Novaya Gazeta Europe

Cover image for 'We have a lot of experience surviving in sulfuric acid.' Interview with Yabloko party chairman Nikolai Ryabakov

'We have a lot of experience surviving in sulfuric acid.' Interview with Yabloko party chairman Nikolai Ryabakov

47-year-old teacher and ecologist Nikolai Ryabakov is the fourth chairman of the Yabloko party. He joined the party in 1995 and rose from a rank-and-file member to the head of Russia's largest and still not banned anti-war organization. Ryabakov became party chairman in 2019, during which time mass political repression, the start of a full-scale war, and the transition of Putinism into a totalitarian form have occurred. 'Novaya-Baltiya' spoke with Ryabakov about the 2026 Duma campaign, the persecution of party members, and whether it makes sense to participate in elections that do not determine state policy. Also discussed are the youth joining the party, human rights work, and the nature of protest voting in these elections. Chairman of Yabloko, Nikolai Ryabakov, at a briefing at the party's central office, Moscow, September 10, 2023. Photo: Dmitry Lebedev / Kommersant / Sipa USA / Vida Press. The text was first published on the website of 'Novaya Gazeta Baltiya' - Direct question: what are the electoral prospects for a party without administrative resources and alliances with the authorities in Russia in 2026? - One could ask the same question about life in Russia in general: what are the life prospects for all of us who are not in power? We have no other choice. But we can change the circumstances in which we live. It is difficult to say now whether they can be changed. That is why many people have decided that it is impossible to influence what is happening and do not even do what is within their power. I proceed from a different premise: in this life, one must do what one must. Based on the fact that we are united in a party, I do what our entire collective must do. Will this affect the course of events? It largely depends on whether millions and tens of millions of people support us. If this happens, the probability of positive change will sharply increase. 'Yabloko has consistently advocated for the peaceful resolution of all possible conflicts for over 30 years and has always opposed wars. If people say they want politicians who save lives, the situation will change. Then it can be considered that we have not worked in vain. I would note that 'Yabloko' has never existed in the most favorable conditions. We have always faced repression against our comrades. Party members have been killed for their beliefs: it is enough to recall Yuri Shchekochikhin and Larisa Yudina. We, unfortunately, have extensive experience of surviving in sulfuric acid. - We will discuss current persecutions and repressions separately. But let's first discuss the campaign for the September elections: with what calls and slogans does 'Yabloko' appeal to the voter? - Since February 24, 2022, our slogan has not changed. Before that, each election campaign had a new title. Now we have one slogan for any election, whether municipal or State Duma: 'For Peace and Freedom.' Its interpretation: immediate signing of a ceasefire agreement. This year, a continuation appeared because we are thinking about what will happen after [the end of the war]: 'For a Life Without Fear.' We want people to build their future in Russia, not leave, not be afraid to live here, not be afraid for their children and parents. And not be afraid of being eavesdropped on, censored, fined, and imprisoned. Freedom and life without fear in one's own country – this is what we are going to all upcoming elections with: parliamentary, regional, and local. - And yet, how do you assess the party's prospects in these elections, and what results would you consider most successful? - Alex, we do not perceive the current elections as a mechanism for forming government bodies. Unfortunately, this is not the case. For us, they are an opportunity to convey our position on the main issue. For people, this is perhaps the only legitimate and relatively safe way now to express disagreement with the government's policy on it. We do not know of any other way for tens of millions of people to do this. Therefore, we are not talking about any specific result - it can be anything. If our campaign helps to stop the loss of life, then we have achieved success. If such an atmosphere arises in society that everyone goes and votes for the 'Yabloko' list, the peace list, in September, this mood will influence the government's decisions. Yes, someday there will be elections again where state policy is actually formed. Now this is not the case. Voting today is, to a certain extent, a civic act that allows you to come and express your position. Nikolai Ryabakov at a lecture at the 'Yabloko' office in Moscow, February 19, 2024. Photo: Irina Buzhor / Kommersant/ Sipa USA / Vida Press. - Regarding your list. Many 'Yabloko' candidates are removed from elections by the authorities through fines for reposts, images, and other mechanisms invented by them. How do you plan to maintain your list? - The effect of a football team works here. There are many people who know how to play football. Yes, the main squad is disqualified, but there is a second squad, a youth team, and a huge number of people who can take the field. You are right, the strategy, or rather the tactic, of the authorities is to remove prominent party members from elections in various ways. Some are imprisoned, some are put on the foreign agent list—I would call it an insulting list—some are fined minimal amounts that formally deprive them of the right to participate in elections. But overall, they have not removed that many people, and they will not be able to completely disrupt the formation of our party list. The next team will come onto the field. Moreover, we continue to appeal the fines. Regarding my own fine (Ryabakov was fined in December 2025 for posting a photo of Alexei Navalny on social media. - Editorial note), we are awaiting a decision from the Supreme Court by June 26. We are doing everything to get it overturned. But whatever happens next, we will all campaign for our list. - Well, you understand that if the authorities set such a task, they can remove the next team through the same mechanisms... - There are millions of people in Russia who support our position. You cannot fine millions of people. - Well, not everyone is ready to go into public politics. - In the end, we don't need a million, but three hundred people - three hundred Spartans. That's the list we plan to field. It's quite feasible. But something else is more important. 'The main result of the campaign is not mandates, but the opportunity for people to express themselves, a change in public sentiment. For years, both the authorities and some of the opposition have convinced people that elections decide nothing. Now we have to work against this machine: to prove that voting remains a way to express one's position. Ivan the Terrible failed to destroy free-thinking people in the country. Nicholas I failed, Stalin failed. The current authorities will not succeed either. Yes, repressions affect the fates of specific individuals. When our colleague from Khakassia, journalist Mikhail Afanasyev, is sent to a penal colony for five and a half years, he is separated from his children for half of their childhood. This will affect their future. But it cannot lead to a situation where there are no people left in Russia ready to say: there is nothing more important than human life, nothing more important than people's rights and freedoms, and the state must serve this, not itself. This cannot be eradicated. Nikolai Ryabakov at a briefing at the 'Yabloko' office, Moscow, September 10, 2023. Photo: Dmitry Lebedev / Kommersant / Sipa USA / Vida Press. - I completely agree with you here, but I wanted to ask more about political maneuvers. Are you prepared, for example, in extreme cases, to call for voting for candidates from other parties? - This is impossible. Russia now effectively has a two-party system. There is one large party of Putin, with various factions within it: communists, Zhirinovsky's nationalists, populists, 'A Just Russia,' 'New People,' pseudo-Greens, Stalinists - these are all Putin's parties. And there is 'Yabloko.' That's the whole system. To call for voting for one of Putin's parties - no, we cannot. - Yet some politicians have used such tactics... - This is a catastrophic policy, and now, I hope, its erroneousness is obvious to everyone. One cannot call for voting for participants in cannibalistic parties just because they have not yet tasted human flesh. As a result, they get into the State Duma and compete to see who most loudly supports Putin's policies. - The alternative is harsh pressure, as in your case. This includes criminal cases against your regional leaders, fines against candidates, and other ways to make life more difficult. - This can be called a form of dialogue with the authorities. We say that we have a position for peace, and the authorities respond: well, here's another [court] proceeding for you. And we understand that the more people in the country support us, the stronger this pressure will be. - What is the latest chapter in this not-so-pleasant dialogue? - It could be unfolding right now, while we are talking, we just don't know about it yet. But among the important recent events, on the evening of May 25, the head of our faction in the Petrozavodsk City Council, a member of the party's Federal Bureau, a well-known ecologist and my namesake Dmitry Ryabakov, was detained. He was held at the police station all night to be convicted in the morning on charges of disseminating extremist materials, which, of course, are not extremist at all. Standard tactics. 'If we talk about the overall picture, almost all deputies of regional parliaments from 'Yabloko' have received fines with disqualification from running. Twelve party members have acquired the status of foreign agents, including my deputies Boris Vishnevsky, Lev Shlosberg, and Vladimir Dorokhov, as well as Nobel laureate Dmitry Muratov and human rights activist Svetlana Gannushkina. Three members of the federal leadership are currently on trial: Maxim Kruglov, Lev Shlosberg, Konstantin Smirnov. Three have been convicted: Mikhail Afanasyev in Khakassia, Vasily Neustroev in St. Petersburg, Vladimir Efimov in Kamchatka. In total, we have had over forty detentions and administrative proceedings. The total amount of fines is 8.5 million rubles. Before that, there was a major case in Irkutsk: our branch head Grigory Gribenko, who was supposed to become a candidate [in the elections] for the Duma, was arrested twice. In December [2025], he organized a rally in defense of Lake Baikal, which I attended. In January, a rally against internet blockages was planned, but the authorities decided they didn't need so many rallies and explained to Grigory that they would cancel not only the rally but him as well. - Do you still have any means of communication with voters? - We use any opportunity. Imagine having to swim across a raging ocean, with waves and sharks around. We swim as best we can: sometimes freestyle, sometimes breaststroke, sometimes doggy paddle, if we find a log - we cling to it. If there's airtime, we use airtime; if there are social networks, we use social networks; if there's an opportunity to meet people in person - we meet. We will do everything legal that can be done, we will not refuse anything. Moreover, even in the calm 2000s, we were forbidden to distribute leaflets and put up advertisements, let alone now. But there is one peculiarity. Now we are clearly associated with the anti-war agenda. If a person in Russia in 2026 understands that the country should take a different path, they will see 'Yabloko' on the ballot and vote for it, regardless of whether the campaign reached them or not. - Can you estimate the approximate number of your supporters? - I am sure that in these elections, the determining issue is peace. Therefore, we should measure not party ratings, but how many people advocate for an end to the killings. According to polls, this is about 60% of Russians. And it turns out that 'Yabloko' is with this majority. All other parties divide the votes of the minority among themselves. As for sociology, even the polls published by VTsIOM record qualitative changes: 'Yabloko's' electorate is getting younger, and young people are voting for the party more actively. But I would not talk about quantitative results. In conditions of a completely cleared information field, when it is impossible to properly introduce oneself, sociological surveys do not reflect the real picture. - Let's talk about youth, as it is among the youth that there are the most supporters of peace and change. How is work with young supporters organized, and how strong is 'Molodezhnoye Yabloko' (Youth Yabloko)? - We do not divide party members into youth and others; everyone works together. But after February 24, 2022, and especially in the last two years, changes are noticeable. First, there are more people willing to join the party. Second, the proportion of young people among them has sharply increased. 'Previously, mainly middle-aged people came to us. Now, those who have just turned 18, and even 14-16-year-olds, are joining the party. And they were born after 'Yabloko' last was in the State Duma [in 2003]. They do not carry the burden of party history, but they see our position today and understand that it reflects their interests. And the interests are simple: to live in Russia, not to leave, not to die, to start families, businesses, to develop creatively. We are not the only ones who see this - the authorities see it too. Hence projects like 'New People': an attempt to create the illusion of a party for the future, for freedom, for peace. But then they come to the State Duma and vote the same way as 'United Russia,' and sometimes even more cynically. Young people online, fortunately, can read this. I see this from the videos that young people themselves shoot and send me: they understand that there are parties that deceive, and there are parties that are truly for peace and freedom. - In Yekaterinburg, a group of young 'Yabloko' supporters disbanded under pressure. What happened there? - We are a liberal party, and our internal rules are not always strict. In Yekaterinburg, there was a group of young people who were not party members but called themselves 'Youth Yabloko.' We are grateful to them as supporters. But repression does its job. One cannot blame people for becoming scared. Unfortunately, this is a natural reaction. There is nothing shameful about it. The party in Yekaterinburg and the Sverdlovsk region continues to operate; we are preparing for regional elections in September. This has not affected our positions. - So, they were pressured by law enforcement agencies? - Yes. There were already second searches in a year. Armed security forces came to the office. This is absolutely unacceptable, and we have expressed our protest against what is happening. - There is an opinion that the Kremlin wants to liquidate the entire party. Can the authorities decide to dissolve 'Yabloko'? - This is not a question that is on my work agenda. If we proceed from this, how can we build our work and our lives? We are doing everything to continue our activities in any organizational and legal form. And we will not change our position. - Let's fantasize and imagine that 'Yabloko' returns to the State Duma. What would be your first legislative proposals? - It will return; there's no need to even imagine it. The first package is unequivocal: the repeal of all repressive laws. Starting with the 'Orphan's Law' ('Dima Yakovlev Law' prohibiting the adoption of Russian children by Americans. - Editorial note), one of the most demonstratively anti-human laws. And then - laws on foreign agents, undesirable organizations, and any other discriminatory laws. People should have the freedom to express their opinions, freedom of assembly, freedom to build the country as they see fit. Personally, I would add: all environmental protection laws adopted since 2000 must be repealed. Since then, there has been continuous degradation of environmental legislation. It is this that made possible, for example, the deforestation in the Baikal ecological zone. In the 2000s, our environmental law was ahead of European law. Now we have lost all of it and given nature to those who destroy it. - Who will be part of 'Yabloko's' dream team and become the face of the party in the elections? - I suggest we talk about this after our pre-election congress. If we name the names now, we will essentially give the authorities a list of those they haven't yet managed to fine. After nomination, fines are not allowed - then we will talk. - 'Yabloko' seems to be a rare example of a Russian party where a real change of leadership has occurred. Has Yavlinsky, around whom the party was once built, stepped away from an active role? - Yavlinsky has not stepped away from anything. That's the value: all former chairmen continue to work actively. Grigory Yavlinsky heads the federal political committee; Emilia Slabunova and Sergey Mitrokhin are its members. Slabunova, by the way, has also been fined - she heads our faction in the Karelian Legislative Assembly. The example we want to set for society is that the change of leadership does not mean the former chairman should be removed and excluded [from party life]. He continues to work in a unified team. Nikolai Ryabakov. Photo: Igor Ivanko / Kommersant/ Sipa USA / Vida Press. - In addition to public politics, 'Yabloko' has recently taken on a human rights function. In particular, you demanded that the head of the Federal Penitentiary Service conduct an official investigation when political prisoner Azat Miftakhov reported torture in a penal colony. Tell us a little about this. - This is very important both for us and for our country. If we look at the last hundred-plus years of Russian history, there has been a process of dehumanization and the cultivation of disregard for the value of human life. World War I, the Russian Revolution, the Red Terror, the Civil War, collectivization and famine, the Great Terror, the Great Patriotic War, the Siege of Leningrad as a separate component... And then Afghanistan, the two Chechen wars, and the situation we have reached. All this time, the authorities have done everything to make the value of human life zero or even negative. So that a person as an individual means nothing in the face of mythical state interests, its mythical greatness, which was determined solely by the ability to wage war. If the greatness of the state were measured by successes in science, education, and the longevity and quality of people's lives, there would be other priorities and decisions. 'But greatness is intentionally cultivated precisely through military actions and through the devaluation of human life: you are a cog, a splinter that will fly off without leaving a trace. A change in state policy as a whole is impossible without protecting every individual, regardless of their political views. I don't know what Azat Miftakhov's views are, and I'm not interested in that now. No one should be subjected to violence, torture, or actions that humiliate human dignity. When amendments to the Constitution were introduced [in 2020], 'Yabloko' became the only party to propose alternatives to Putin's proposals. One of our amendments was a constitutional ban on torture and criminal prosecution for it. World practice is such that if a problem is not resolved at the level of ordinary laws, it must be enshrined in the Constitution as an inviolable norm. Unfortunately, practice has shown the relevance of this proposal. Therefore, in addition to our own inquiries, we urge our supporters to write them. One of 'Yabloko's' supporters wrote to me before our conversation that she is also sending her inquiries regarding Miftakhov's case. And we also need to write letters to political prisoners. Letter-writing evenings are held at party offices across the country. It is important for a person to know that they are remembered and that they are not alone. To all who have read this far into the interview, I urge you to visit the 'Yabloko' website - there are detailed instructions on how to write such letters. And if you know someone who is being unjustly persecuted, write to them. Alex Yesod

