• What the research actually says
• # Is Bitcoin really the target?
• # Beyond crypto: a much bigger problem
• How real is the risk?
• The race against time

Google says it may only be a matter of years before quantum computers can crack the cryptography that underpins Bitcoin. But for Nicolás Vescovo, a mathematician and researcher at RootstockLabs, that timeline still belongs firmly in the realm of theory.

“It’s science fiction, to be honest,” he says. “We still need the quantum computer. Without that, we don’t have anything.”

The claim comes from recent research suggesting that, with enough qubits, a quantum machine could run Shor’s algorithm to break the encryption behind modern digital systems in minutes. Google’s estimates point to a non-zero probability of such a machine emerging as early as 2029.

Vescovo isn’t convinced. “Three years? I don’t see that coming,” he says. “If we shift the spectrum from 10 years to seven or eight, that sounds more logical.”

§What the research actually says

At the heart of the concern is Shor’s algorithm, a quantum method developed in the 1990s. In simple terms, it can reverse the mathematical process used to secure digital systems – taking a public key and deriving the private key behind it.

That’s what protects Bitcoin wallets, banking systems and encrypted communications.

The new research doesn’t invent a new attack. Instead, it improves how efficiently that existing algorithm could run – reducing the resources needed to break widely used cryptographic schemes, including those based on elliptic curves.

In theory, with a sufficiently powerful quantum computer – somewhere in the range of 12,000 to 15,000 qubits – encryption could be broken in minutes.

But that machine doesn’t exist. “We don’t have anything like that,” Vescovo says. “It’s in a lab. It’s not functional at that scale.”

§Theoretically, a powerful quantum computer could break encryption in minutes. Photo: Unsplash / Deepmind

§# Is Bitcoin really the target?

Headlines have focused on Bitcoin, but Vescovo is quick to challenge that framing. “It’s not a Bitcoin problem, it’s an all-blockchain problem,” he says.

Bitcoin, Ethereum and other cryptocurrencies all rely on similar cryptographic principles. If one is vulnerable to a sufficiently advanced quantum attack, they all are.

In fact, some of Bitcoin’s design choices already reduce its exposure. Modern Bitcoin addresses hide the public key behind a hash until the moment a transaction is made, limiting the window in which an attacker could act.

Older coins – particularly those mined in Bitcoin’s early years – are more exposed because their public keys are permanently visible on the blockchain. But even then, exploitation would still depend on the existence of a powerful quantum machine.

“If you get that machine, you can break everything,” Vescovo says. “Not just Bitcoin.”

§# Beyond crypto: a much bigger problem

The same underlying cryptography protects a wide range of everyday systems, including:

· secure web browsing (TLS)

· encrypted messaging apps

· digital identity systems such as e-passports

· cloud infrastructure and remote access software

However, traditional systems may be at an advantage when it comes to protecting themselves. Centralised institutions such as banks can update their security protocols more quickly than decentralised networks, which require global consensus to make changes.

For Bitcoin, that process happens through Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (or BIPs) – a system that is deliberately slow and resistant to change.

“That’s one of the strengths,” Vescovo says. “But also one of the weaknesses.”

§Cryptography sits behind more than just cryptocurrencies, including digital identity systems. Photo: Unsplash / Sasun Bughdaryan

§How real is the risk?

“We know this will be a problem in the future,” Vescovo says. “We need to address it now. But it’s not something to panic about.”

Even the research itself points to areas of resilience. Bitcoin’s proof-of-work mining process, for example, is largely resistant to quantum advantage. Other algorithms, like Grover’s, may speed up certain computations, but don’t fundamentally break the system in the same way as Shor’s.

And solutions are already emerging. Post-quantum cryptography – encryption designed to withstand quantum attacks – is no longer just academic theory. It’s already being tested and deployed across parts of the internet and explored within blockchain ecosystems.

Upgrading a global, decentralised system will not be straightforward. “You need agreement first,” Vescovo explains. “Then you need to build it. Then you need everyone to migrate.” In practice, that likely means a hybrid period where old and new cryptographic standards run side by side – a slow and complex transition.

§The race against time

While Vescovo estimates the real quantum threat may still be around seven years away, the window to act is much shorter. “In two or three years, we should already agree on what to build,” he says.

The underlying reality is clear: if a sufficiently powerful quantum computer emerges, today’s encryption will not hold. “It’s a matter of when, not if,” Vescovo says.

For now, the challenge is less technical than behavioural. The tools to respond are already being developed, but urgency is lacking. “We believe there is enough time,” he says. “That’s why it’s not a priority.”

That may be starting to shift. “Google has done a good job at scaring people,” Vescovo adds – and that pressure could be exactly what’s needed to accelerate the race to adapt.