Dictators Have Learned to Use Interpol in Their Interests. What to Do If the Russian Federation Tries to Put You on an International Wanted List for a Political Charge? An Interview with Lawyer Alexey Obolentsev
Hundreds of Russian citizens abroad have been declared criminals in their homeland for their anti-war activities. Russian courts issue заочные приговоры (in absentia sentences), then special services try to use international institutions to pressure dissidents. Interpol's statute prohibits the organization from being used for politically motivated persecution, but in practice, dictatorships find loopholes in these rules. How does Interpol work, and what can be done to protect oneself from international persecution? Kirill Martynov, editor-in-chief of 'Novaya-Evropa,' discussed this with Alexey Obolentsev, a lawyer specializing in Interpol-related cases. Photo: Portuguese police at the Russian Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal, March 17, 2024. Antonio Pedro Santos / EPA. — My criminal case includes correspondence between an investigator and criminal investigation: the latter refuses to send a request to Interpol, citing that the case is politically motivated. Can I be happy? Alexey Obolentsev, a lawyer specializing in Interpol-related cases. — On one hand, this is good news. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation understand that Interpol will not accept documents in their current form because Article 3 of the organization's constitution prohibits politically motivated persecution. On the other hand, your document mentions direct intergovernmental mechanisms for your search and extradition. This is alarming, as the number of these mechanisms and their operational methods are not transparent and, therefore, have not been studied by the international human rights and legal communities. In my practice, I have not encountered such mechanisms: documents for search and arrest have always been sent through Interpol channels. But I know that, for example, France accepted direct requests from Ukraine solely within the framework of bilateral legal assistance agreements. Therefore, the Russian Federation authorities can formally attempt to use the legal system of another country. ‘ This most often concerns jurisdictions with relatively weak judicial independence – countries popular with tourists: the Middle East, the Far East, Africa. Now, traveling as a Russian opposition figure sometimes feels like playing football on a minefield. Okay, I won't be in Interpol's databases, but where can I go besides Canada, the USA, and EU countries? Can I go to Dubai, can I go to Istanbul? Interpol is the second largest international organization by number of member states after the UN. And the Russian Federation has legal assistance agreements on criminal matters with a large number of states. Therefore, if you are traveling somewhere, you should first check if such an agreement exists with the destination country. In addition, theoretically, one must be prepared for the possibility that a 'normal,' non-politicized charge might be fabricated against you, for example, fraud, embezzlement, smuggling, or violation of tax laws. And it could become grounds for initiating your search through Interpol. In my practice, there have been cases where Interpol refused to accept documents on economic charges, understanding that politics lay behind them. But there were also reverse cases: a person clearly persecuted for political reasons, with several political charges and convicted in absentia, suddenly received absurd economic charges that Interpol accepted for execution. It must be understood that Russia is not sleeping; employees of the international departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, FSB, and Prosecutor's Office are training, working, and they will use any mechanisms to not leave political opposition abroad in peace. Anti-war opposition march of Russians in Berlin, Germany, November 17, 2024. Anton Karliner / Sipa / Scanpix / LETA. — BBC published a story about how Russia, even after 2022, pursues dissidents through Interpol structures. Under various pretexts, the organization is asked, if not to issue a red notice – an obligation to detain and extradite the suspect – then at least to provide information on where to find these people. In particular, it was about Armen Aramyan, co-founder of the DOXA project: Russian authorities wanted Interpol to establish his location within the EU. What are the Russian authorities trying to achieve in such cases if they know extradition won't happen? — The Interpol wanted notice system is quite diverse: there is a red notice, blue, black, yellow, purple, UN notice. For each notice, there is a provision for sending requests to national Interpol bureaus worldwide. The example you cite is most likely related to an attempt to initiate a blue notice – it requests from member states all available information about the person of interest to the Russian Federation: where the person lives, where their bank accounts are, what about their family, property, what fines have they received. That is, everything that passes through the police should be transmitted through Interpol channels to Russia. Then Russia decides how to use it. I am aware of cases where a person had a blue notice and didn't know about it. They fly to an EU country, go through border control, check into a hotel. Information about this is sent to the Russian Federation, and at five in the morning, a police officer accompanied by a special