“Everyone was betrayed.” What does Trump’s deal with Iran mean for Israel? An explanation by Israeli political analyst Dmitry Dubov

On Thursday, June 18, a day before the scheduled date, Donald Trump signed a peace memorandum with Iran in Versailles. Iran was represented by President Masoud Pezeshkian. The U.S. commits to ceasing hostilities, not interfering in the internal affairs of the Islamic Republic, lifting the blockade on Iranian ports, preparing a $300 billion plan for the restoration of the Iranian economy, lifting sanctions on Iran, including those imposed by the UN Security Council, and unfreezing Iranian assets upon completion of negotiations. Iran promises that it might consider reducing its enriched uranium stockpile in 60 days. In simple terms, Donald Trump agreed to almost all of Tehran's demands. Israel, which participated in the war initiated by Trump to protect its interests, is not mentioned in the document. Israeli journalist and political analyst Dmitry Dubov explains who won and lost this war and how it will affect the entire Middle East architecture. Donald Trump signs a Memorandum of Understanding between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America at the Palace of Versailles on June 17, 2026, in Versailles, France. Photo: Daniel Torok / White House / ZUMA Press / Scanpix / LETA.— The deal with Iran looks like Donald Trump no longer cares how he gets out of this war, he just wants to get rid of it quickly, and he doesn't care about Iran or Israel anymore. How would you assess such an end to the war? — There's a temptation to say everything is bad, everything is lost, Trump's position is 'to hell with it all, let's wrap this up.' But I am an Israeli, and Trump's motives, his psychological profile, concern me last. I proceed from how this deal affects Israel's security. And not just Israel's; we need to talk about the architecture of the entire Middle East here. And I don't have good predictions yet, because everything we see can be described in one word – depending on our level of education and upbringing. It could be the word 'betrayal' or 'scam,' as there's a feeling that everyone has been scammed. First, the Iranian opposition has been scammed, people who were publicly promised that help was on the way and so on. Today, I cannot even imagine how and in what numbers they will start being arrested now and what will happen to them in Iranian prisons. The regime has become even more radical as a result of this war. We eliminated the top leadership, and I will not sprinkle ashes on my head about it – it was the right thing to do. But you know, when work is not done 100 percent and stops halfway, sometimes the result is worse than it was. And as a result, Iran has an even more radical leadership. Not only because there are more radicals in it, but also because the established decision-making institutions have been destroyed, and new ones have not been created. And the power hierarchy in Iran today is not entirely clear. Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian was initially a figurehead president, and he, in fact, does not aspire to anything more. And it was clear before that the supreme leader had the final say. But still, before, the president was also, let's say, not a nobody. And today, he is a classic nobody, he is simply not taken into account, and it is not entirely clear why he is there. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signs a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. in Tehran, Iran, June 18, 2026. Photo: Office of the President of Iran / EPA.Who makes the decisions then? For example, Ahmad Vahidi, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. These are people who understand several things perfectly. First, 'thank God I'm alive.' Second, they are not going to leave their own fate to chance, and for this reason alone, the first conclusion that the current Iranian leadership has likely reached is that by all means, secretly or openly, however, they must move towards a nuclear bomb. They would say that if Tehran had a nuclear umbrella, none of what has happened in recent months would likely have occurred. The example of North Korea is very telling for them. — Or Ukraine. — Yes, I agree, if we recall 1994 and the Budapest Memorandum. And as a result of this deal, we see the well-known principle: money in the morning - chairs in the evening. First, the Iranians are given money, but whether there will be 'chairs' later – that remains to be seen in negotiations. The feeling is that the Iranians have been promised something concrete in exchange for their more amorphous theoretical obligations, spread over a 60-day negotiation process. — Iran promised to think about thinking. — Yes, yes: we will agree to negotiate. And I don't know how these negotiations will end, but I'll bet my head that they will last much longer than 60 days. — Negotiations on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the deal between the Obama administration and Iran, lasted a year and a half. — Exactly. And, first, Iran had a much more pragmatic and reasonable leadership then than it does now. Second, Iran's favorite maneuver is to stall for time. To toughen positions to the maximum, reset the situation, force the opponent to return to previously agreed positions, presenting it as their victory. Trump will again rage and roar, say that now Iran will be destroyed, then say that some Qatari or Pakistani mediator asked him to postpone the strike, let's talk again. This tactic has worked repeatedly; it has happened, as counted, about 40 times. And now we have come to a deal that turned out to be much worse than any other scenario. The most important