Factory in Cheboksary, Refinery in Samara, and the Panorama 'Defense of Sevastopol'. Which Objects Were Targeted by the Night Attack of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

This night, the Armed Forces of Ukraine attacked Cheboksary, Samara, the Vladimir region, and also annexed Crimea. Which objects in Russia became targets for the Ukrainian army - in the material of 'Novaya Gazeta Europe'. Cheboksary. The capital of Chuvashia came under rocket attack by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said the head of the republic Oleg Nikolaev. Later, he reported that three people were injured due to the attack - they received injuries of moderate and mild severity. He did not talk about damaged objects. "VNIIIR-Progress" came under fire - an enterprise that supplies radio-electronic products to the Ministry of Defense, as found out by the publication Astra and Ukrainian monitoring telegram channels. According to their estimates, the administrative building was seriously damaged, and a fire is still ongoing. "VNIIIR-Progress" has already been a target for Ukrainian attacks. The last of them occurred on the night of May 5. Then at least one of the drones of the Armed Forces of Ukraine hit a residential building, killing two people and injuring 35 more. Samara. Rocket and drone danger was also declared in the Samara region, according to publications by Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishev. In Samara, the Kuibyshev refinery caught fire due to the attack, Astra learned. This is one of the largest oil enterprises in the city, which is part of Rosneft. The Armed Forces of Ukraine have already carried out attacks on it, the last of which was in August 2025. Later, Fedorishev wrote that several enterprises in the region were damaged. Three people were injured. Vladimir region. In the region, two infrastructure facilities in the Kamyshkovsky and Alexandrovsky districts caught fire due to the attack, said Governor Alexander Avdeev. He did not specify what these facilities were. A fire broke out at the 'Vtorovo' oil pumping station (OPS) near Vladimir, Astra established. The 'Lobkovo' OPS on the border with the Moscow region and Sergiev Posad also came under fire, the Ukrainian project Exilenova+ added. Crimea. On the annexed peninsula, after an attack by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the panorama 'Defense of Sevastopol 1854-1855' caught fire, said the head of the city appointed by Russia, Mikhail Razvozhayev. The strike was targeted, he emphasized. 'The situation is extremely difficult: it is already clear that Franz Roubaud's great masterpiece is practically destroyed,' the official said. He did not talk about casualties. The fire was assigned the fourth level of complexity out of five possible. More than 80 people and 22 units of equipment are working on the site, Razvozhayev noted.

Cover image for Team "Fire!". The story of the Crimean Tatar partisan movement "ATESH". Since 2014, they have been operating in occupied territories, and now in Russian regions

Team "Fire!". The story of the Crimean Tatar partisan movement "ATESH". Since 2014, they have been operating in occupied territories, and now in Russian regions

