then free people do not need permission to begin building the alternative.
Konkin’s importance to this book lies here. He turns Austrian critique into a theory of transition. He points from logical analysis to parallel practice.
What the Austrian Tradition Contributes
The Austrian line contributes three things that the rest of the book will develop in depth.
It gives a descriptive claim: privacy belongs to the structure of action.
It gives the basis for a normative claim developed later: coercive intrusion into private domains is not morally innocent.
It gives a strategic claim: free order can emerge through voluntary coordination without central direction.
The Austrian contribution is already enough to establish privacy’s place in action, property, and exchange. It is not yet enough to defend privacy in the real world. For that, the second tradition becomes necessary.^5^
2.2 The Cypherpunk Approach: Building What Theory Requires
David Chaum and Privacy by Design
David Chaum saw the problem before most of the world understood the stakes.^6^ Early networked systems were already creating the conditions for total recordkeeping. Chaum’s answer was architectural: tools that would render the surveillance assumption inoperative without waiting on legislatures or courts.
Blind signatures showed that verifiable digital payment did not require the issuer to know who spent the token. That insight is larger than the primitive itself. It changed the terms of the debate. The question stopped being whether institutions could be trusted to behave well after collecting data. The question became whether the system could be designed to avoid collecting the data in the first place.
That is a core cypherpunk move. Do not beg power to limit itself. Remove the power.
The same logic will appear again and again in this book. Hope is a poor basis for privacy, so the discipline is always to remove the capability that would require hope in the first place. Instead of hoping the bank stays honest with your transaction history, use money the bank cannot control. Instead of hoping the platform resists censorship when pressure arrives, use protocols no platform owns. Instead of hoping the database stays secure after each compromise or subpoena, refuse to build the dossier at all. In every case, the cypherpunk instinct is to remove the capability at the source and not to trust the institution to decline to use it.
Software Freedom and Verifiability
The cypherpunk answer also required one further condition: users must be able to inspect the tools they trust.
Here Richard Stallman’s importance is monumental.^7^ Software that cannot be studied cannot be trusted in a strong sense. A closed binary may promise privacy while exfiltrating keys, logging metadata, or baking in dependencies the user never approved. Open code does not guarantee security, but closed code blocks independent verification from the start.
Cypherpunk systems ask users to trust mathematics and public scrutiny more than institutional benevolence, and that trust collapses if the code cannot be inspected and maintained outside one vendor’s control, with forking available if needed. Every major privacy system in the modern stack, including Tor, Bitcoin, Signal, and Nostr clients, depends on this assumption.^8^
The link to Austrian analysis is tight. Information is not scarce, and voluntary order requires the freedom to inspect what one relies on. Hidden control inside closed software recreates dependency under a technical skin.
Timothy May and the Politics of Anonymous Commerce
Timothy May stated the political implications with unusual clarity. If cryptography lets people communicate and transfer value without showing legal identity, then the state’s ordinary tools of taxation and control lose much of their force.^9^
May also saw the next problem. Anonymous business does not abolish trust; it changes how trust must be built, because reputation becomes central once legal identity stops doing the usual work.^10^ That observation is one of the most important bridges in the whole manuscript: the cypherpunk project was never only about secrecy of messages, but also about the conditions for economic coordination once identity and payment move outside the state’s default channels.
This book follows May all the way to that institutional question. Chapter 24 is one answer to the problem he saw.
Eric Hughes and Selective Disclosure
Eric Hughes gave the movement its cleanest ethical summary.^11^ Privacy means selective disclosure. Each party to a transaction should know only what is directly necessary for that transaction. The cypherpunk line is visible here in full.
The discipline is to ask what the exchange requires, not to collect broad identity data and promise restraint later. If the transaction needs proof of payment, then prove payment; if it needs proof of age, then prove age; if it needs proof of continuity with a known key, then prove that continuity. Anything beyond the real informational requirement is surplus extraction that the protocol should refuse to produce in the first place.
Hughes also supplied the movement’s governing method: cypherpunks write code. Arguments become harder to reverse once they are embodied in working systems. A court ruling can be overturned. A legislative win can be repealed. A protocol with a real user base and a distributed set of operators is a different kind of fact.
From Cyberspace Independence to Parallel Institutions
John Perry Barlow’s declaration captured the early optimism of a borderless internet.^12^ Later texts grew harder and more disciplined. What remained after the optimism burned off was the durable strategic insight: freedom can be practiced in parallel through separate rails of communication, payment, and association, without waiting for a final political break.
Here the cypherpunk line meets Konkin’s counter-economics. Anonymous messaging, digital cash, open protocols, and cryptographic proof function as the infrastructure of separation as well as the technical novelties they appear to be. They let people begin building markets and communities that do not ask every question through the state’s categories.