thing is that we don't know where the enriched uranium is, what will happen to it next, what Tehran will be doing during these 60 days. Won't it happen that at the end of these 60 days, Tehran will be even closer to creating a nuclear bomb? I understand that two months might seem like a short time, but I wouldn't underestimate Iran. It is logical to assume that Tehran will do everything in its power to pass some point of no return, to establish some new factor, after which it will say: now start talking to me, we agreed not to touch each other for 60 days, and in the meantime, unfreeze our assets. By the way, the issue of charging for passage through the Strait of Hormuz has not been removed from the agenda. — Are Israel's interests completely ignored in this deal? — I would draw attention to the fact that Israel is not mentioned in the memorandum at all. It's understandable that it's impossible for Iran to name Israel in principle, but there's no mention even of a 'Zionist entity,' although they somehow link the absence of attacks on Hezbollah in Lebanon to it. The Iranian army and the Iranian Foreign Ministry say that if the bloody Zionists attack Lebanon, they will consider it a violation of the agreements. The IDF today, and this is very important, published a map of our forces' positions north of the Israeli border with Lebanon; there is a security zone 10 kilometers wide. The official press service of the Israel Defense Forces says: we will stay there, we reserve the right to respond to strikes even on territory north of the security zone if necessary. The question is – how will events unfold, will there be provocations from Hezbollah, will we respond, how much time will Trump need to pressure Bibi again? The Iranians demand the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon. As far as I understand, there is no such clause in the document, but Trump might demand it to avoid irritating the Iranian side. — And then what? Will Israel withdraw and leave Hezbollah alone? — It turns out that we either go into conflict with Trump or not. But this is already a matter of security. If we withdraw from northern Lebanon now, Hezbollah will be there within minutes. That is, we are repeating the situation before October 8, 2023. Israeli soldiers at a position on the Israeli-Lebanese border, June 18, 2026. Photo: Atef Safadi / EPA.— When this war just began, it was already clear that the U.S. would achieve nothing from Iran. But many Israeli experts said: 'Never mind, we will use the 'lawn mowing' tactic: as soon as we see Iran creating something new, we will strike again.' The same was said about Hezbollah in Lebanon. Does Trump's agreement deprive Israel of this possibility as well? — And this is the most unpleasant part. Apparently, we should admit that the issue of a military scenario with Iran became relevant back in 2018 when Trump withdrew from the JCPOA deal. It was then that all restraining factors disappeared for Tehran. Now, one can write books about Trump's unpredictability, his inconsistency, the illogicality of his decisions, the incompatibility of his words and actions – and these would be books not on political science, but on other scientific disciplines studying human mental health. I say this without any irony. This factor must be considered in the overall decision-making complex. There is one more factor. When our Israeli leadership bets solely on one person in the U.S., not even on one party – this is a weak position. Thus, we have lost legitimacy in the world. In such a situation, the 'lawn mowing' tactic is generally flawed because it does not involve a strategy. Any war, in principle, should end with some political resolution. It is clear that it is impossible to conclude any treaty with the Iranians, but there are international structures for controlling them, and in them, as I repeat, we have lost legitimacy. And today, Israel is, to some extent, an outcast; pressuring Iran through international structures is an impossible task for us. Yes, we are forced to 'mow the lawn' around the perimeter: in Gaza, in Lebanon, in Iran. But when the load-bearing element does not work in this construction, namely the understanding between Jerusalem and Washington, the whole construction collapses. And today we see an example of this: it was enough to sign at least this memorandum, and how can we 'mow the lawn' if we are not supported? It is clear that we can do it ourselves, and there was no need for American military support here. I recall that the 12-day war was fought for 11 days without the participation of American bombers; only then did they arrive, bomb, and leave, and before that, we fought on our own. Of course, American support is highly desirable, especially since, it seems to me, the next military conflict is inevitable. But even if we have to act alone, it is feasible, albeit at a greater cost. — Do you think it's feasible? Isn't it clear now, when Israel couldn't retaliate against Beirut because Trump shouted, that even independently Israel won't be allowed to 'mow the lawn'? — That's exactly what I'm talking about. From a military standpoint, we can flatten Beirut in half an hour. The question is, what for some military actions, political support is necessary. With a character named Donald Trump, this is apriori a problematic story, which means a plan 'B' is needed. And we don't have one. And we haven't had one from the very beginning. This is the main blunder. Our freedom of maneuver will depend on how hard Iran pressures Trump, because they cannot pressure us. And on how long Trump can withstand this pressure. The moment he realizes that Iran is ready to break the crockery in the shop, he may, of