They maintain social media, but without faces or names. They have no spokesperson to talk about their activities. They operate in occupied territory, and in recent years of the major war, also in Russian regions. They blow up, set fires, destroy, and conduct reconnaissance. They are Crimean Tatar partisans united under the name "ATESH". It means – fire. Not fire as an element, but "fire!" as a military command. Their claims of involvement in various acts of sabotage are generally impossible to verify independently. And some of their operations do not enter the public domain at all. However, this phenomenon – the partisan movement as a form of internal resistance – exists, so "Novaya-Europe" began to gather information about it bit by bit, and eventually we managed to talk to their commander. We also discussed with a specialist in the ethics of war how to evaluate the activities of partisans from the perspective of international law and morality. Illustration: "Novaya Gazeta Europe". Simferopol-2014. The Beginning It took six months to arrange a conversation with one of the founders and commanders of the Crimean Tatar partisans. His name is Enver, but this is, of course, a pseudonym. Even not all of his closest associates know his real name. In May 1944, Enver's grandfather was deported from Crimea along with two hundred thousand other Crimean Tatars. The relatives of many movement participants also experienced deportation and repression. So, for them, the occupation of Crimea 70 years later became a terrible continuation of the people's tragedy: it turns out that after Stalin's death, nothing ended, but was only "put on pause". According to Enver, the partisan movement can be considered to have begun in February 2014, when Crimean Tatar activists came out to the parliament in February to prevent the occupation, and "titushki" from Sevastopol were brought against them. Crimean Tatars came to the rally out of their own will, to defend the land of their ancestors, Enver recalls. But everything ended badly: it was the Crimean Tatars who were accused of organizing riots, and they became defendants in criminal cases. Then the activists realized that the occupation could not be overcome by peaceful rallies: everyone would simply be imprisoned, and the protests would be stifled. Many remember that rally, which took place on February 26, 2014. The Crimean parliament was then to consider the issue of the peninsula's status. Crimean Tatars and other local residents who opposed joining Russia came out to the building of the Supreme Council in Simferopol. They chanted "Crimea is not Russia!" and "Bandu – het!". The "titushki", in turn, chanted "Russia!" and tried to raise the Russian flag, which either slipped from the flagpole or was torn down by supporters of a united Ukraine. Then clashes began. The "titushki" threw flares at the protesters. They responded with flagpoles. Two rally participants – Igor Postny and Valentina Korneva – never returned home: they were trampled during the clashes. Crimean Tatars hold flags during a rally near the Crimean parliament building in Simferopol, Ukraine, February 26, 2014. Photo: Baz Ratner / Reuters / Scanpix / LETA. It was already clear where things were heading. And the head of the Mejlis (the representative body of the Crimean Tatars, established in 1991 and banned in Russia in 2016), Refat Chubarov, called for uniting into self-defense units: "When you return home, go to your neighbors, Russians, Ukrainians, people of other nationalities… Together, protect churches and mosques, together, watch over cemeteries, together, arrange schools." And at night, the parliament building was seized by unknown persons ("criminals", as they were called by the then acting president of Ukraine and speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, Oleksandr Turchynov), and by morning, instead of the Ukrainian flag, the Russian flag was flying over it. The occupation probably began with that rally. And then the Russian authorities initiated a criminal case for mass riots. The deputy chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, Akhtem Chiygoz, was sentenced to eight years in prison, and his colleague, Ilmi Umerov, to two years in a penal colony. The rally became a pretext for searches, threats, and intimidation of Crimean Tatars. Chiygoz's sentence seemed almost an act of humanism against the backdrop of what happened to the Crimean Tatar activist Reshat Akhmetov. On March 3, 2014, Reshat held a solo picket against the occupation of Crimea in the center of Simferopol and was abducted by unknown persons in camouflage. His body, with signs of torture, was found in a forest on March 15. "One of my friends climbed into the power lines with grenades" Some Crimean Tatars then left for Ukraine. But many stayed. They expected a blockade: they understood that otherwise Crimea could not be returned. But the Ukrainian government signed an agreement with Russia and began to sell electricity to Crimea. And then the Crimean Tatars began a civil blockade: they hoped that this would force the occupiers to leave. But they didn't succeed, and they had to take tougher measures: blow up power lines so that regardless of any signed agreements, electricity supplies to Crimea would become impossible. According to Enver, explosives for the power lines were brought by a Kharkiv friend of Crimean Tatar activists with the call sign "Samurai". It was a truly large-scale campaign, which began with the civil blockade of the peninsula announced by the Crimean Tatars and ended with a blackout: in two days – November 20 and 21, 2015 – four power lines supplying Crimea were put out of order. "A year after the power lines were blown up, I was awarded the honorary badge "Civil Blockade of Crimea"," recalls Crimean Tatar public figure Erfan Kudusov, who is personally acquainted with Enver and confirmed his identity to us. "Lenur Islyamov, one of the organizers of the blockade (Lenur Islyamov is a Crimean Tatar politician and businessman, sentenced in Russia in absentia to 19 years in prison for the blockade of Crimea and sabotage. – Ed.), presented me with the award. By the way, Lenur loves to use the word "atesh" – I don't rule out that he influenced the choice of the name for the movement." He presented the awards right next to the explosion site – in Novo-Alekseevka. After the power lines went out of order, the Ukrainian authorities tried to restore them. But the destroyed supports were guarded from repair by Crimean Tatars. Ukrainian special forces were sent there. And there, on one side of the road, stood a Crimean Tatar unit – the battalion of Noman Chelebidzihan (the first chairman of the government of the Crimean People's Republic, killed in 1918 by revolutionary sailors. – Ed.), and on the other – "ATO soldiers": "Azov", "Donbas" and, I think, "Aidar". Blood could have been shed. One of my friends climbed into the power lines with grenades. The situation was very difficult. And then we – editor-in-chief of "Ukrainska Pravda" Sevghil Musaeva, [Ukrainian journalist] Aider Muzhdabaev and I – called on Crimean Tatars in Kyiv to come out to Bankova Street. People came out. [President] Poroshenko summoned [previous head of Mejlis] Mustafa Dzhemilev and [current head –] Refat Chubarov to resolve the issue. A shopper in a grocery store, lit by candles due to a power outage, in Simferopol, Crimea, Ukraine, November 22, 2015. Photo: Pavel Rebrov / Reuters / Scanpix / LETA. On November 21, 2015, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, after a meeting with the leader of the Crimean Tatar people, Mustafa Dzhemilev, instructed the government to do everything necessary to completely stop trade with Crimea. Three weeks later, the Cabinet of Ministers decided to ban the supply of goods and services to the occupied peninsula. The campaign turned out to be successful. True, at that time it was not yet a formed partisan movement, but simply a group of Crimean Tatar activists. At first, no one thought about creating an organization. But when Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea began to be persecuted, it became clear that a long struggle lay ahead. However, Crimean Tatars are no strangers to struggle and exile. Before the full-scale invasion, Crimean Tatar activists were mainly engaged in studying the deployment of Russian troops in Crimea and occasionally engaged in sabotage – for example, disabling gas pipelines. But after February 24, the issue could be formulated differently: it was not just about returning Crimea, but about preserving Ukraine. In September 2022, the "ATESH" movement was finally formed. The core, Enver explains, remained the Crimean Tatar majority, but "ATESH" was joined in large numbers by Ukrainians and Russians. Enver keeps the structure of "ATESH" secret, but promises to reveal details after the war, saying that the model was OUN-B (a faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists that emerged in 1940 and was led by Stepan Bandera, hence the letter B in the name). In early 2023, a Telegram channel was created, the first post of which was the oath of an "ATESH" warrior, and the second was a short video manifesto. A man in a balaclava said: "We are the underground movement ATESH, which includes Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians, and Russians. We have mobilized into the Russian army and will destroy it from within. We will leak data on positions, warehouses, soldiers, and equipment. We will carry out sabotage at warehouses and headquarters. Every day there are more and more of us!" ATESH leaflet in Feodosia, August 2023. Photo: ATESH / Telegram. The Two Hundredth and Thirtieth After the partisan movement was formed and announced itself publicly, sabotage began in the occupied territories. According to Enver, from the very beginning, they understood that under these conditions, only a forceful approach was possible, not persuasion and negotiations. But a forceful approach is not only sabotage on power lines and railways. It is also the destruction of the enemy. It was they, the Crimean Tatar partisans, who took responsibility for two very high-profile actions: the murder of the deputy head of the occupation administration of Kherson, Kirill Stremousov, and the attempted assassination of Zakhar Prilepin (both reports on the "ATESH" Telegram channel, which Ukrainian media refer to, are now deleted). Kirill Stremousov was called the main media face of the Russian occupation. However, before the full-scale invasion, he was considered more of a town madman and a scandalist, who from time to time was involved in criminal cases, and in his free time wrote complaints about everyone he could. But with the start of the occupation, such people became extremely in demand. As early as March 2022, Stremousov created a gathering of collaborators in Kherson – the "Committee for the Salvation of Peace and Order". And a position appeared there, with unlimited power. In late October and early November 2022, Stremousov urged "not to listen to the malicious Ukrainian Nazi media" and swore that Russian troops would not leave Kherson. And on November 9, he unexpectedly died in a car accident. Almost simultaneously with the retreat of the occupiers from Kherson. Whether by chance or by plan – no one knew: neither the occupation forces nor the advancing Ukrainian army had time for investigations. According to Enver, Stremousov was arrogant and overconfident – he drove his SUV like a madman, ignoring traffic rules and not noticing anyone or anything around him. And when one of the partisans happened to be nearby (the action was not planned), then, as Enver says, "the rest was a matter of technique." Portrait of the deceased Kirill Stremousov during a mourning ceremony in Simferopol, Crimea, Ukraine, November 11, 2022. Photo: EPA. The story with Zakhar Prilepin was different. On May 3, 2023, his car was blown up in the Nizhny Novgorod region. The explosive device was detonated remotely. It was located under the passenger seat, but on that particular day, Prilepin himself was driving. His bodyguard and driver, Alexander Shubin, was in the passenger seat – he died on the spot. The severely wounded Prilepin was taken to the hospital and placed in an artificial coma. The Investigative Committee of Russia initiated a criminal case under the article "terrorist act". Alexander Permyakov was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment in this case. According to the prosecution, it was he who planted two radio-controlled anti-tank mines on the road in the Nizhny Novgorod region. In a conversation with me, the commander of "ATESH" neither confirmed nor denied whether Permyakov was somehow connected with the partisan movement. When asked why Prilepin was chosen, Enver replies that since he visited Kherson and agitated for the "Russian world", he, like any occupier, became a legitimate target in wartime. Propagandists are not as harmless as they seem and cause no less harm than aggressors with assault rifles, because largely thanks to them, volunteers continue to join the Russian army, believes the partisan commander. "We are used to perceiving partisans as some kind of spontaneous self-organized movement," says philosopher Arseny Kumanov, a specialist in the ethics of war and author of the books "War in the XXI Century" and "War, or Captive to Violence." "But historically – both in Napoleonic times and in the 20th century, including World War II – partisan movements were more often associated with regular armies and supported by them. They were, simply put, soldiers who acted in an unconventional way. Remember, Napoleon complained that the Russians were fighting incorrectly: their way of war was not noble. In our case, the situation is different: "ATESH" is, in my assessment, a self-organized movement. And the question of whether partisans fall under certain ethical norms and international law is more complex in this case. International law is not doing very well, because it, it turns out, should generally prohibit any partisan movement: because soldiers mimic civilians and can create additional danger for them. So, another question is important here: do people who lack the resources and capabilities to confront regular army units have the right to conduct combat operations against those they consider occupiers or traitors? It is also the right to liberation from occupation, the right to national self-determination. Damaged car after the assassination attempt on Zakhar Prilepin in the Nizhny Novgorod region, May 6, 2023. Photo: Anastasia Makarycheva / Reuters / Scanpix / LETA. "Let's Stop the War Together!" "Even before "ATESH" was formed into a movement, people remained in Crimea who, by virtue of their oath, patriotism, and initiative, began to help informationally, organizationally, and in other ways," recalls Erfan Kudusov. "Then such people appeared in occupied Henichesk, Melitopol, Novo-Alekseevka. Not only Crimean Tatars, but also Ukrainians. They, I would say, helped proactively. Naturally, there were also those whom our special services deliberately left there for intelligence work. Unfortunately, there was also a lot of betrayal during the occupation. Employees of the police and SBU defected to the occupiers in large numbers. And partisan activity became more valuable. In Crimea, you can be imprisoned for speaking Crimean Tatar or Ukrainian – vigilant citizens will call the FSB. And if a person has actually done something – drawn something, glued a leaflet, set fire to a relay cabinet – they will face huge sentences. My friends are in prison – some got 17, some got 20 years. Therefore, of course, there is fear. But at the same time, there is an understanding of Russian chaos. They cannot suppress social networks, they fight messengers, but unsuccessfully. New messengers, new technologies appear. A huge number of people play games, and within the game space, excellent information exchange takes place. It's very difficult to track. If earlier the main geography of "ATESH" was the occupied territories, then after the full-scale invasion, their actions began to spread to different regions. This means that Russians are joining the movement – at least, Crimean Tatars cannot "cover" such a number of regions. So, overnight, thousands of leaflets appear in Russian cities: in Nizhny Novgorod, Kostroma, Tambov, Tver, Saransk, Kursk, and also in Omsk, Novosibirsk, Kazan. Then an "ATESH" agent infiltrates the radio plant of the air defense concern "Almaz-Antey" in Balakhna, Nizhny Novgorod region. Then participants of the movement, who joined the Russian army, conduct filming from a training ground in the same region during exercises. ATESH leaflets calling to stop the war. Photo: Civil Force / Telegram. The story of Gennady Artemenko, whom "Novaya Gazeta Europe" wrote about, also happened in the Nizhny Novgorod region, in Dzerzhinsk. He was accused of state treason, including for "ATESH" leaflets that appeared in the city almost every night. True, after Gennady's arrest, the leaflets did not stop appearing, but the accusation, based on footage from a distant surveillance camera (the video only shows a silhouette in a jacket, and the investigation could not establish the identity), remained. By the way, those leaflets did not call for killing Putin or blowing up a military unit – they said: "Let's stop the war together!" In the Nizhny Novgorod region, by the way, the hunt for spies was active. One can recall the case of pensioner Lev Lerman, who was accused of espionage, but when nothing could be found at all: neither on his phone, nor on his computer, nor on video cameras among the silhouettes pasting "ATESH" leaflets, a second search was conducted and 10 cartridges were found (only police officers were present during the "discovery"). Lerman was sent to a penal colony. Perhaps such activity of the special services in the Nizhny Novgorod region is related to the attempt on Prilepin. Or perhaps it is also due to the fact that "ATESH" leaflets continue to appear there regularly, even after all the arrests. And now not only with calls to stop the war together, but also with calls to join the partisan movement, which sounds even more radical to the authorities. " But so far, none of the movement's participants have been caught by Russian special services or ended up in prison, say the leaders of the Crimean Tatar partisans. Two years ago, the movement acquired a cyber-partisan unit – "Cyber ATESH". Last year, cyber partisans disabled the Russian registry of electronic summons; attacked "Alfa-Bank" and "Rosselkhozbank"; hacked the phones of employees of an enterprise producing drones and extracted logistics and UAV transfer schemes to troops; obtained secret documents on the combat duty of Black Sea Fleet cutters. And, of course, personnel lists are always relevant for them: these, the partisans say, will be useful for future accountability. By the way, according to Enver, most of the "cybers" are Russians. "Regarding the national composition – how many Crimean Tatars, how many Ukrainians, and how many Russians are there now – I won't tell you, and no one will," says Erfan Kudusov. "But I assure you that if there is one or two Crimean Tatars in any unit, that unit can safely be called Crimean Tatar." When "ATESH" formed as a partisan movement, most Crimean Tatars perceived it with joy. But many were scared. The situation in Crimea has changed dramatically. Conditionally speaking, every third person there is now in uniform. And special services are creating an atmosphere of fear. Intelligence, agent, and sabotage work are being carried out as they have been all this time. But all attempts to get close to the top officials have been unsuccessful: it is so saturated with special services that it is impossible to describe in words. According to Kudusov, many Crimean Tatars were forced to leave: some – to Europe, others – to Ukraine, and now they are fighting in various units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. "They do not advertise themselves under any circumstances, do not maintain social media, do not speak out publicly," he continues. "Because we have large families, and everyone has relatives left in Crimea." "And if there is even a vague suspicion that your relative is fighting, they will first send a district police officer to you – like a "black mark", then the prosecutor's office, the Investigative Committee, the FSB. People live in constant fear. Husbands "close themselves off" from their wives so as not to blurt out anything extra. I don't want to call – like, come on, Crimean Tatars, everyone join "ATESH" – but we really need more people and strong resistance. Over the past year, I have attended seven funerals. And I understand perfectly well that resisting means putting yourself in mortal danger. But not resisting means that there will be not seven, but seven thousand funerals. A soldier with the flag of the Crimean Tatar people, Kyiv, Ukraine, April 7, 2023. Photo: Alina Smutko / Reuters / Scanpix / LETA. "If we don't resist, we will simply disappear" People join "ATESH" voluntarily. But sometimes it happens that partisans have to recruit someone from the Russian military to obtain information or to blindly use the recruited person to carry out sabotage. There's no need to invent complex schemes and multi-step combinations. Enver says that the best argument for recruiting military personnel is money. And also alcohol, which the partisans promise to deliver to their unit's location: cars with military personnel are stopped at checkpoints and vodka is searched for, while families of civilian residents of Crimea can pass all these posts without inspection, which is what they use. Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian businessmen help "ATESH" members, so they have money for work, including recruitment. According to Enver, all this time they have not met a single ideological occupier who refused to betray their homeland: they immediately start bargaining. Back in 2022, Crimean Tatar partisans came up with a project for those who did not want to fight against Ukraine but lacked the courage to desert and go to prison. "ATESH School" is an online educational project in which movement instructors trained Russian soldiers in sabotage: damaging military equipment, ammunition, and fuel. " Partisans say that over the year of the project's existence (it ended in August 2023), four thousand people completed training in the online school. But this was a temporary thing. They came up with it, did it, and finished it. It is impossible to determine the effectiveness of the school: everything that was done online remains there, and if someone who completed the course actually engaged in sabotage, they are unlikely to notify anyone about it. They would prefer it to remain a secret forever. Or, at least, until the end of the war. The partisans themselves do not comment or provide details – they only say that feedback still exists and that in several well-known cases, the lessons of "ATESH School" worked. However, they talk openly about their other actions. For example, on November 12, 2022, the "ATESH" Telegram channel published a statement: "In the military hospitals of Simferopol, ATESH agents successfully liquidated 30 servicemen of the Russian Army. 30 unfortunates whom we helped reach God's judgment" (this entry is now deleted, but its screenshots remain in the messages of Ukrainian media). The same Telegram channel published a list of the deceased (only screenshots remain). The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation did not confirm or deny this information. According to Enver, several partisans got jobs as volunteers in a military hospital and replaced IV drips, resulting in the deaths of dozens of patients. It was not difficult to do this, he says, because people who came to the hospital and offered themselves as volunteers were not even checked for documents. The partisan commander claims that they all managed to leave for Turkey – it was the fastest and easiest way. Wounded Russian serviceman in a Russian Ministry of Defense hospital in Simferopol, Crimea, Ukraine, June 28, 2022. Photo: Dmitry Makeev / TASS / Profimedia. In December 2022, "ATESH" members recruited, or rather bribed, a private from a military unit in the village of Sovetsky. The soldier, Enver says, "turned out to be very greedy and bargained for a long time." But in the end, he agreed and carried a bag into the barracks' quartermaster's room. At night, the bag caught fire and burned down the barracks. The fact is that Crimeans know everything about this military unit – before the occupation, it was Ukrainian unit A-4519. And in Nova Kakhovka in February 2023, partisans tracked down Russian military personnel who had come on a business trip. "ATESH" members noticed that the seconded personnel drove along the same route every morning and evening, and visited the same shops and cafes. Therefore, it was not difficult to plant explosives in their car. The explosion occurred on the morning of February 10 on Dneprovsky Avenue, near a police station. Two died on the spot, two were hospitalized in serious condition. From the partisans' perspective, this was a message to all Ukrainians in the occupied territories: they must see that resistance continues. "From a legal point of view, these are certainly illegal actions," says Arseny Kumanov. "The wounded are non-combatants, meaning they are not currently participating in hostilities. Therefore, attacking them, from a legal point of view, is certainly not allowed. It is a crime. But if we quickly dealt with the law, then morality also remains. And if we look at the situation through the prism of moral categories, then it turns out like this: the wounded will recover, go to the front again, and kill. On the other hand, by this logic, one can attack everyone, because potentially this person can sign a contract and go to the front." A teenager can grow up and become a soldier. Women also serve in the army, by the way. And if we act according to this logic, then we can provoke a huge amount of violence. To disable the enemy in non-lethal ways, to make them harmless, but not to kill them – this is, of course, the ideal formula. And in general, I may express an unpopular opinion, but in my opinion, we must be strict about morality and simply accept that our actions are not always moral – even though they are sometimes effective, necessary, and even the only possible ones. Then we need to tell ourselves: "Yes, we are doing something not very good from a moral point of view, but it is the only possible means right now." And the second thing we need to talk about is why these people are forced to do what they do? Why did they find themselves in such a situation? And this is no longer their responsibility. Some say that some "ATESH" actions look cannibalistic. Others believe that "they are somehow not multiplying the occupiers by zero enough." Still others are convinced that the activities of Crimean Tatar partisans in the occupied territories are chemically pure heroism, about which books will still be written and films will be made. "You see," Erfan Kudusov said at parting, "if we don't resist, we may simply disappear. Ukrainians as a nation will not disappear, they will not dissolve even without Donbas and Crimea. Even if you take away half the country, God forbid – Ukrainians will not disappear. But we face a serious threat of disappearance. And therefore, the activity of "ATESH" is very important for us. Even the word itself – "atesh" – warms the soul, because it is ours, Crimean Tatar."