forces unit appears at their hotel room door and says, “Excuse me, you have a red notice, please come with us.” This means that within a few hours, the color of the notice was changed at the national Interpol bureau in Moscow – and the person is detained. Therefore, the task of political activists who know they are facing criminal prosecution in Russia is to preemptively notify Interpol through the Commission for the Control of Files. The purpose of the letter: I am [name], here is my passport, I am being persecuted for political reasons, the risk of my data being transferred to Interpol is very high, I request that it be blocked and deleted and not accepted in the future, as its acceptance would violate Article 3 of your organization's constitution. ‘ If a person is a refugee or asylum seeker, all this is somewhat simpler: the transfer of information regarding them is strictly prohibited. In such a case, you need to write that you are a refugee or asylum seeker and request not only that any information from the Russian Federation not be accepted but even that no exchange of information about your contact with them be made. The Commission is obliged to notify the General Secretariat, and they are obliged to respond. This is a form of insurance. It is best to arrange it under any circumstances: at a minimum, they are obliged to inform you of incoming requests and provide their comments. Unfortunately, this is not absolute protection. Recently, there was a precedent: a Russian citizen with refugee status, whose data Interpol had removed from its system back in 2022, was somehow re-entered into the database, this time with a red notice. He was detained in an African country, despite the UNHCR notifying local authorities and Interpol of his refugee status and that he should not be deported to his country of origin. Interpol behaved extremely strangely: it simply did not block his data. As a result, the person was extradited to Russia, despite oral guarantees from the host country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And only after the extradition did Interpol write: sorry, we have blocked his data, apparently, there was some kind of error. I am now receiving rather absurd explanations from the Commission for the Control of Files regarding this case and am preparing to file a complaint with the police in France, where the organization's headquarters is located. Russian citizens queue at the Russian Embassy in Lisbon on the final day of voting in the Russian presidential elections, Portugal, March 17, 2024. Antonio Pedro Santos / EPA. In fact, Interpol pursued a refugee – and the refugee himself did not know about it because he had a certificate stating that he was not in the Interpol database and traveled with it. Neither he, nor his lawyers, nor the UNHCR office were notified of Russia's repeated request. So, the preemptive steps I mentioned earlier are necessary. This year alone, we have encountered another very dangerous precedent: a court in Morocco illegally revoked a person's refugee status, which had been granted to them in another country, and initiated extradition proceedings to Russia. Again, this was despite objections from the UNHCR. This case is now being considered by the UN Human Rights Committee. Interpol remains conspicuously silent again. — There is a situation where political persecution is obvious – as in the case of charges for participating in undesirable organizations, when Russian police themselves refuse to send a request to Interpol. There is a situation where criminal charges of economic crime are fabricated against a person, and then they have to prove to Interpol that the case is fabricated. But there seems to be another option: Russian authorities bring political charges under the most serious articles, declaring their opponents terrorists. I unfortunately have such a case: 23 members of the Anti-War Committee have been charged with seizing power and creating a terrorist community. How will Interpol process such applications without further clarification? And what to do in such a situation? — If it concerns a group of individuals accused of terrorist activities, one must assume that Interpol may accept such an application from the Russian authorities and issue, for example, a green notice or even a red one, if the organization is not notified in advance. There is an example of the persecution of a Russian opposition journalist who participated in a demonstration in front of the Russian Federation's cultural center in Ukraine back in 2014, and the Russian side fabricated a criminal case against him and declared him a terrorist wanted. Interpol took this case quite seriously for a long time – it took us over five years to convince the Commission to remove his data from the database. In the case of the Anti-War Committee, a collective letter signed by all defendants must be sent to Interpol. If each person writes individually, the commission may cite overload and consider each case separately, which will significantly delay the process. The letter should inform the organization that the signatories expect persecution from the Russian Federation in the form of wanted notices under a terrorism charge, that these cases are entirely politically motivated, with detailed reasons, and request that any incoming information from Russian sources regarding each participant be blocked and deleted. This will provide at least minimal insurance. And the General Secretariat will receive a signal that Russia is systematically using terrorist