course, start pressuring us again. „ He said it almost literally: I, he said, support Israel's right to self-defense, but within reasonable limits. — What does that mean? — That's a question for Trump. At one time, Trump [said]: I don't like that you're demolishing an entire multi-story building because Hezbollah is in it. And we started making targeted strikes on a specific apartment where a Hezbollah militant was. But it's clear that for Hezbollah, for Iran, any strike by the Israeli army on Beirut or even southern Lebanon is a reason to turn the shop upside down. They will do it constantly. And the question is how ready we are to confront Trump, because there is no other way, in my opinion, if we want to protect our security. Because Iran will continue to pressure Trump; they understood that they pressured once – so they can continue to pressure. And this can continue as long as Trump remains in the White House. A Houthi soldier with a rifle next to a digital billboard depicting (from left to right) the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian during a rally of solidarity with Iran after the US-Iranian ceasefire agreement in Sana'a, Yemen, April 10, 2026. Photo: Yahya Arhab / EPA.— All the same, when talking about 'lawn mowing,' I meant not only responding to provocations and attacks. I was also referring to Israel responding to any of Iran's attempts to create an atomic bomb, develop its missile program, and so on. Does the deal also eliminate this possibility? — Before the 12-day war, and especially before the last war, the 'lawn mowing' tactic was already in effect. Only it wasn't manifested in Israeli air strikes, but in Mossad special operations, as the foreign press wrote about it, although there was no direct confirmation. There were constant publications that someone somewhere inserted a flash drive, and a virus damaged reactors in Iran, someone was eliminated... The only way for Israel today to counter the Iranian nuclear threat, and they will certainly violate the treaty, is not through open strikes, but through some Mossad special operations. — Mossad also obtained documents on the nuclear program at one time and proved to the Americans that Tehran was violating the terms of the JCPOA. — Yes, there was such an operation. — Will such operations affect Trump? — I think it's very difficult to convince Trump today; he has his own logic. Look at how his messages start today: 'Oil is flowing!' – says Trump. And if, he says, Iran decides to violate the treaty, our might, the gates of hell, and so on, will descend upon it. — Yes, yes, we've heard that too. — But 'if' and 'when' are questions of the future. For us, they are very important, but for Trump, they are an excuse. The most important thing for him is that oil is flowing, prices are falling. For the sake of a momentary effect, he is ready for the principle of 'after me, the deluge.' — You mentioned Plan B in case of problems with Trump. What do you envision it to be? Could someone, for example, in Europe, act as Israel's ally after many European countries reacted to the war in Gaza? — I think so. If we consider the situation with Iran as a continuation of a large regional crisis, the active phase of which began in the Middle East in 2023, then at one time we could have not insisted on demolishing half of Gaza. The issue of post-war settlement in Gaza arose at the very beginning, because it is clear that without clear goals, this whole war situation is a vicious cycle. And an alternative future for Gaza emerged. According to Occam's razor principle: cut where it's easier. We could have reached some solution to the problem, legitimate from the perspective of the international community and the internal Palestinian society. It could have implied various alternatives, for example, a combination of a civilian administration under the patronage of Egypt, on the one hand, and on the other, involving elements of the Palestinian administration in governing Gaza. This would have provided some stability, predictability, cooperation, which exists between Israel and Egypt, from the perspective of the international community, and legitimacy. And similar legitimacy from the perspective of the Palestinian society. Even just a sign with a contour of a Palestinian flag would have been enough to tick the box here. But Netanyahu shied away from such a scenario like a scalded cat; even the shadow of a Palestinian flag, from the perspective of his far-right electoral partners, would have meant the collapse of the government. A Hezbollah supporter during a protest rally under the slogan “The whole country is resistance” outside the headquarters of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) in Beirut, Lebanon, February 4, 2026. Photo: Wael Hamzeh / EPA.— Benjamin Netanyahu openly said that this would not happen. — The question is, why won't it happen? Because Netanyahu was ideologically against it? Or because he feared the collapse of the government, which, in turn, could severely complicate his personal affairs, particularly criminal ones? As long as he is prime minister, he has a certain leverage in these matters. When he ceases to be prime minister, he loses that influence in his criminal cases. It's a slightly more complex construction than it seems at first glance. Regardless, whatever Netanyahu's motives, as a result of this whole story, by running away from such a decision, we have already lost legitimacy. And today, in the Iran situation, we have entered this war as a player who has lost this legitimacy. If we were a more legitimate player today in the eyes of the EU or other foreign policy actors, if we had established normal dialogue with the