State Duma adopts the "Antifraud-2" bill aimed at combating fraud

The State Duma adopted a large-scale bill on new measures against cyber fraud in the second and third readings simultaneously, according to the chamber's website. Key innovations: 🔵 A unified database of IMEI numbers, unique identifiers of mobile devices, will be created, containing information about phones allowed for use in Russia. Illegally imported or stolen devices will be blacklisted and stop working. There will be no fee for registering gadgets in the unified IMEI database, as previously proposed. 🔵 Hosting providers will be prohibited from servicing VPN services. For hosters, this means transitioning from intermediary to controller status: they will now have to prevent the very possibility of providing resources to "violators." 🔵 Citizens will be able to block incoming calls from abroad. The restriction can only be lifted by visiting an MFC in person. There is no automatic ban in the document. 🔵 A "red button" will appear on "Gosuslugi" for "prompt reporting of illegal actions." 🔵 Russians will not be able to have more than 20 bank cards issued in their name. A telecommunications service agreement can only be terminated 90 days after its conclusion. 🔵 Russians will have the right to compensation for stolen funds from banks and telecom operators if they fail to prevent the actions of criminals. What disappeared from the document: 🔵 The obligation for banks to link customer accounts to INN. The Central Bank, however, stated that they would pursue the adoption of this measure in the future. 🔵 The provision on mandatory confirmation of financial transactions through "Max." However, banks and operators will retain the ability to confirm customer identity via SMS. 🔵 The requirement to register on significant Internet resources exclusively using Russian email.

Russians' Asylum Applications in the EU to Be Processed Faster. This Could Impact Activists and Lead to More Rejections

From June 12, new rules for processing asylum applications will take effect in the EU. Russia has been included in the list of countries whose citizens may be directed to an accelerated procedure. This could affect the quality of case reviews and lead to an increase in rejections, writes The Insider. The new EU regulation makes accelerated processing mandatory for several categories of applicants. One such basis is citizenship of a country for which the average recognition rate of international protection in the EU is 20% or lower. For Russia, this figure was 18.1%. In some cases, applications may be processed under a border procedure – immediately after checks at the EU border. The processing time can be reduced to three months. The European Union Agency for Asylum claims that each application should still be considered individually. However, human rights defenders warn that the accelerated procedure could lead to an increase in rejections and affect Russians facing political risks – activists, anti-war citizens, deserters, journalists, human rights defenders, "foreign agents," and LGBTQ+ individuals. Politician Andrey Pivovarov, on behalf of the "Consuls" of the Anti-War Committee, asked the EU to prepare separate recommendations for the Russian Federation so that such categories of applicants are not sent for accelerated or border processing. Human rights defender Daria Dadli stated that the new EU rules are "a victory of absurdity over common sense, a complete disregard for human lives and human dignity."

Recruitment pace for Russian army contract soldiers falls to a three-year low

In the first quarter of 2026, Russian authorities paid federal bonuses to 71.2 thousand new contract soldiers – this is a minimum for three years, comparing data for similar periods. According to economist Janis Kluge, recruitment slowed to approximately 800 people per day in January-March. Where is the data from? Kluge made the estimate based on Russian Ministry of Finance data on federal budget expenditures. In January-March, 28.5 billion rubles were spent on one-time payments for contract conclusion. Since the federal payment is 400,000 rubles, this corresponds to 71,216 new contracts. This is less than for the same period in 2025, when 89.6 thousand people received payments, and less than in the first quarter of 2024, when there were 73.4 thousand such contracts. Federal data aligns with estimates made based on information from regional budgets. At the same time, in the second quarter, recruitment, according to regional data, stabilized again at approximately 1000 contracts per day, or about 30 thousand per month. Kluge notes that there is a gap between official statements and budget data. For example, Dmitry Medvedev spoke of 127 thousand new contract soldiers since the beginning of the year at the end of April. What does this mean? A decrease in recruitment rates is not direct proof of a shortage of people for the Russian army. However, according to Kluge, the version of recruitment problems seems more likely: average regional payments per contract continue to rise and are at a record level, and there are many reports from regions about pressure to meet recruitment targets. What is happening with students? Ivan Chuvilyaev, press secretary for the "Go to the Forest" project, noted in a conversation with "Novaya-Europe" that human rights defenders have not noticed a decrease in pressure on students. According to him, there are still many attempts at recruitment, especially among those persuaded to sign a contract through administrative structures. Human rights defenders are currently aware of one deceased student. There are also approximately a thousand students from Siberia, the Urals, and the Volga region known to have possibly joined "drone troops." However, more detailed data on students who have signed contracts and gone to the front is currently unavailable. Impact on the war. As explained by Ilya Volzhsky, military observer for "Novaya-Europe," fluctuations in the recruitment of Russian contract soldiers for the front have occurred before. The largest number of those willing to serve in the army was observed after Trump took office as president – then Russians decided that the war would end soon and hurried to receive payments for signing a contract. "These fluctuations have not played a decisive role on the front yet. The Russian army is still trying to advance, but unsuccessfully," stated the expert. "The use of kill-zone tactics by Ukrainians has proven effective. Most Russian assault troops die during infiltration attempts. Specialists believe that without new methods of offense, Russian forces will get bogged down in Ukrainian defenses even if new extensive reinforcements arrive," said Volzhsky.

State Duma Approves New Restrictions for 'Foreign Agents'

The State Duma immediately adopted in the second and third readings a bill on 'strengthening state control' over 'foreign agents'. This is stated on the website of the lower house of the Russian parliament. The amendments, in particular, provide for: A ban on placing social advertising on social networks and on the resources of 'foreign agents'. In addition, people and organizations with this status will not be allowed to order such advertising. Previously, the ban applied only to commercial advertisements; An obligation for banks to provide information on financial transactions, accounts, and deposits of 'foreign agents' to the Ministry of Justice within three days upon request; A ban on submitting a repeated application for exclusion from the register if a person or organization has already been refused less than a year ago. However, this will not apply to individuals who received 'foreign agent' status for the first time, noted the human rights center 'First Department'; An obligation for 'foreign agents' to submit most reports to the Ministry of Justice electronically, rather than on paper, as is currently the case. At the same time, the submission of a form about the absence of changes has been left in its previous format; Exclusion of 'foreign agents' from the scope of the law 'On Mandatory Requirements', which protects businesses, organizations, and citizens from excessively frequent inspections and excessive demands from the authorities. It will be easier to check people and organizations with this status, human rights defenders concluded. The 'foreign agent' status was introduced in Russia in 2012. At that time, the list included those for whom the Ministry of Justice found 'foreign financing'. This could include, in particular, single transfers of funds from citizens of other countries, including Belarus. Since 2022, one can become a 'foreign agent' in Russia without 'financing' from other countries, but merely with the presence of 'foreign influence'. At the time of writing this news, more than 1200 individuals and legal entities are included in the Ministry of Justice register. According to 'OVD-Info', in 2024, 178 people and 37 organizations were added to the list. Moreover, 96% of them had no foreign funding found.

Cover image for Owners of Russian websites are forbidden to authorize visitors through foreign services and use foreign certificates. How will this affect users?

Owners of Russian websites are forbidden to authorize visitors through foreign services and use foreign certificates. How will this affect users?