Smuggler and XYZ carried this line into strategic practice. The Second Realm treats cypherpunk tools as the working infrastructure of parallel institutions: protected digital channels and recurring physical meeting places, with proxy merchants that let trade move across the boundary under lower exposure. In that sense it is modern cypherpunk strategy applied to ordinary life.^13^
The mature version of this strategy aims at something harder than digital escapism and does not imagine a clean migration into a separate cyber-domain. It aims at functioning institutions that coexist with the official order while depending on it less and less.
Digital Cash Precursors and the Cypherpunk Method
A secure and private digital money has been a dream of the cypherpunks from the start. Before Bitcoin, they solved parts of the puzzle one by one. Hashcash showed how computation could impose cost.^19^ B-money described participant-created digital money, and Bit Gold pushed digital scarcity closer to a usable design.^20^ Reusable proof-of-work^21^ and related experiments filled in more of the map.^14^
Even the systems that failed reveal the cypherpunk method: build, publish, test against reality, and keep what survives.
The cypherpunk method differs from praxeology without being in conflict with it. Cypherpunks answer practical questions that theory alone cannot settle, such as which cryptographic assumptions hold up under attack, which network designs resist censorship in hostile conditions, and which monetary systems can survive adversarial pressure and real user mistakes. Those questions need code, not deduction alone.
What the Cypherpunk Tradition Contributes
The cypherpunk line contributes three things.
It shows that privacy can be built into systems as a property of architecture.
It shows that verification cannot rest on trust in opaque institutions, which forces tools to be open and inspectable.
It shows that the path to freedom runs through deployed systems, not declarations alone.
The cypherpunk contribution is already enough to explain how privacy can be defended. It is not yet enough to explain why privacy belongs to the structure of human coordination. For that, the Austrian line remains necessary.^15^
2.3 Independent Convergence: Why Both Reached the Same Place
Different Methods, Same Constraints
The Austrian and cypherpunk traditions used different methods because they confronted different parts of the same problem.
Austrians asked what must be true if action and exchange are real under conditions of calculation. Cypherpunks asked what must be built if privacy and sound money, together with free communication, are to survive hostile conditions. One line moved through deduction. The other moved through implementation.
The convergence is still striking.
Each tradition begins with the person, not the collective abstraction; rejects the idea that central oversight improves coordination as such; and discovers that coercion distorts the signals on which order depends. Both end up defending decentralization and voluntary exchange against unchecked observation.
That agreement does not require one tradition to borrow its conclusions from the other. The stronger explanation is that both had to reckon with the same constraints of action and control.
Shared Conclusions
The shared conclusions can be stated plainly.
Human beings act on private judgments before those judgments become public.
Exchange works better when parties can choose what to disclose.
Free order can emerge without a master plan.
Surveillance and coercion damage the process they claim to improve.
A tradition that starts with action is pushed toward privacy. A tradition that tries to defend freedom in code is pushed there too.
What the Synthesis Adds
Each tradition alone leaves something exposed.
Austrian theory can derive privacy from action and can show why intervention degrades coordination. By itself it cannot identify which tools resist surveillance in the present world.
Cypherpunk engineering can build communication and payment systems that work under hostile conditions, along with identity systems suited to them. By itself it can still lose its way economically, with projects centralizing and incentives drifting, and systems that look elegant in code failing because they ignore human coordination or capital structure.
The synthesis closes both gaps.
Austrian analysis locates privacy inside human action and specifies the incentives that privacy-preserving systems must respect. Cypherpunk practice shows how those systems can be built and defended against real adversaries.
That combination gives this book its shape. The chapters ahead move from axiom into economics, then through the adversary and the tool stack before they reach practice. The two traditions do not agree only in the abstract. They complete each other in sequence.
Chapter Summary
Two traditions reached the same conclusion about privacy from different starting points. The Austrian line begins with the acting individual: from Menger through Mises, Rothbard, Hoppe, and Konkin, it shows that action starts in private judgment, that voluntary order can emerge without central design, and that coercive intrusion damages the conditions of exchange. The cypherpunk line begins with technical possibility: from Chaum through Hughes and May, then into the digital cash precursors, it shows that privacy can be built into systems, that open code matters for verification, and that working tools can shift power away from institutions built on observation.
Their convergence is evidence. They used different methods because they confronted different sides of the same reality, and each contributes what the other lacks. Austrian analysis grounds privacy in action and identifies the voluntary order that makes it possible; cypherpunk engineering shows how resistant systems can be built and maintained against real adversaries. Konkin’s counter-economics is the bridge, the Austrian critique turned into a program of transition that the cypherpunks then made operational.