articles of the criminal code to persecute political opponents. Kirill Martynov at the conference of the Anti-War Committee of Russia in Strasbourg, France, May 20, 2026. Alamy / Vida Press. There is a more serious trend that is not widely discussed. If you go to the Interpol website and filter publicly posted notices with the Russian Federation as the requesting party, you will find that slightly less than half of the individuals sought through Interpol under a red notice are Russian citizens. They are mainly natives of the North Caucasus, and almost all are wanted on terrorism charges, presumably related to combat operations in Syria. Whether these people were there or not, no one knows for sure. And another telling figure: approximately 10% of individuals publicly sought by Interpol under a red notice are Russian women. If you consider an organization comprising over 150 countries, including highly populated ones like India, China, Nigeria, Brazil, or Japan, then 10% of individuals in one category from one country speak for themselves. ‘ Russia has truly learned to abuse this mechanism. Interpol accepts its applications without analyzing the substance or true motives. The level of trust in Russian requests, despite public declarations to the contrary, remains quite high. — Why does Interpol maintain relations with the Russian Federation in the context of the war? — Firstly, the Russian Federation is a member of the organization. According to Interpol's regulations, it is impossible to exclude it – the country must apply for withdrawal itself. Secondly, despite the UN resolution regarding the war against Ukraine, Interpol reacted minimally to this event: it announced that 'special requirements' would be imposed on notices from Russia, but what this actually entails has not been fully disclosed. Thirdly, Russia, as far as I understand, is one of the organization's donors. Fourthly, Interpol does not include, for example, North Korea or Kosovo, but Iran and other dictatorial regimes are full members. Interpol apparently does not consider it politically feasible to apply restrictions to a country that remains a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Plus, there is an obvious practical argument: if such a large territory on the planet were excluded, it would very quickly become a haven for organized crime. Therefore, Interpol tries to limit Russia but fears a complete break. — Is it possible to imagine a case where a real criminal convinces Interpol that their prosecution is politically motivated, citing numerous documented abuses by Russia? — Such cases are well-known. The previous head of Interpol's Commission for the Control of Files, Mr. Pyrlog, as far as is known from open sources, is currently in France under arrest: a corruption case is being investigated. According to the charges, using weaknesses in the organization's regulations, he and his accomplices, for money, removed data of individuals who were real criminals. The scheme was simple: his connections in Chisinau provided these individuals with asylum seeker status in Moldova – then the data of wanted individuals were blocked and removed from the database. The flag with the Interpol logo at the organization's headquarters in Lyon, France, September 30, 2023. Gonzalo Fuentes / Reuters / Scanpix / LETA. Among the defendants, as far as can be judged from fragmented publications – Interpol guards its reputation very zealously in this matter – were citizens of China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkey, and France. The public scandal began when a person wanted by France was released from extradition to the UAE based on Moldovan asylum. According to unconfirmed reports, the President of France personally contacted the President of Moldova and inquired on what grounds French citizens were granted asylum in that country. — How important is the post of Interpol President? What powers does it have? Do I understand correctly that dissidents from authoritarian countries care who occupies this post? The previous president was from the UAE – and this seemed to cause serious concern. Now a representative from France has been elected. — The President of Interpol is largely a ceremonial figure, like a constitutional monarch. They represent the organization in relations with international structures, chair official events, and are elected for four years. But when the president was a representative of the UAE, it was sometimes extremely difficult to explain to Interpol that there are refugees in the United Arab Emirates, despite the country not having signed the relevant convention: there was a certain diplomatic deference to the president of the international police organization. But the real decision-making center is the office of the Secretary-General, not the President. The current Secretary-General is a native of Brazil, the previous one was a citizen of Germany. All Secretaries-General are former members of national police forces. ‘ Here it is important to look at the level of corruption in their country of origin according to Transparency International: if it is high, it means we are dealing with a former police officer from an environment where corruption is the norm. Officially, everyone is honest and impeccable, but certain national practices inevitably carry over into any institutional environment. There are checks and balances – deputies, collegial procedures – but practice shows that the overall trend worsens when leadership comes from countries with low levels of democracy and