The State Duma, in its second and third (final) readings, passed a bill that introduces administrative responsibility for violating authorization rules. Now, according to the deputies' initiative, owners of Russian websites will be fined for allowing users to log in through foreign services (e.g., Google or Apple ID). Details of the initiative and who it may affect are in the analysis by 'Novaya-Europe'. What is the initiative? The bill was introduced in November 2025 by a group of deputies, including Andrey Lugovoy and Anton Gorelkin. One of the provisions of the new anti-fraud law adds Article 13.55 ('User Authorization') to the Russian Code of Administrative Offenses. According to it, if a website or application requires users to authorize, its owners must ensure they are from Russia and use permitted methods. The authors of the bill stated in the explanatory note that an amendment to the law 'On Information' was made back in 2023, obliging websites to allow users to log in only via a Russian phone number, 'Gosuslugi', biometrics, or a Russian authorization service. However, there were no fines for non-compliance with this rule until now. Now, according to the bill, fines will be imposed for authorizing on online portals through foreign services, including Gmail and Apple ID: for individual website owners, the fine will be up to 20,000 rubles, for officials – up to 50,000, and for legal entities – up to 700,000. What else is in the bill? A separate part of the bill concerns TLS certificates, which ensure a secure HTTPS connection, i.e., encrypt traffic in the browser. The law formalizes the operation of the Russian national certification authority (NCA) and obliges developers of Russian browsers to embed its certificate as trusted. The government, by decree, receives the right to make the NCA certificate mandatory in certain areas – for example, in the banking sector. Thus, the state now controls both DNS (where the domain leads) through the National Domain Name System and TLS (whether the browser trusts the domain). 'This indeed carries certain risks to security and anonymity for Russian users. It's another infrastructural step towards the sovereignty of Runet,' is convinced IT specialist and coordinator of eQualitie projects in Russian, Leonid Yudashev. 'In particular, the state can thus conduct a Man-in-the-Middle attack, where the regulatory body, which sees which pages of which sites you visit, if these sites have this Russian state certificate, can substitute one page for another if necessary. And we know such cases in Kazakhstan in 2019.' With the same law, deputies have again complicated the operation of VPNs. Now, hosting providers and data centers can no longer provide servers to VPN clients that grant access to resources blocked in Russia. Servers located within the country were particularly effective for bypassing blocks, notes Yudashev. Traffic from them is perceived by Russian infrastructure as internal and is less susceptible to filtering through TSPU. Does the authorization law apply to absolutely any websites? The law does not apply to any websites in principle, but only to Russian information resources (websites, applications, information systems). That is, logging into Instagram via Gmail will still be possible after the law is passed. Moreover, the document establishes requirements and fines exclusively for their owners. User responsibility is not prescribed in the law. 'The law does not prohibit ordinary users from having a conditional Gmail,' noted IT specialist Sarkis Darbinyan in a conversation with 'Novaya-Europe'. However, it imposes an obligation on the owners of Russian websites and applications not to use foreign services as a means of authorizing users from the Russian Federation if the site operates in the Russian Federation and allows login/registration. 'This means that for an ordinary user, it will be noticeable that on websites in the .ru zone and Russian apps, there will be fewer and fewer alternative authorization methods. Citizens are not subject to fines. However, for owners of services in the RU zone – websites and applications – the project adds a new significant risk in the form of a fine of up to 700,000 rubles, which is quite substantial for small businesses,' says the expert. Photo: Artem Geodakyan / TASS / ZUMA Press / Scanpix / LETA. What should users do now? If the bill is passed, it does not mean that only Russian emails are needed, noted Sarkis Darbinyan. 'According to the expert, one needs to have different emails and different services for different purposes. Many services will still offer the option to use any email for registration, but for authorization in some applications, only the methods specified in the law can be used. 'Gosuslugi and ESIA are not the only choice. Authorization will be possible via a Russian mobile number or through Yandex and VK. It is worth noting that the use of these services is fraught with the platform's compliance with the Yarovaya law, which means extrajudicial access by an FSB major to all available information, including the content of emails in the mailbox. If constant monitoring is not a concern [on a specific platform where you will use a Russian service for authorization], then this can be a workable solution,' says the expert. Did Russian services really ignore authorization requirements? An analysis by 'Agentstvo' in November last year showed that 16 out of the top 50 websites (almost a third) still offer login through foreign services: these include Google, X, Apple ID, and Telegram. Among them are Mail.ru, Ozon, Avito, Yandex, and Odnoklassniki. In addition, other well-known services also ignored the law: several Yandex projects (Market, Music, Kinopoisk), Mail.ru services (Cloud, News), as well as Drom, Drive2, hh.ru, 2GIS, Russian AliExpress, and even the manga site Mangalib. Although Yudashev considers the new restrictions on VPN and TLS more important than the ban on authorization through foreign services, he is confident that Russian regulators will indeed start fining website owners for violating this ban. 'And who will like this?' he sums up. What did the authors of the bill say? Gorelkin, commenting on the initiative, wrote back in November: 'Authorization via Google – that's ALL.' However, he assured that ordinary users would not be affected – only those 'owners of websites and applications who have been ignoring the law for two years.' 'The initiative is aimed at further reducing Runet's dependence on decisions from unfriendly countries,' he stated. In the explanatory note, the deputies justified the law with cybercrime statistics: 380,000 fraud cases in 2024, with damages of almost 189 billion rubles. At the same time, they did not explain how banning authorization, VPN hosting, and foreign certificates would help combat this.

Cover image for "Last century instead of digital medicine." How constant internet outages affect the speed and quality of medical care

"Last century instead of digital medicine." How constant internet outages affect the speed and quality of medical care

A year ago, mass internet outages began in Russia. The problem affected dozens of regions, with residents of Central Russia, the Volga region, and border areas reporting outages most frequently. In July of last year, Russia set its first world record for the number of shutdowns – over two thousand outages – exceeding the global figure tenfold. It quickly became clear that the problems also affected healthcare. Patients with diabetes were the first to feel it – applications used to send glucose monitoring data to smartphones did not work without the internet. This meant it was impossible to monitor blood sugar levels, a vital indicator. According to a survey conducted by the "Doctor's Handbook" app among its users, mobile internet outages at work have become a regular problem for 54% of medical professionals. Some noted that wired internet was not provided in their facility, so mobile internet outages practically stopped work. Without the internet, it is often impossible to clarify information about a medication, upload patient data to the system, or even – seemingly – take a blood sample. Doctors told "Novaya-Europe" how they are working under conditions of endless shutdowns. All names have been changed at their request. Photo: Maxim Shipenkov / EPA. Working manually, Irina has been working in an ambulance crew in Moscow since the pandemic. According to her, this service is now fully digitized. After a patient's call, the dispatcher enters the data into a unified electronic database, and from there, calls are distributed to ambulance crews. Calls come to a tablet, which is integrated with EMIAС (unified medical digital system) and is available to every ambulance doctor. This device replaces all the paperwork that had to be done before. Through the tablet, the doctor can obtain operational data about the patient, make prescriptions, and transfer accompanying documents to the hospital. – In May, it became impossible to respond to calls, – complains Irina. – In the "trekhka" area, the internet consistently disappeared – and then you figure it out. The driver gets angry because it's unclear how to drive. Because of this, we sometimes wandered through courtyards before finally reaching the right house. The tablet worked partially: the call, thank God, comes through, although sometimes with a delay, but you can't access the patient's card. And this is important because the dispatcher's initial information is always very general – just age and what happened. Usually, while driving, you look at the card to see if there are chronic diseases, drug allergies, or other nuances. And during the appointment, you don't waste time asking questions. But when the internet is down, you drive to the patient with no idea about them. " And here I sit, asking questions, although all the answers are in the medical record, only it's inaccessible. All this lengthens the appointment time, and for an ambulance, it's critical. Then, while shaking in the car on the way to the next call, you write down the diagnosis, recommendations, and prescriptions on paper as before, so as not to forget. And in the evening, you enter it into the computer. According to Irina, there is a special helper application for the ambulance, where you can see diagnosis codes and clarify the algorithm of actions. You enter the diagnosis – and it immediately shows whether hospitalization is needed and where to take the patient. It can be downloaded in advance to work without the internet. Otherwise, even more time would be spent on the call, not on examining the patient, but on some organizational matters. Nevertheless, questions can still arise – about medication prescriptions or hospitalization – which, with internet access, can be clarified through the same tablet. – You have to call the substation by phone, – says Irina. – Or we bring the patient to the hospital, give the information verbally, and then after work, we enter everything into the system again. It's only worse for doctors on voluntary medical insurance (a paid alternative to state emergency medical services, which allows you to call a commercial team and, if necessary, be hospitalized in a private clinic. – Editorial note). Their application does not work without a network. Receiving calls, routing patients, requesting hospitalization – everything has to be done through the dispatcher. He calls the doctor back and explains the procedure. In general, the last century instead of digital medicine. Everything is turned off Today, almost all state medical institutions work with information systems. The programs may vary, but the essence is the same: they unite all the work of the polyclinic – electronic registration, referrals to specialists, laboratory tests, prescriptions, hospital discharge summaries – into a single digital database. Doctors have complained about the operation of these systems before – the program sometimes freezes, sometimes glitches, and now problems with the internet have been added to its imperfections. Anna is a paramedic at a district polyclinic in the Volgograd region. Internet outages began constantly here back last year. Residents are already used to the network disappearing in the evening, and it's usually gone by morning. But there are regular interruptions during the day as well. – At first, when the internet was turned off, we had chaos, – says Anna. – The district doctor can't do without it: the computer contains the history of doctor visits, specialist appointments, and hospital discharge summaries. We can check test results, prescriptions there. We couldn't even take blood samples from patients because without the internet, you can't create a barcode for the tube. Now, according to Anna, all medical information is being duplicated on paper. – But you still can't cover all cases, – she admits. – I was recently filling out a sick leave form, and everything turned off. The next day I look, and it's not in the system, as if I hadn't entered anything. Or here's a common situation: you're filling out a chart, the internet disappears – all the information is lost, and you have to re-enter everything. And sometimes there's no connection at all, not even by phone. " The other day, a patient came for an appointment, and he needed to be hospitalized. The doctor called the hospital, but the call didn't go through. Oh, how nervous we were. Fortunately, after about ten minutes, the connection returned, and everything was fine. Photo: Anton Vergun / TASS / Zuma Press / Scanpix / LETA. Out of reach. Doctors themselves consider the lack of access to professional information to be the biggest problem associated with internet outages. – Look, I have an oncology patient at my appointment, and I need to prescribe medication, and I need to quickly clarify the dosage according to the protocol, – says Roman, an oncologist at a private clinic in Moscow. – Or look at the current guideline, but the resource is either unavailable or requires a subscription that cannot be obtained without a foreign card. I have to work from memory, it's uncomfortable. I often read outrage in chats: what kind of doctor are you if you can't write a prescription without the internet. But no specialist can keep all the information in their head, so it will be limited. His colleague is supported by Evgeny, an ophthalmologist from a Moscow hospital. – I remember the dosages and how to take medications that I prescribe regularly by heart. For everything else, there's the internet. Or rather, there was. Recently, a patient came for an appointment who had complications after starting a medication. I had never encountered this before, and I needed to urgently review the literature and find a replacement. Foreign websites are blocked here, but a VPN can help with that. But if there's no internet at all – neither mobile nor Wi-Fi in the polyclinic – what can I do? Only offer to come back later or see another, more experienced doctor. For Olga, a psychiatrist from Samara, such situations are more the exception than the rule. – Of course, mobile internet disappears constantly in our city, but the clinic has its own Wi-Fi, which is usually enough to conduct appointments, – she says. – Although once there was a situation: I had a patient with a co-existing chronic illness, and I needed to clarify the combination of medications and dosage. And the internet had been lagging since morning, nothing was loading. I told the patient that as soon as I found out, I would call him back. According to the doctor, such a situation, although unpleasant, is solvable. It is much more critical that internet outages affect the ability to learn. – I constantly take training courses, listen to lectures, attend online conferences. And all this takes place on platforms like Zoom and Yandex Telemost, which require a stable internet connection. And this is precisely the problem. Either the picture freezes, or you can't log into the platform at all. The other day I was at an online conference on child behavioral disorders, my internet froze, and I was kicked out of the lecture. And it wasn't recorded. That's a shame! Photo: Yuri Smityuk / TASS / Zuma Press / Scanpix / LETA. Double work After the incident where she couldn't quickly get online to find a medication, Olga decided to play it safe. She made a reminder in a Word document with the dosages of all the medications she usually prescribes. She downloaded tests and questionnaires for diagnosis to her computer, which she usually used online. – Medications are one thing, you can indeed call back. But if everything freezes while the patient is taking a test, it will look bad, – explains Olga. – So I "covered myself" in advance. Most doctors are forced to do the same – to back up virtually every stage of their work. – Everything I use on a regular basis, I now have in an offline version, – says ophthalmologist Evgeny. – Treatment regimens, dosages, the Amsler grid test, which helps detect problems in the central parts of the retina, disease coding – all of this I used to find on websites with one mouse click. Now everything is saved in folders on my computer's desktop. " But it's impossible to predict what might be needed at any given appointment, so a doctor is internally always prepared for the fact that they may not be able to provide full assistance. Paperwork has also increased. Without the internet, even consent for the transfer of personal data cannot be filled out online; patients have to write it by hand. – We always had a lot of writing. Even with the internet, we have to fill out a lot of things, but at least not by hand. And now we issue both an electronic and a paper referral. So that the patient can get to a specialist if there is no internet. First, everyone re-learned how to write electronic prescriptions, and now we are teaching young people to write paper ones again, – chuckles paramedic Anna sadly.