American Democrats, whom we have also lost, then, by a combination of indirect factors, our overall legitimacy would be higher today. It could allow us to claim something in resolving the Iranian crisis or even publicly disagree with the U.S. president while maintaining legitimacy. But we don't have it. „ It seems to me that the events we are observing today are the result of precisely this irresponsible foreign policy of Israel, which combines not only diplomacy but also war. — I will simplify to the extreme now. Does it turn out that this entire difficult situation for Israel arose solely because Netanyahu clung to his position as prime minister? — In my opinion, yes. — Yes? — Let's break it down. 2023 is a failure of the policy that involved appeasing Hamas, showering it with money – Qatari and American money in Qatari suitcases. And we got the Hamas attack, which we slept through, and Netanyahu is still running from responsibility for it. A state commission has still not been established. When the issue of confronting Iran arose, it was immediately clear: to fight such a monster, international support is necessary. I'm not talking about the military component; I'm talking about creating some kind of anti-Iranian coalition. And Netanyahu has two narratives that have persisted for thirty years and three years. The one that is 30 years old is a nuclear Iran: Netanyahu has always talked about preventing this as long as he has been in Israeli politics. And the three-year one is his statements about war until complete and final victory. Neither the former nor the latter has happened. Paradoxically, today we see all this on the eve of the election campaign, which is about to begin in Israel, and the main challenge for Netanyahu is how he will explain all this. Yes, I believe that the situation we are in today, in terms of security and our status in the international arena, is a direct consequence of Benjamin Netanyahu deciding at some point that power was more important than anything else for him. — The JCPOA agreement was criticized in Israel from the very moment President Barack Obama signed it with Iran, and Israelis with different political views and different attitudes towards Netanyahu were unanimous on this. And in 2018, Israel highly praised Trump for withdrawing from that deal. But now he is concluding a new agreement on terms much worse than Obama's. Was the JCPOA the only possible construct, or is there some other way to negotiate with Iran? — Hindsight is 20/20. And there is no subjunctive mood in history. But there is a clear life dilemma: when you have bad cards in hand, you can fold them and leave the game or try to do something with them. It is clear that the JCPOA was a bad treaty. In particular, it did not include a ballistic missile program. But there were other aspects that allowed this treaty to work, albeit poorly and with difficulty. There was some mechanism of control. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at a conference in Jerusalem, Israel, June 15, 2026. Photo: Ronen Zvulun / EPA.— And now we understand how important it was. — Everything was bad there; there was a unified opinion on this in Israel. But let's look at the alternative. One could say: the treaty is bad – that's it, we're out. — Which, in fact, is what Trump did. — Yes, and there was no control at all. What could have been done? One could draw attention to what was happening, point out the problem areas, prove, convince. Yes, it's work – convincing leaders of other states that such a treaty would ultimately harm not only Israel but also their countries. It's hard work; one had to do it constantly, meet all the time, work, explain. But, after all, that's what a normal Ministry of Foreign Affairs is for, not what we have today, whose autonomy is reduced to decisions about opening an embassy in Fiji. I say this without any irony and with full respect to the state of Fiji, but all other foreign policy was conducted by one person – the head of executive power, Benjamin Netanyahu. And none of this happened. During Trump's first term, Netanyahu clearly showed his priorities. Then, under President Biden, Netanyahu flies to America, meets with Biden, then goes to Florida, to Trump's private estate, and there says: 'And now the most pleasant part of my visit begins.' Isn't that also a message? That is, one cannot bet solely on one person, no matter how much of a friend he is. Especially if this person is somewhat... unpredictable. — The fact that relations between Israel and Donald Trump are not as wonderful as expected was clear not only now but also before the 12-day war. Was it too late to change anything? — Much too late. An arrest warrant has been issued against Netanyahu by the International Criminal Court; he cannot travel anywhere today except America. Observe the flight paths of the prime ministerial aircraft on Flightradar24: it doesn't even clip the airspace of countries where an arrest warrant is in effect. And it flies to New York for 13–14 hours instead of the usual ten. Today, Netanyahu has found himself in a dead end, and the only way out is down, such a steep dive. „ Hence the rhetoric that is perhaps painfully familiar to your Russian readers: we are in a besieged fortress, everyone is against us, we are fighting a collective enemy. Only the labels change. — It must still be admitted that, as applied to Israel, this is much more justified than to Russia before it began attacking its neighbors. — I agree. But nevertheless, I find more and more similarities in the rhetoric. Although I have lived in Israel for the fourth decade and understand that we indeed have enemies surrounding us. But this circumstance cannot justify everything. I really dislike the concept of 'we are enemies, we are Sparta, we will fight forever.' Normal states that want to see their countries with a normal future are not built like that. I would not want my children to be Spartans, of whom, by the way, nothing remains except our knowledge that they were warriors. Such a model has no future. Here, everyone serves in the army, everyone goes to reserve training, everyone here is a warrior by second profession, if not by first, but still, the country should have a brighter prospect than constant wars. Why am I saying this? When a leader starts talking about eternal wars, it's usually the same model: he has been in power for too long and is no longer ready to give it up. A woman walks past political posters on a wall in Beirut, Lebanon, June 9, 2026. Photo: Wael Hamzeh / EPA.