high dependence of the judiciary on the executive branch. Interpol President Lucas Phillippe, Lyon, France, February 5, 2026. Alamy / Vida Press. — How is the decision-making system within Interpol structured? There is a ceremonial president, a Secretary-General, and his deputies. How collegial is this body? Is consensus needed for complex cases, or is a single official's signature sufficient? — The formal decision to accept data for consideration is made at the level of rank-and-file employees of the General Secretariat. A letter arrives from Moscow – okay, let's process it. What exactly is meant by the publicly announced 'increased attention' to requests from Russia is unclear: the mechanism itself is not disclosed. Are additional inquiries made? Is the public context of the case analyzed? When up to 50 orders can be received per day, it's impossible to keep track of everything. Something inevitably slips through. Incoming flow decisions are technical. It's different if an appeal for data deletion is received: then a commission makes the decision. It consists of seven people and a secretariat. Recently, at the secretariat level, I have observed a strange bureaucratic dynamic: obvious cases are delayed under contrived pretexts. For example, a person is a refugee, the documents are in order, the lawyer has a power of attorney – and a response comes: your power of attorney is incorrectly drawn up, please redo it. A delay of several months. Then it turns out that the power of attorney was correctly drawn up from the beginning. There was a completely curious case. My client is an asylum seeker in one of the European countries. The migration service, for some reason, did not enter his data into the registry, but there was a letter from the Minister of Internal Affairs guaranteeing non-expulsion. The minister personally advocated for the deletion of data from Interpol. The response was: we contacted the migration service, he is not in the registry, we will not delete the data. I wrote a second letter – in another working language of Interpol. It went to a different employee. Three days later: everything is fine, we are blocking the data. This means that changing the language automatically meant changing the executor. Why the first one responded this way, I don't know. I cannot accuse anyone without proof, but this situation raises serious questions. — Can Interpol be sued? — Judicial precedents exist – primarily in France, where the organization's headquarters is located in Lyon. I have not had such cases in my practice, so I rely on general information here. In cases of serious human rights violations, complaints can be filed in France. ‘ Interpol is not part of the UN system – unlike, say, the ILO or WHO: it only has observer status. This makes any legal proceedings long and difficult – the process can drag on for years. What I know for sure: Interpol reacts painfully to publicity when it is caught in illegal actions. Criticizing Interpol, I often refer to the history of this organization, which was led by Kaltenbrunner during World War II, and at that time, it was involved in the persecution of political opponents and anti-fascists. The current commission formally exists to prevent such things from happening again, but in practice, cases of persecution of political activists, refugees, people with mental disorders, and national minorities continue, including at the request of the Russian Federation. In my practice alone, there have been two cases where Russia sent data of people with serious mental illnesses to Interpol. We warned that if they were returned to Russia, they would be subjected to torture and inhumane treatment – the organization continued the persecution with the standard response: your mental illness may be grounds for refusing extradition or applying for asylum, but that is not our concern. Frankly speaking, Interpol does not need a Commission for the Control of Files to consider complaints from database subjects: if you are involved in searching for criminals – search for criminals, find a way not to get involved in politics. The very existence of the commission indicates that the organization lacks internal mechanisms to independently distinguish between criminal and political matters. And the corruption scandal with its former chairman shows that even existing procedures are extremely vulnerable. Interpol headquarters in Lyon, France, September 30, 2023. Laurent Cipriani / AP / Scanpix / LETA. — Do I understand correctly that the Commission for the Control of Files is not a completely ordinary structural unit of Interpol? — It is a structural unit with special status. The commission has more independence than other units: it has the right to request information from the General Secretariat, has direct access to the database, and is not obliged to notify the General Secretariat of the data provided by the applicant: location, names of lawyers, etc. On paper, this looks solid. But there are two fundamental problems. The first is that we don't know who actually works in the commission's secretariat. The second is that it is an elected body, but the elections take place within Interpol. It is written nicely about the commission members that they are lawyers with experience in human rights and criminal law, but there is no external observer, no independent human rights structure that could verify their qualifications. In essence, Interpol creates a quasi-human rights body for itself. At the same time, and this is paradoxical, before the corruption scandal, the