This chapter traces intellectual lineage. The full axiomatic derivation begins in Chapter 3, the normative case in Chapters 4 and 5, and the assessment of Bitcoin, Tor, Nostr, and the rest in Parts V and VI.
Endnotes
^1^ Wei Dai, “b-money” (November 1998), http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt. A two-page proposal for an anonymous digital currency that Satoshi Nakamoto cited as reference [1] in the Bitcoin whitepaper. Dai’s opening paragraph, quoted in this chapter’s epigraph, names the fusion of cryptography with economic thought that this chapter traces: privacy infrastructure designed not as policy reform but as permanent architecture of exchange. For the rhetorical companion text that named the movement, see Eric Hughes, “A Cypherpunk’s Manifesto” (1993), https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html, which supplied the phrase “cypherpunks write code” and is quoted throughout the chapter.
^2^ On Menger’s method and the Austrian break with the historical school, see Carl Menger, Principles of Economics (1871), and Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (1949), especially the methodological chapters.
^3^ Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (Humanities Press, 1982), develops the derivation of self-ownership and property from action and the concept of aggression as boundary-crossing.
^4^ For Hoppe’s argumentation ethics, see Hans-Hermann Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism (1989), Chapter 7. On Konkin and counter-economics, see Samuel Edward Konkin III, New Libertarian Manifesto (1980).
^5^ Readers who want to work through the Austrian tradition in depth should begin with Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (1949), still the single most complete exposition of praxeology. Murray Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State (1962) extends and systematizes Mises. For a shorter entry, Peter Boettke, Living Economics (2012) and Jesús Huerta de Soto, The Austrian School (2008) are excellent. Carl Menger, Principles of Economics (1871) and Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences (1883) are the original sources. For the relationship between Austrian method and cryptographic systems specifically, Eric Voskuil’s Cryptoeconomics (online) applies praxeology directly to Bitcoin.
^6^ David Chaum, “Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital Pseudonyms,” Communications of the ACM 24, no. 2 (1981): 84-88, https://nakamotoinstitute.org/library/untraceable-electronic-mail/, introduced mix networks; Chaum, “Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments,” in Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Crypto ’82 (Plenum, 1983), 199-203, introduced the blind-signature primitive discussed in this section; Chaum, “Security Without Identification: Card Computers to Make Big Brother Obsolete,” Communications of the ACM 28, no. 10 (1985): 1030-1044, https://nakamotoinstitute.org/library/security-without-identification/, generalized the design philosophy.
^7^ Richard Stallman, “The GNU Manifesto” (1985), https://www.gnu.org/gnu/manifesto.html, and the Free Software Foundation, https://www.fsf.org/. The four freedoms are stated at https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html.
^8^ Canonical project pages for the systems named in this paragraph, each of which receives extended treatment later in the book: Tor (https://www.torproject.org), the anonymous-routing network developed from David Chaum’s 1981 mix-network design and deployed since 2004, treated in Chapter 20. Bitcoin (https://bitcoin.org; whitepaper at https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf), the peer-to-peer electronic cash system introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto in October 2008 and launched in January 2009, treated in Chapter 18 and Chapter 19. Signal (https://signal.org), the end-to-end encrypted messenger whose Double Ratchet protocol is the reference design for modern secure messaging, treated in Chapter 17; the protocol specification is at https://signal.org/docs/. Nostr (https://nostr.com; protocol specifications in the NIPs repository at https://github.com/nostr-protocol/nips), the public-key-based decentralized social protocol introduced by fiatjaf in November 2020, treated in Chapter 21.
^9^ Timothy C. May, “The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto” (1988), https://nakamotoinstitute.org/library/crypto-anarchist-manifesto/. For the fuller treatment of persistent digital pseudonyms, anonymous business, and reputation inside virtual communities, see May, “Crypto Anarchy and Virtual Communities” (1994), https://nakamotoinstitute.org/library/virtual-communities/.
^10^ On the libertarian-property treatment of reputation that May’s observation rests on: reputation is not a resource in the property-theoretic sense, since it consists of what other people believe about a person, not in any resource the person owns. Cypherpunk reputation systems (developed in Chapter 21) do not treat reputation as ownable; they make signed attestations and consistent behavior over time the empirical signals on which counterparties form their own assessments. For the framework, see Stephan Kinsella, “Defamation as a Type of Intellectual Property,” in Jörg Guido Hülsmann and Stephan Kinsella, eds., A Life in Liberty: Liber Amicorum in Honor of Hans-Hermann Hoppe (Mises Institute, 2024), and the treatment in Chapter 6, §6.5 of this book.
^11^ Eric Hughes, “A Cypherpunk’s Manifesto” (March 9, 1993); see note 1 above for the full citation and URL.