Putin appears more often amid falling ratings. However, the politician still rarely visits regions

Vladimir Putin has started appearing in public more often amid falling ratings. However, he still rarely visits regions, Faridaily reported. In April and May, Putin participated in 60 public events, compared to only 55 in January-March, according to journalists citing official Kremlin press service publications. In total for January-May, Putin held 22% fewer public events than in the same period of 2025. In 2024 and the pre-war year of 2019, there were 1.5 times more such meetings than now, Faridaily calculated. Putin's events in April and May. In May, the politician traveled abroad twice: to China and Kazakhstan. Both visits were solemn and provided many news opportunities in state-controlled Russian media, journalists noted. In the same period last year, he did not leave the Russian Federation. Additionally, in May, Putin met with his 94-year-old former German teacher, Vera Gurevich, and with Peng Pai, a grown-up boy from China who first met the politician in 2000. Putin does not visit regions. However, as journalists noted, the politician still avoids trips to Russian regions. From January to May inclusive, he officially traveled out of Moscow only twice, both times to St. Petersburg. Last year, during this period, Putin visited regions eight times, in 2024 - 14 times, and in 2019 - 17 times, Faridaily calculated. Excluding trips to his hometown, the politician's last regional visit was to Samara in November 2025. Putin's non-public activities. The politician has not stopped working, but his priorities have likely changed, two sources suggested to the journalists. Recently, Putin has often met non-publicly with widows of soldiers killed in the war in Ukraine, as well as with combat veterans, engaging in their adaptation to civilian life, one of Faridaily's sources said. Another noted that the politician holds non-public events on the topic of high technology and AI, which has recently interested him. Security concerns. In March, Faridaily noted that Putin had become less visible in public and less prone to travel to Russian regions. This is due to the politician's concerns about a possible coup or assassination attempt, according to a report from an unnamed European country's intelligence service published by "Vazhnye Istorii", CNN, and the Financial Times. Ratings. Putin's approval rating, according to VTsIOM, fell for seven weeks until the end of April, dropping from 73.3% to 65.6%. Subsequently, the state sociological center began combining telephone surveys with in-person interviews, and the rating started to rise again.

Anti-drone nets spotted over a truck stop near Putin's residence in Valdai. This could be a defense against a repeat of Operation "Web."

Anti-drone nets have appeared approximately nine kilometers from Vladimir Putin's residence in Valdai, Novgorod region, as reported by publicist Oleg Kashin and confirmed by "Agentstvo." Published photos show a net covering a truck parking lot. However, it might not be for protecting trucks from drones, but rather to prevent a repeat of Operation "Web," during which drones were launched from trucks, suggested Ruslan Leviev, founder of the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), on "Dozhd." Details. For Operation "Web," the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) hired random truckers to deliver prefabricated buildings to specific locations. There, drivers were instructed to park and await a call from the client. But at the designated spots, drones were launched from the trucks towards military airfields, Leviev recalled. "So, these nets at truck parking lots in the Novgorod region are precisely to ensure that if such a truck arrives, its drones cannot fly anywhere – the net above the truck would obstruct them," speculated the CIT founder. Trucks will not park on the roadside as it obstructs other vehicles' movement. Therefore, according to Leviev, to defend against a repeat of Operation "Web" in Valdai, it is sufficient to cover all truck parking lots with nets. Context. In late June 2025, the SSU conducted a large-scale attack on Russian military airfields. According to the Ukrainian service, drones damaged 41 aircraft, including an A-50 radar detection aircraft, as well as Tu-95 and Tu-22M3. Ukraine estimated the total damage at $2 billion. These figures, according to analysts who reviewed satellite imagery, may be exaggerated, wrote The Wall Street Journal. The Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed the attack and called it a terrorist act.

Cover image for A Lost Generation. "Only the Headlights" is a novel by Ilya Mamaev-Niles, where characters travel around Russia against the backdrop of war. It is a modern text that captures reality.

A Lost Generation. "Only the Headlights" is a novel by Ilya Mamaev-Niles, where characters travel around Russia against the backdrop of war. It is a modern text that captures reality.

Writer Ilya Mamaev-Niles announced himself in 2023 when his novel "Year of Porn" about a thoughtful and vulnerable young man in provincial realities was called "one of the most important Russian novels of the year" and compared to Sergey Davydov's "Springfield." This spring, Polyandria No Age published the writer's new novel. The author, who grew up in Yoshkar-Ola and now lives between Russia and the USA. "Only the Headlights" is an atmospheric road book, whose hero and heroine travel through the European part of Russia after 2022. Sorin Brut read "Only the Headlights" and saw in it a psychological portrait of people who grew up with Kerouac's "On the Road" with a promising America, but found themselves in the war years in Russia. Collage: Lyalya Bulanova / "Novaya Gazeta Europe." Forty-year-old Yan Troyanovsky travels in a camper and lives on wedding photographer fees. He met his beloved at one of the weddings: thirty-year-old Kira is an HR manager and a runaway bride (her "relationship out of habit" almost turned into a "marriage without love"). The heroine will soon leave her IT company for the same reasons: it's unbearable to live a false life. They are heading to the sea – to freedom, to another reality, where it will be less suffocating. The book could have been built around their melancholic romantic journey. But their past life is not going to let the characters go easily. Kira learns about her pregnancy from her ex-fiancé, and the couple seems to decide on an abortion. But the circles of bureaucratic hell and other obstacles from the state of "traditional values" can change the minds of even more stable people. Photo: Anatoly Maltsev / EPA. The reader begins to think that the novel is about this, but the plot sharply changes direction again. This is a metaphorical technique, quite appropriate for a time of total uncertainty: a fragmented plot masks a plotless prose. How the characters talk to each other and to themselves is more important than their actions. Although all their movements are also metaphorical. Yan and Kira rush around the country, but to little effect. It resembles the buzzing of mosquitoes that have flown into the car and are unsuccessfully looking for a crack in the slightly open window (the author focuses on them more than once). The confusion of the characters is the main feeling of the novel. Kerouac's "On the Road" has a lot of hope, freedom, and disappointment. In Mamaev-Niles' novel, the first is crushed in the past off-screen, the second is almost an illusion, but there is plenty of disappointment. The novel cannot be called realistic, but the dialogues are even hyper-realistic. "Mamaev-Niles recreates the conversational speech of a generation, minimizing literary convention (earlier it was more of a dramatic technique, but it entered prose). Those who appreciate such snapshots of life in art will probably love the book. But lovers of economical texts, where there are no superfluous words, will surely find much redundant. The flow of everyday and disjointed speech, full of digressions, thoughts get stuck and break off halfway. It is not so easy to extract the worldview of the characters from all this (although they themselves hardly understand themselves well). However, such dialogues accurately reflect the depressive mess in their heads. Mamaev-Niles does not let you forget about the cause. The war seeps into the text – sometimes with army vehicles on the highway, sometimes with a fellow traveler who is a veteran, and the cafe "Vkusno i tochka" feels like the restless ghost of a prematurely deceased being. Yan is always focused on the future. In his youth, he set goals, like a successful career or "finding a wife," and achieved them, but he didn't seem to be satisfied. Now Yan is wary of his dreams – they are fraught with disappointment. What he is striving for is not entirely clear, but he cannot stop. Movement drowns out the painful question: "Why?" The characters drink "black coffee from "Twin Peaks."" Descriptions of gas stations echo American art, which loves this type of location. "You know, it's all like in American movies," said Kira. "Hotel, bathrobes, view of the night city. Do you know what else they do in movies?" she asked. "What?" "Go to the bar." "Okay, let's go to the bar." "Maybe I don't want to go to the bar." Photo: Alamy / Vida Press. Try to figure out where your own desires and meanings are, and where they are unconsciously perceived from the outside. Yan unsubscribed from all media long ago. Reels are still left, but while watching them, he experiences "the same thing that made him stop following the news." Kira reacts sharply to attempts to tell her about the sinfulness of abortion – just like to her mother's intrusive advice. "Get out of my head!" she declares to the priest, and these words sound like the heroine's slogan. Both Yan and Kira feel the pressure of reality – they may be trying to escape from it. The characters often talk about meanings, questioning them every time. Common ideas about a normal life and marriage have let Kira down. The company she worked for also does not meet her standards. But perhaps the best metaphor for the dominance of fakes is the Bruges Embankment in Yoshkar-Ola, which Yan contemplates. Ex-head of Mari El, Markelov, built gingerbread-like buildings in various old European styles here – "Pseudo-palaces, pseudo-temples, pseudo-houses." A kingdom of simulacra: "Find ten people who consider a mop the highest purpose of human life, and it will become true. There is no truth in nature. It's an agreement. Yan saw despair in the man's eyes. Nothing made sense. Everyone lied." The generation of the book's characters was formed under the cross-influence of late Soviet and American cultures. For both, the idea of "finding their purpose" was important. In a space with an authoritarian tradition, it was easily perceived as an obligation. In 2022, people like Kira and Yan discovered that they were being prepared for life in a completely different Russia, where long-term planning and gradual development are possible. Photo: Anatoly Maltsev / EPA. Meaning for them is a familiar support (Kira seeks stability above all) and a necessary element of navigation (Yan seeks direction). But the conceptual field has collapsed into a crisis. The Russian government has done a lot for this, juggling deliberately vague ideas, using them as a multifunctional weapon against society. Then there is the rise of populism worldwide, the rampage of conspiracy theories, and finally, the coexistence in one feed of many incompatible concepts, which sometimes look more like part of a business strategy than beliefs. There is a feeling that the space of meanings has been captured by cynics and fanatics. The pressure is also created by the authoritarian presentation of information widespread in the Russian-speaking environment (in the spirit of, if you are not with us, then you are wrong). The war has only exacerbated it. The novel often features discussions about how no one should be judged. There is also this line: "Whatever we do, it's all wrong. We are always not like that. We think wrong. We do something wrong. Everyone is right, but we are not." Ilya Mamaev-Niles. Photo from his personal VK page. Often, upbringing and socialization create an authoritarian inner voice, which tries to fit a person into every value system and condemns them for non-compliance. As a result, any concept becomes oppressive. The prevalence of meta-irony in the Russian-speaking segment of the internet looks like a reaction to all this. But such anti-crisis adaptation is more characteristic of the younger generation than Yan and Kira. Throughout the novel, the characters are looking for a way out of the crisis and, in the end, perhaps, they find it. At the same time, "Only the Headlights" carefully avoids imposing meaning on the reader. On the one hand, this is consistent and appreciated by many. On the other hand, those who like to argue with the author's ideas and mentally develop them are likely to feel a conceptual vagueness in the novel. "Only the Headlights" is good for another reason. It subtly reflects the psychological state of young people who have been run over by the "new normality." And it does so, as it were, "from the inside." There will be many more books about the psychology of wartime in the Russian Federation, but to show it the way Mamaev-Niles does – hot on the heels and with un-aged feelings – can only be done now.