commission was one of the most effective tools for protecting human rights. The European Court of Human Rights could consider cases for years, and in some cases, the commission recognized the political nature of persecution in less than nine months. With this decision, it was already possible to achieve concrete results in the courts of other countries. After the scandal, the commission published a notice on its website – it is still there – that due to limited budget and increased volume of applications, complaint processing times may exceed regulatory limits. Now, in my practice, there are cases that are being considered for two, two and a half years. What was previously an urgent tool for freeing people from red notices has turned into another slow bureaucratic machine. My clients have gone so far as to hold demonstrations in Lyon – in front of Interpol headquarters. ‘ This worked: decisions were reviewed, data was deleted quite quickly. An interesting and effective way to influence the slowness of an international organization. — What, in your opinion, are Russia's real goals when it sends blue notices requesting information? And how much of a targeted operation is this, meaning how difficult is it for Russia to achieve real action from Interpol if it needs to, for example, fabricate a criminal case? — Regarding financial costs – I don't know if Russia pays for placing notices. If you mean human and administrative resources – this is a fairly mass production when there is political will. In my practice, cases have been initiated in two ways. The first is commissioned cases: a competitor found a loyal investigator or head of the investigative body, and the case is initiated. The second is cases initiated by special services. The FSB says, 'Look into these people,' and the machine starts. There is almost no documentary evidence of this – it is destroyed or not recorded initially. There are fewer and fewer lawyers in Russia willing to work in this direction. The system then works. If a case is taken into production, the investigator is obliged to pursue it. There is no situation where they say at some stage, 'This is politics, I won't deal with it.' They start – to the best of their ability and imagination – fabricating materials. Standard phrases are carried from case to case: 'Unidentified persons at an unidentified time and place committed unidentified criminal acts.' As a result, Article 159 or 160 appears. If the person, according to the investigation, has fled, the investigator is obliged to declare them federally wanted first, then – having received confirmation from the FSB that they have crossed the border – initiate an international search. Not doing so would be negligence. Then comes the pre-trial detention measure in absentia, materials are sent to the National Central Bureau of Interpol in Moscow, and the files go to Interpol's General Secretariat. In your case, there was a glitch in this chain. In most others – there wasn't. Building of the Russian Embassy in Berlin, Germany, April 29, 2026. Markus Lenhardt / dpa / Scanpix / LETA. — You worked extensively with Chechen cases before the war. What is the dynamic there now? How active is Interpol in searching for Chechens? What role does Kadyrov play? — I have a moral obligation to the Chechen people. In the 90s, I lived in Stavropol, and we all sincerely believed that the war would end on its own, all Chechens would be quickly defeated, and so on – this was a profound misunderstanding of what was actually happening. Therefore, helping these people and their families is my personal duty. Today, two trends are observed regarding Chechens. The first concerns the older generation who fought in the 90s: old cases are being revived and sent to Interpol under the qualification of either 'terrorism' or 'mass murder of police officers.' It is necessary to prove that these were combat operations. Many of these people have lived in Europe for a long time, have obtained citizenship, their families are already Belgian, German, French, they are fully integrated. Nevertheless, Russia declares them wanted through Interpol. The second trend is the so-called 'Syrian' trend. Kadyrov's supporters actively use it: any undesirable person who left Chechnya and ended up, for example, in Turkey is accused of participating in illegal armed groups. ‘ The logic is simple: Turkey borders Syria – therefore, they were in Syria, therefore, they are a terrorist. Those who cannot be directly accused of participating in combat operations are charged with 'assistance' or 'financing' – allegedly transferring money to terrorists. Testimonies against such refugees are usually extracted under torture, or a universal witness who 'saw and knows everyone' appears in the cases, and, according to the latest information, people simply sign blank sheets of paper. Any conflict is sufficient – not necessarily political, a financial or domestic dispute with representatives of certain teips is enough for a person residing abroad to be threatened with international search. These cases are extremely difficult to work with if the person does not have refugee status, especially when it comes to those living in Turkey or Egypt. In general, the situation with Muslims is worsening. It doesn't matter if you are Chechen, Dagestani, Kabardian, or Balkar – if you left Russia and said something against the authorities on YouTube, you might end up in the Interpol database under the charge of spreading extremist views. The same mechanism is actively used by