^12^ John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” (February 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence. Written at the World Economic Forum in Davos two days after President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Reform Act, the declaration asserts that cyberspace constitutes a separate social space beyond state sovereignty: “Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone.” The declaration’s optimism about voluntary self-governance and its rejection of territorial jurisdiction were not sustained as predictions; as a statement of the movement’s early self-understanding and aspirations, the text has no equal.
^13^ For a later strategic text that carries the cypherpunk line past anonymous messaging and digital cash into recurring parallel institutions, see Smuggler and XYZ, The Second Realm: Book on Strategy (Liberty Under Attack Publications, 2018). For the earlier autonomy language it partly inherits, see Hakim Bey, T.A.Z.: The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism (Autonomedia, 1991). The value of these works for this chapter is genealogical and strategic, not axiomatic.
^14^ For the path from Hashcash and B-money to Bit Gold and Bitcoin, see Adam Back, “Hashcash: A Denial of Service Counter-Measure” (2002); Wei Dai, “B-money” (1998); Hal Finney, “RPOW - Reusable Proofs of Work” (2004); and Nick Szabo, “Bit Gold” (2005).
^15^ On the cypherpunk tradition and its history, Steven Levy, Crypto: How the Code Rebels Beat the Government, Saving Privacy in the Digital Age (2001) is the standard narrative history. Andy Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) and Tracers in the Dark (2022) cover the later phases. Simon Singh, The Code Book (1999) provides the pre-digital context. Primary sources include May’s “Crypto Anarchist Manifesto” (1988); Hughes’s “A Cypherpunk’s Manifesto” (1993); Hal Finney’s “Protecting Privacy with Electronic Cash” (1993), https://nakamotoinstitute.org/library/protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash/; Phil Zimmermann’s “Why I Wrote PGP” (1991); and the Cypherpunks mailing list archives.
^16^ Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State: A Treatise on Economic Principles, Scholar’s Edition (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2009 [1962]). Rothbard’s most systematic work, deriving price theory, capital theory, and the theory of production from the action axiom. Where The Ethics of Liberty grounds property rights in self-ownership and natural law, Man, Economy, and State grounds them in the logic of action and exchange, making it the core economic complement to the political theory cited in note 3.
^17^ Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2006), https://mises.org/library/economics-and-ethics-private-property. The definitive collection of Hoppe’s argumentation-ethics derivation of property rights and its applications. Hoppe shows that anyone who argues against self-ownership already presupposes control over their own body and reasoning capacity to conduct the argument - a performative contradiction that grounds property rights without appeal to moral intuition. The argumentation-ethics chapter (originally published 1988) is reprinted here alongside applications to money, banking, and state theory.
^18^ Samuel Edward Konkin III, An Agorist Primer (KoPubCo, 2008), https://kopubco.com/pdf/An_Agorist_Primer_by_SEK3.pdf. Konkin’s shorter and more accessible introduction to counter-economics and agorism, written as a companion to New Libertarian Manifesto. Where the Manifesto makes the strategic and philosophical case, An Agorist Primer explains the economic logic of grey and black markets as the practical terrain on which voluntary order expands at the state’s expense.
^19^ Adam Back, “Hashcash - A Denial of Service Counter-Measure,” technical report (August 2002), http://www.hashcash.org/papers/hashcash.pdf. Back’s proof-of-work system was originally designed to combat email spam by requiring senders to expend CPU time. Satoshi Nakamoto cited it as reference [6] in the Bitcoin whitepaper, and Hashcash’s SHA-1-based cost function directly informed Bitcoin’s mining mechanism. Back later became CEO of Blockstream, a Bitcoin infrastructure company (https://blockstream.com).
^20^ Nick Szabo, “Bit Gold” (2005), https://nakamotoinstitute.org/library/bit-gold/. Szabo’s design for a decentralized digital scarcity system using proof-of-work chains and public ledgers anticipated Bitcoin’s architecture in several respects, including the chaining of work proofs and the need for a distributed title registry. Szabo also developed the concept of smart contracts; see “Smart Contracts” (1994), https://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html, and “The Idea of Smart Contracts” (1997), https://nakamotoinstitute.org/library/the-idea-of-smart-contracts/.
^21^ Hal Finney, “RPOW - Reusable Proofs of Work” (August 2004), https://nakamotoinstitute.org/library/rpow/. Finney’s system allowed a hashcash token to be exchanged for a signed token of equivalent value, solving the double-spending problem for proof-of-work tokens through a trusted server holding its code open to remote attestation. Finney was the first person other than Satoshi Nakamoto to run the Bitcoin software and received the first Bitcoin transaction (10 BTC in block 170, January 12, 2009). He was also a lead developer on PGP 2.0 at PGP Corporation and one of the most technically accomplished contributors to the cypherpunk mailing list.
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