Georgia Plans to Tighten Rules for Obtaining Residence Permits for Foreigners

Georgian authorities have prepared amendments to migration legislation that will make it more difficult for foreign students and spouses of Georgian citizens to obtain residence permits. Additionally, the powers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in combating illegal migration will be expanded. This is reported on the website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 🔵 Details. Authorities want to recognize sham marriages for the purpose of obtaining residence permits or citizenship as a criminal offense, punishable by up to two years in prison. Foreigners may be deported with a ban on entering Georgia. Rules for student residence permits will also be tightened. Only students of accredited educational institutions will be able to obtain them. The document may be revoked for violating academic requirements, failing to comply with employment conditions, or prolonged absence from the country. A language certificate or an exam in a foreign or state language will be required for admission to Georgian universities. Furthermore, the Ministry of Internal Affairs will have the right to conduct operational-search activities to combat illegal migration. Judicial procedures in migration cases are to be accelerated: deadlines for appeals and case reviews will be reduced, and some cases will be considered without oral hearings. 🔵 Statistics. According to authorities' estimates, over 20,000 illegal migrants remain in the country. In 2024, approximately 250,000 foreigners lived permanently in Georgia, representing 6.6% of the population. 🔵 Context. Earlier, Georgia adopted a law obliging foreigners to undergo a special procedure to obtain a work permit. Strict deadlines for registering foreign entrepreneurs have also been established.

Cover image for 'In fact, we are seeing the very beginning of the operation to liberate Crimea.' The Armed Forces of Ukraine are attacking road and rail routes connecting Crimea with Russia. How the partial blockade of the peninsula is affecting the course of the war and local residents

'In fact, we are seeing the very beginning of the operation to liberate Crimea.' The Armed Forces of Ukraine are attacking road and rail routes connecting Crimea with Russia. How the partial blockade of the peninsula is affecting the course of the war and local residents

On the night of June 8, Ukrainian forces attacked several targets in Crimea, including a railway power substation and a locomotive. The Russian-appointed governor of the peninsula, Sergey Aksyonov, reported on his Telegram channel that a train driver was killed and his assistant was injured as a result of the strike on the train. According to the press service of Grand Service Express, a company operating in Crimea, all passengers were transferred to buses, and passenger train movement was temporarily halted. Attacks on the railway have become more frequent recently. Since May, the Ukrainian army has been actively using drones to attack the 'Novorossiya' highway, which connects Crimea and Rostov-on-Don through occupied territories. On May 21, Russian authorities banned truck traffic on the highway, except for several categories of particularly important goods. Motorists are also advised not to travel on certain sections of this road. As a result of the partial blockade, a fuel crisis began in Crimea, residents started hoarding inexpensive long-shelf-life products, and tourists are massively canceling trips to local resorts. What are the sentiments on the peninsula, and will the Ukrainian army be able to completely cut off occupied Crimea from Russia? 'Novaya-Evropa' interviewed local residents and military experts. A queue of cars at a gas station in Crimea, Ukraine, June 3, 2026. Photo: Maxim Churuso v / TASS / ZUMA Press / Scanpix / LETA. Deprive of ammunition and fuel. According to analysts, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have two tasks: to disrupt the supply of the Russian army fighting in Ukraine and to isolate Crimea. - The Ukrainian Armed Forces are trying to establish a blockade of Crimea today, - says military analyst and former SBU officer Ivan Stupak. - In addition, the Ukrainian side's task is to disrupt the supply to two groups of Russian armies – 'Dnepr' and 'Vostok', with a total strength of 150 to 180 thousand people. For this purpose, drones are blocking logistics along the 'Novorossiya' highway from Rostov through Taganrog and Mariupol to Chongar. 'If the Ukrainian Armed Forces can disrupt the supply of fuel, medicine, ammunition, food, and water to these army groups, it will slow down the offensive actions of the Russian Armed Forces. This is already happening in Zaporizhzhia, Kherson region, and Luhansk region. Crimea is the cherry on top.' - I am sure that we will see attacks on the Crimean Bridge very soon, - adds military-political observer of the 'Information Resistance' group Oleksandr Kovalenko. - This is the same transport artery that supplies the occupied territories. Mid-range strike drones can quite reach the bridge. For this, they need to be launched from special aerostats that can cover most of the distance. According to Ukrainian military expert Roman Svitan, Crimea is practically unusable from a military point of view without supplies from the mainland. - It will become a 'suitcase without a handle' for the Russian command, - says the expert. - Now the Ukrainian Armed Forces are stopping such logistics and transit of military cargo through the peninsula. In fact, we are seeing the very beginning of the operation to liberate Crimea. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces have enough drones, the Russian military presence on the peninsula will soon be reduced to a minimum. By disrupting logistics in the occupied territories, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be able to begin their liberation. The order, apparently, will be as follows: Zaporizhzhia and Kherson region, then Crimea, and then Donbas. In this case, a landing by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Crimea, which some Z-correspondents have written about, is unlikely. - It is irrational, illogical, suicidal, and meaningless, - says Kovalenko. - A landing force must be consistently supplied with ammunition, reinforcements, and everything necessary. Armed liberation of the peninsula is possible only after the Ukrainian military pushes the enemy out of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. Currently, only special forces operations for sabotage and reconnaissance activities are possible in Crimea. And such incidents have already occurred at Cape Tarkhankut and other locations. A queue of cars at a gas station in Yevpatoria, Crimea, Ukraine, June 3, 2026. Photo: Oleksiy Pavlishak / Reuters / Scanpix / LETA. Blockade of Crimea - The operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are putting pressure on the local population of the occupied regions, - says Roman Svitan. - However, it should be taken into account that Ukrainians, who usually have a garden plot, find it easier to survive. But migrants who have moved from Russian regions are unlikely to withstand these living conditions and will leave Ukrainian lands. Ivan Stupak agrees: a clear destabilization of life on the peninsula can lead to tension and protests. - Residents of Crimea and other occupied territories are seeing this nightmare and will soon start protesting against the Russian authorities, - he believes. - There is already a shortage of medicines, food, essential goods, and fuel in the occupied territories. This creates discomfort. I can assume that initially only military tasks were set. But then they saw that there was a social response and began to implement a long-term strategy of pressure on the population of the occupied territories. Within this framework, for example, there is a struggle against the tourist season in Crimea. It is clear that [under such conditions] people try not to travel to the peninsula. Russia is now frantically looking for solutions, with an acute need for truck drivers. By July, it will be clear what results have been achieved. Fuel and food problems. In annexed Crimea and Sevastopol, restrictions on fuel sales continue to be introduced. Now, to buy gasoline in Sevastopol at TЭС gas stations, you need to get a personal QR code registered to the vehicle. Local residents and tourists can get no more than 20 liters of gasoline per week. Free sale is possible only for AI-92 gasoline at some city gas stations of ATAN. Smaller gas stations regulate fuel sales independently, but even they have AI-95 gasoline in limited quantities. More often than not, even small gas stations sell fuel by coupons – no more than 20 liters per person. Such coupons cannot be purchased directly from gas stations. The exception is for legal entities. Some turn to resellers on 'Avito' who trade coupons and gasoline at double the market price, or to motorists selling canisters with Krasnodar fuel at the exit of Kerch – the nearest large city to the Crimean Bridge connecting mainland Russia and the annexed peninsula. Some chain grocery stores sell goods in limited quantities – for example, no more than three kilograms of sugar per person. The shelves of the peninsula's stores are empty only in the segment of the cheapest brands of goods – flour, oil, milk, cereals. Slightly more expensive goods can still be purchased in any of the Crimean cities. - There are no problems with products, it's just that some people, in any situation, start stocking up sharply, buying everything: buckwheat, sugar, canned goods, long-shelf-life products, - believes Sevastopol resident Valentina. - There are no problems with delivery, the problem is with panicking idiots. I have friends who have stocked up on canned goods – if there's another blackout, the freezers will defrost, and we'll need to think. I was in the store the other day – everything is there. What the media write about products is greatly exaggerated. Photos of empty shelves were likely taken closer to the evening on weekends, well, there would be something left. Elena, a resident of Yalta, is less optimistic and fears shortages. - Aksyonov could simply announce without details that Crimea has reserve stocks so that we don't worry, - she is indignant. - Many pensioners, including myself, have small pensions, and I would feel calmer if I knew that I was guaranteed a certain set of products by coupon. I'm even afraid to go to the store so as not to see empty shelves. Yesterday, a friend told me on the phone that cheap sugar had disappeared from 'Yabloko' (a chain of grocery stores in Crimea – Ed.). I haven't gone anywhere yet. A sign in the window of the 'Tavria' passenger express, April 28, 2026. Photo: Mikhail Voskresensky / Sputnik / Imago Images / Scanpix / LETA. How to leave Crimea? The biggest difficulty now is leaving Crimea via the bridge. Drivers spend two to three hours in queues, sometimes more. Locals attribute this to some residents going to gas stations in Russia. It is possible to enter the peninsula without queues. Restrictions apply to some vehicles: electric cars, hybrid vehicles, and gasoline cars with electric motors up to 20 kW and a 48 V battery (MHEV 48V) cannot cross the bridge. They are also prohibited from using the ferry. The batteries of such vehicles contain lithium, which looks the same as explosives to scanning devices, and manual inspection would further lengthen the queue. Owners of such vehicles are advised to switch to other cars or take the land route along the 'Novorossiya' highway. Another difficulty related to departure is the lack of fuel for tourists. The peninsula authorities have created a hotline: "For tourists who have difficulties leaving the Republic of Crimea, the Ministry of Resorts and Tourism of the Republic of Crimea hotline is available at 8-800-511-80-18. Gas filling stations will be identified in the regions (South, West Coast, Center) where guests can refuel to leave the peninsula." However, despite promises of a multi-channel phone line, tourists complain that it is impossible to get through. "I've been calling this number since Friday, it's useless, and I'm not the only one. Please write down the conditions for selling fuel and the addresses of gas stations," writes Alexander under a post congratulating social workers. People walk along the embankment in Yalta, Crimea, Ukraine, June 8, 2026. Photo: Konstantin Mikhalchevsky / Sputnik / Imago Images / Scanpix / LETA. Bookings canceled. A mass cancellation of tour bookings to Crimea has been recorded for the first time in several years. The 2025 resort season was one of the most profitable since 2022 – Russians preferred holidays on the Black Sea without the fuel oil that reached other domestic resorts. However, the fuel deficit – Russians often traveled to the peninsula by personal transport – has seriously changed their plans. From the end of May to June 6, at least 70% of bookings on the peninsula were canceled, and in some resort towns, the number approaches 80%. Founder of the 'Pink Elephant' travel agency network, Aleksan Mkrtchyan, predicts a loss of about three or four million tourists. In his opinion, Russians are ready to reorient themselves to resorts in the Krasnodar region, including Anapa. It can be assumed that the Ukrainian Armed Forces' strike on the locomotive of the Moscow-Simferopol passenger train on the night of June 7 in Crimea will also affect tourists' decisions. Already, there are disruptions in the movement of trains of 'Grand Service Express', the operator of railway passenger transport. Not only the schedule but also the logistics are changing. For example, those wishing to travel to Moscow from Simferopol, the capital of the republic, must now arrive at the bus station an hour earlier, from where they will be picked up by a bus, or they can independently reach the Kerch Yuzhnaya railway station. Sevastopol residents traveling to St. Petersburg also need to take a bus an hour earlier, which will take them to the station Seven Kolodezev in the village of Lenino between Feodosia and Kerch. Such logistical changes significantly alter plans, and many tourists refuse and return tickets. For example, Marina from Chelyabinsk says that due to changes in train schedules, she will miss her flight: - My tickets are non-refundable, with a ten-hour delay in departure, I won't make it anywhere. I'll have to look for options in Anapa, Sochi, or somewhere nearby. And this strike, honestly, scared me a little. I have a young daughter, I worry about her. Mikhail from Krasnodar decided to cancel his trip due to the need to change transport: - It used to be convenient: get on the train and get to Sevastopol, but now there are some buses, and what if they get hit too. This year I will support the resorts of the Krasnodar region, I haven't been there for a long time! - the man reasons. - I've been coming to Sevastopol every year since 2014, this year, apparently, I'll break the tradition. The carrier 'Grand Service Express' issued a recommendation: "Passengers of trains traveling to or from Crimea, in case of danger, must be prepared for situations where they need to evacuate from the train – to the station, and in cases where danger overtakes them outside the station, - to the open area. [...] For all of us, including train crews, such situations are new and non-standard. In each specific case, conductors and train managers are guided not only by general instructions but also by the specifics of the operational situation." "The car completely burned down." Traffic on the north of the peninsula, where the 'Novorossiya' highway runs, appears calmer. The traditional vehicle checkpoints of Dzhankoy and Armyansk are operating in reverse mode after the Ukrainian Armed Forces' strikes – traffic is allowed in both directions on one lane alternately. However, there is currently no active movement from either the annexed Crimea or the occupied territories. Drivers share observations in chats: - 7:40 Chongar is clear in both directions, reverse. - It's possible to pass. They say there are no queues. - They started letting people through the bridge. One side is working. Reverse in 2 directions. There are almost no cars. Truckers are being sent through the village of Perekop towards Chaplynka. They are temporarily banned from passing through other checkpoints. All drivers are advised to travel only during the day to avoid drone attacks. At night, the situation is considered much more dangerous for trucks: "For us, the night was terrible, - they write in the chat. - My husband was driving a loaded 20-ton truck. On his last trip, he saw other burned-out cars from a distance, and today he found himself in such a situation. A drone hit our car. It hit the cabin directly. The car was moving quite fast, and probably luck, as well as the car itself, saved him. We have an American tractor: the impact hit the rear left part of the cabin, behind the driver. " The drone pierced the roof, the door jammed, all the upholstery and sleeping bags were torn off. My husband says he was deafened and blinded, everything was like a fog. But he somehow managed to pull himself together. The cabin caught fire instantly. The fire was hellish. He tried to put out the fire, but nothing worked. The fire extinguishers did not help – there were two of them, the fire only intensified. There were explosions, and more than one. Trucks are intentionally set on fire with some substance." - Complete remote isolation of Crimea will allow it to be taken by attrition, - believes military-political observer of the 'Information Resistance' group Oleksandr Kovalenko. - At the same time, Ukrainian troops will advance overland towards Berdyansk and Mariupol. This will allow them to gain fire control over the entire Sea of Azov and the Crimean Bridge itself.