Central Asian countries, primarily Tajikistan. — What has changed since the start of the war? Is there a special line – deserters, people accused by Russia of participating in 'illegal armed groups'? — With the start of the war, there was a short period when requests from Russia were processed more strictly. Now I observe the opposite trend: they are readily accepted. Regarding 'illegal armed groups' – this is automatically a terrorism charge, Article 205 and its subsections. With deserters, it's different in my practice: I haven't yet encountered Interpol issuing a wanted notice for deserters. After all, desertion is an obvious military charge, it is a person's refusal to participate in combat operations, and it is difficult to explain it as 'terrorism.' But I would not rule out such cases in the future. For political charges, Russia already understands that it will be refused. Therefore, in my opinion, the following will happen: for prosecution, charges that appear to be criminal rather than political will be used. For example, the 'foreign agent' law itself is obviously political, and it is difficult to issue a wanted notice under it. But if a person has not paid a fine – that's already evasion of mandatory payments. Or they left Russia and took jewelry that belongs to them – then it's smuggling. The main thing is that the task is set: if there is a person – there will be a charge. Police officers patrol the Trocadéro square near the Eiffel Tower in Paris, France, October 17, 2023. Michel Euler / AP / Scanpix / LETA. — Is it possible to create a checklist for a person who finds out they are wanted or are about to be wanted by Interpol? — First – determine your legal status. Refugee or asylum seeker status protects against expulsion internationally. Third-country citizenship does not provide this protection. A regular visa, residence permit, German paragraph 22, even paragraph 24, which Ukrainian refugees receive – none of this protects against Interpol. One must also understand the specific conditions of the country of residence. Turkey, by its constitution, does not extradite its citizens. Israel does. Investment citizenship – Cyprus, Turkey, other countries – can be annulled in the case of Interpol. Prepare for the worst. Second – understand the substance of the claims. Is there a criminal case? If so, under what article? Is it politicized or not? If it is not obviously politicized – look for grounds that confirm political persecution. Third – notify Interpol of your situation. Here arises a fundamental fork in the road: if a person is not a refugee and has not applied for asylum, there are no restrictions on information exchange with Russia. Contacting Interpol in such a case may lead to exactly what the person is trying to protect themselves from. If the case is political but not obvious – it is more advisable to seek protection in the country of residence, including applying for asylum. ‘ No matter how long and exhausting this process may be, there is practically no alternative: a person with a criminal case will not receive their next Russian foreign passport. In parallel, it is advisable to engage a lawyer in Russia who will obtain the court proceedings materials and file complaints under Articles 124-125 of the Criminal Procedure Code regarding illegal actions of the investigator. From these documents, it is sometimes possible to establish the political background of the case. Support from the human rights community is also useful – not a decisive argument, but it carries some weight. Although the Commission recently wrote to me directly: Freedom House's conclusion is a good document, but not decisive for us. — Do you believe Interpol needs reform? — Reform is necessary. The question is who and how will carry it out. An organization created in Monaco as a structure for finding fugitive criminals has grown into something entirely different. At the same time, the headquarters staff is no more than 100–150 people; everything else consists of national Interpol bureaus. Essentially, it is not so much the organization itself that needs reform, but the UN, which gave birth to the post-war Interpol in its current format. Countries that have weight in the UN also have weight in Interpol – and this is a fundamental problem that cannot be solved from within. The United States has left Interpol several times and returned, believing that their citizens should not be sought through international warrants. Interpol is part of a certain world order, and now, as this world order is changing, the entire system is changing. Speaking of specific changes, the requirements for the evidence base need to be significantly increased. Currently, a formal decision by a national court for arrest is sufficient – and Interpol initiates a search. A country wishing to search for someone must prove that the person is indeed a criminal, not just present court documents, which are worth little in authoritarian systems. Cooperation with the human rights community needs to be strengthened – not through closed correspondence, but publicly. Interpol must be accountable for its work openly. For now, the organization hides behind the argument of operational secrecy: if we disclose information, criminals will escape. As a result, it remains a closed structure that dictatorial regimes have learned to use for their own purposes – and so far, quite successfully. The state flag of the Russian Federation on the roof of the Russian Embassy building in Berlin, Germany, August 9, 2023. Clemens Bilan / EPA.