— Israel is a super-democratic country; I know how Israelis themselves joke about it. And you compare it to Russia. How is it that one person can hold power in Israel for so many years? How is his party elected? — That's a whole separate topic. I'll just remind you that Benjamin Netanyahu's current term began in January 2023, and from January 4, when the judicial reform was announced, until October 7, 2023, when the Hamas attack occurred, Israel managed to experience a profound split, a political and public crisis surrounding this reform. The necessity of some measures within this reform is another matter, but at its core was Benjamin Netanyahu's persistent desire at any cost to remain in power. This happens, probably, in any society where one person has been in power for too long. In a parliamentary system, this is possible. It happens that such a person decides that the state is him. I have had numerous interviews with Netanyahu, including during the political crisis of 2019–2020, when we went to elections every six months. And I asked him more than once: perhaps the crisis itself arose because the opposition did not want to sit in the same government with a person under investigation? Perhaps he should step down and step aside for the common good? He answered with a straight face: I would betray my voters; they elect me, I will lead them. — Actually, they elect the Likud party. Wasn't there another leader? Isn't that the strength of a parliamentary system? — The election ballot says: Likud party led by Benjamin Netanyahu. So, there is still some personalization. But we see this disease: when a person has been in power for too long, they stop seeing the difference between themselves and power. I just saw from arm's length: „ the man entered politics as a breath of fresh air in the mid-1990s, and today he is becoming a classic autocrat. Such a metamorphosis repeats itself in history time and again. — The next elections in Israel are in October. How will this war with Iran and Trump's deal affect the positions of the Likud party and Netanyahu himself? — I believe that the upcoming elections are the most important and fateful in the country's history since its creation. There is no pathos here; it's a statement of fact. Immediately after the first leaks about the deal between the U.S. and Iran, Netanyahu convened a press conference, and it was predictable what he would talk about, down to specific names. He went on the offensive, saying that we had repelled the Iranian threat, we destroyed these and those, from Hamas leadership to Hezbollah leadership and Iranian ayatollahs... That is, we are in a situation where facts are secondary. A woman walks past a billboard depicting Likud party leader Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem, Israel, October 28, 2022. Photo: Abir Sultan / EPA.— No, wait. You don't live in Russia; Israel has complete freedom of the press, and people will not necessarily hear only what Netanyahu tells them. — This is a very naive and therefore dangerous misconception: because we are not in Russia, things applicable to Russians are not applicable to us. They are very applicable. The pro-government propaganda machine works just as well here. Recently, I saw on the air of the pro-government Hebrew-language Channel 14, one of the guests urged to take an example from Putin, from Russia, where no one would dare to speak against the war in Ukraine. — Seriously? — Absolutely. The propaganda machine works here too. And today, the attitude towards Netanyahu among his supporters is irrational, even religious: 'who if not him,' and so on. These mechanisms are surprisingly similar. And it is a very naive assumption that democracy protects us, that we have immunity. Democracies often collapse where you least expect it. At the same time, I will remind you again that Benjamin Netanyahu is under investigation; he is on trial in three criminal cases. At one time, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, when he was only charged, resigned even before the trial began. — What does this deal with Iran mean for the Middle East as a whole? President Trump has long promised a new Middle East, new participants in the Abraham Accords. Now he names Saudi Arabia, not Israel, as the main U.S. ally outside NATO. What will happen next in the Middle East? Could a Middle Eastern NATO emerge with the participation of Israel – or with the participation of Iran? — That's the million-dollar question... The Saudis were indeed close at one point to giving at least formal green light to normalizing relations with Israel. They were even willing to overlook to some extent the fact that a Palestinian state was not created, agreeing to some intermediate gesture from our side. Few people know, but there is cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia in spheres important to both countries, involving security. Israeli Ministry of Defense employees installed the well-known Pegasus surveillance program where Mohammed bin Salman indicated, and this information is not hidden from us. And it's not for nothing that Israeli planes fly to the Emirates and Bahrain through Saudi airspace. A certain understanding of each other's interests has existed for a long time, although we do not officially maintain relations. That's the first point. Second, when we look at the relationship of the Persian Gulf countries with their neighbors, we must consider the Eastern mentality. Arabs never put all their eggs in one basket. When we concluded agreements with the Emirates and Bahrain, soon the Emirates moved towards warming relations with Tehran. Such is Arab policy: to show that they can engage in dialogue with everyone. And the Emirates, which were subjected to shelling more often than Israel during the last war, are today demonstrating that they are ready to move towards détente with Iran, because they understand that Trump cannot be relied upon; Trump, roughly speaking, will betray them, but Iran is right there, across the Arabian Sea, very close; Trump will leave, but the Iranians will remain. Therefore, from their point of view, they need to smile at each other. Talk about an Arab NATO with Iran's participation is designed to send a clear signal without any real progress. This is a rather old story. We should primarily worry about the prospects of Saudi-Turkish cooperation; this is a more troubling prospect than cooperation between the Saudis and the Emirates on the one hand and Iran on the other. Not to mention that there are disagreements between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. It's always complicated here. Enqelab Square in Tehran, Iran, June 18, 2026. Photo: Abedin Taherkenareh / EPA.But we see how the world is tired of endless wars and conflicts in the Middle East, therefore it is ready to make peace at any cost, even if it is only a semblance of peace. And apriori, this makes the entire situation much more unstable in the strategic perspective. Because the Iranian threat has not disappeared; the Iranian regime, even in a semi-dismantled state, does not abandon its global goals of Shiite influence; it does not abandon funding Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shiite militias somewhere in Iraq or Syria. That is, Iran remains Iran. This pursuit of peace, of self-satisfaction, reminds me somewhat of the behavior of European leaders before World War II, when they thought Hitler could be appeased. And this zeitgeist – the spirit of the times – scares me greatly, when post-truth replaces everything else, when narrative replaces facts, when any story can be turned into a victory, the main thing is to present it correctly. In such a situation, all constructs are inherently unstable. And what will happen next – the planning horizon is unclear. — To what extent can Israel influence the situation in the region today? — Today, even supporters of the government in Israel will agree, albeit in a whisper, that we are losing our agency. Today, we are not even the 51st state of the U.S.; that would be half the trouble. Today, we are like vassals to a suzerain. If you fly to Israel today, the first thing you will see at the airport is many, many, many American refuelers who arrived at the beginning of the war and settled at Ben Gurion Airport. A civilian facility, I might add. And they are not going anywhere. This creates gigantic problems for our civil aviation, and it's already difficult in Israel due to obvious circumstances. We simply don't have enough parking spaces for aircraft. Perhaps you will say that this example is not related to reality. But they tell us: we will not leave here until the end of 2026 – and that's it, whether you like it or not. The other day, there was news that out of this gigantic number of refuelers, the Americans are relocating 20% – attention! – to other bases in Israel. When you bet on one person, you become subordinate to that person. Especially if this person is such a problematic client as Trump. We are losing our independence and agency before our very eyes. In this whole Iran affair, we were not even allowed as observers at the negotiating table; we were notified after the fact; we learned about what was happening from the U.S. President's social media posts. This is not how it should work. And it's not a big deal when the U.S. President calls the Prime Minister of Israel and curses him out like a kid for Israel responding to Hezbollah's strikes on Israel with strikes on Dahieh. They say, 'Nobody died, right?' So, someone has to die for us to respond to a strike on our territory? That's what frightens me greatly. We are not independent in making decisions today. „ We don't have our former agency, and I don't know how it can be restored as long as the person who is in the White House is there, and as long as the person who is in the Prime Minister's office is there. But I am an optimist; I believe everything will be fine. — But according to your words, it doesn't seem so. — No. I am only stating a fact; that is the situation today. But any crisis, even the most serious one, is not endless; we just need to make the right decision about who we want to see in power. I believe that we will return to pragmatism, to the ability to build bridges, and return to dialogue with those with whom we are not even communicating today. Not immediately, but everything will gradually get better. Remains of an Iranian ballistic missile that fell on an agricultural field near the town of Najā, in the Damascus countryside, Syria, June 8, 2026. Photo: Mohammed Al Rifai / EPA.