Cover image for After a change in government, Hungary ceases to block Ukraine's EU accession talks. They will begin on June 15. What steps must Kyiv take now?

After a change in government, Hungary ceases to block Ukraine's EU accession talks. They will begin on June 15. What steps must Kyiv take now?

In the coming days, Kyiv will move even closer to the European Union. Under Viktor Orbán, Budapest blocked the start of substantive negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU, but a change in power following Hungary's April elections has allowed for a breakthrough. According to media reports, the opening of the first of six thematic negotiation clusters is to be announced on June 15 at an intergovernmental conference in Luxembourg. This first cluster concerns issues such as financial control, justice, and the protection of citizens' fundamental rights. In total, the parties will have to work through 35 negotiation chapters covering various areas of interaction: from judicial proceedings and taxation to security and environmental protection. The material from 'Novaya Gazeta Europe' discusses the path still ahead for Ukraine and potential obstacles. Silhouette of the 'Motherland Monument' against a sunset sky in Kyiv, Ukraine, November 2, 2023. Photo: Eugen Kotenko / Ukrinform / ZUMA Press Wire / Scanpix / LETA. The Road is Open Two years ago, on June 25, 2024, participants in the first EU-Ukraine intergovernmental conference formally launched accession negotiations. However, this was largely a political gesture, as the difficult negotiation process did not de facto begin then or a year later. By early June 2026, the situation has moved forward: sources from Politico and Kyiv Independent reported that an intergovernmental conference will be held in Luxembourg on June 15, where negotiations on the first cluster will be officially opened. This is an event Kyiv has been anticipating for two years. What are these clusters? Membership negotiations involve analyzing national legislation for compliance with the acquis, the body of EU legislation, divided into 35 chapters. Since 2020, 33 of these have been grouped into six thematic clusters: 'Foundations,' 'Internal Market,' 'Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth,' 'Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity,' 'Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion,' and 'External Relations.' The 'Foundations' cluster includes issues such as the rule of law, the judicial system, fundamental rights, the functioning of democratic institutions, public administration, public procurement, statistics, and financial control. This cluster is opened first and closed last, as it is ultimately used to judge a country's readiness. Chapters 34 and 35, 'Institutes' and 'Miscellaneous,' are handled separately at the very end. The negotiation mechanism is structured such that progress can stall at any step. The opening and closing of each cluster require a unanimous decision from all 27 member states. This is precisely why the formal start in 2024 did not lead to substantive progress for so long. The sole obstacle was Hungary. The process was unblocked by Hungarian voters. On April 12, Péter Magyar's 'Tisza' party defeated Viktor Orbán's 'Fidesz,' which had been in power for 16 consecutive years. In early May, Magyar replaced Orbán as prime minister, and negotiations with Brussels took a new turn. By the end of the month, the new Hungarian prime minister had reached an agreement with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to unfreeze almost all of Hungary's allocated funds from the EU's recovery and cohesion funds, amounting to €16.4 billion. Magyar publicly denied any link between the unfreezing of funds and the opening of the Ukrainian cluster, although the connection is evident. Optimistic statements began to emerge from Brussels. For instance, Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi stated in an interview with the Financial Times that 'the narrative has changed': the first cluster will open in June, and the rest in July. However, it was not that simple. Budapest had already specified its price for lifting the veto under Orbán: '11 points' concerning the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia. The new prime minister proved no less firm on this issue than his predecessor. 'The most important thing for us is guarantees for the 100,000 Hungarians living in Ukraine, ensuring they can use their native language in schools, cultural events, and public administration,' Magyar emphasized. Active technical negotiations with Kyiv began almost immediately after Magyar's government was formed, and by late May, the Ukrainian broadcaster 'Suspilne' reported that nine out of the 11 demands had been met. Against this backdrop, Magyar proposed a meeting with Zelenskyy in Berehove, a Ukrainian city in Transcarpathia with a Hungarian majority. Consequently, on June 3, Magyar announced that negotiators had 'achieved in three weeks what Viktor Orbán could not achieve in ten years'—'full agreement with Ukraine on expanding the language, educational, cultural, and political rights of the hundred-thousand-strong Hungarian minority' in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs subsequently announced the commencement of 'a new stage in relations, built on mutual respect, trust, and a common European future.' On June 5, it was reported that the leaders of the two reconciled countries might meet not in Berehove, but in Budapest. The Ukrainian Ambassador to Hungary, Fedir Shandor, spoke about the negotiations regarding this possibility. He did not name a potential date for the visit. Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar speaks at a press conference in Budapest, Hungary, May 18, 2026. Photo: Robert Hegedus / EPA. Progress Scale Regardless of where Zelenskyy and Magyar ultimately meet, it is now clear that nothing will prevent the start of substantive negotiations between Ukraine and the EU, though not all clusters will be opened simultaneously, as Ukraine had advocated. According to an informed source cited by 'Evropeyska Pravda,' considerable preparatory work remains before the planned intergovernmental conference in Luxembourg on June 15, including efforts in working groups and at the ambassadorial level in Brussels. It is expected that the EU's common negotiating position for the first cluster will be approved this week. By the summer of 2026, Ukraine had already made significant progress in aligning its legislation with EU norms. Several sources help answer the question of how many steps remain. Firstly, there are the Enlargement Reports, prepared annually by the European Commission. The latest report on Ukraine was published on November 4, 2025 (covering the period from September 1, 2024, to September 1, 2025). It begins by stating that 'Ukraine continues to demonstrate remarkable resilience and a firm commitment to its European path,' although it also notes 'significant causes for concern.' Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka described the enlargement report as 'the best in three years': 'The European Commission has for the first time recognized our record progress in most reform areas.' 'Higher reform speed (improved progress) is observed in 15 negotiation chapters. In 12 chapters, this progress is rated as 'good progress,' the Deputy Prime Minister wrote on Facebook. For example, customs received one of the highest ratings in the report—'good level of readiness' and 'good progress.' In taxation, there was 'good progress' with moderate readiness. Financial control improved from 'limited' progress to 'good' over the year. In common foreign policy and sanctions, Ukraine showed near-complete alignment with the EU: 95% in 2024 and 99% in 2025. The main risk remains the fragility of the anti-corruption architecture. A dramatic episode in July 2025, when the parliament attempted to strip the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) of their independence by subordinating them to the Prosecutor General, served as a worrying signal for Brussels. Although the autonomy of these bodies was restored, trust was somewhat undermined. Furthermore, the document notes that 'anti-corruption institutions and civil society report increasing pressure from state bodies, including criminal investigations by law enforcement and security agencies.' 'Overall, these events call into question Ukraine's commitment to the anti-corruption agenda,' the European Commission concluded. Another problematic area is the judiciary (indicating a constant shortage of personnel and a high workload for courts). Additionally, the report noted that the position of Prosecutor General remains politicized. A second source of information is the reports on the implementation of the Association Agreement signed in 2014, prepared by the Ukrainian side. This document implies the need for structural reforms in the same legislative areas as in the EU accession process. By the end of 2021, Ukraine had completed 63% of the necessary work. By the end of 2024, progress reached 81%, and a year later, it was 84%. Leading areas include 'Statistics and Information Exchange' (100%), 'Education and Youth' (99%), 'Intellectual Property' (98%), and 'Customs' (96%). The most significant gains over the year were in 'Financial Sector' (+8%) and 'Social Policy and Labor Relations' (+7%). Lagging areas include 'Financial Cooperation and Fight Against Fraud' (24%, unchanged from the previous year) and 'Transport, Transport Infrastructure, Postal and Courier Services' (59%, +1 percentage point). The findings of Ukrainian private analytical projects, such as UAEUMeter and Vox Ukraine, are also indicative. For instance, analysts from Vox Ukraine examined 180 reforms of varying scale in 2025 and summarized their findings with the sobering phrase: 'More reforms do not always mean more progress.' The vast majority of decisions in 2025—172—received positive assessments. Of these, 32 were rated +2 or higher on a scale of -5 to +5 (the threshold separating significant reforms from less important regulatory changes). According to experts, the greatest progress in 2025 'occurred in social policy, business regulation, and healthcare, generally aligning with citizens' expectations.' However, there were also four decisions that Vox Ukraine considered steps backward. 'Most of the counter-reforms in 2025 are related to the anti-corruption sphere. This is a worrying signal, as the resilience of anti-corruption institutions is one of the key conditions for Ukraine's future EU membership,' the experts stated. Reforms continued in 2026; for example, an analysis by Vox Ukraine published on June 3 discusses five reforms carried out between January 12 and 25. After the Clusters Some of the 35 chapters will be closed quickly, while others will require significant work. However, even the completion of this process will not be the end of European integration. First, the European Commission and the Council of the EU must issue a positive opinion on the country's readiness for EU membership, after which all involved states and the candidate country must sign an Accession Treaty, which then needs to be ratified (either by parliamentary vote or national referendums). Each of these stages can present challenges. Doubts among the current 27 EU member states can be broadly categorized into two main groups: financial-economic concerns and security-related issues. For instance, due to migration pressure, many countries are hesitant to immediately grant Ukrainians freedom of movement for labor. Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto noted: 'If Ukraine, given its size and economic system, were to join Europe, many EU countries would immediately face a very serious agricultural crisis, which even Germany cannot afford.' The strong resistance in several European countries to the recent EU trade agreement with MERCOSUR (the common market of South American countries) highlights the complexity of this issue. Equally important is the fact that Ukraine is a country with significantly lower incomes than the European average, necessitating additional spending on agricultural subsidies and the equalization of economic development levels. According to calculations by the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel, the net cost to current EU countries from Ukraine's accession would be €136 billion at current prices for the period 2021-2027, equivalent to 0.13% of the EU's total GDP for the same period. While a significant sum, it is not ruinous, contrary to popular fears. Experts note that for recipients of EU funds, any additional reduction in payments would be relatively small compared to the decreases already experienced in recent years. Meanwhile, most EU budget donors would have to increase their contributions by approximately 0.1% of GDP under the baseline scenario. However, some Eastern European countries risk transitioning from aid recipients to donors, which would naturally be a sensitive change for them. Independence Square in the center of Kyiv, Ukraine, August 11, 2025. Photo: Gleb Garanich / Reuters / Scanpix / LETA. Former Italian Prime Minister and former European Commissioner Paolo Gentiloni, responding to Guido Crosetto's statement, argued that the concern that 'the accession of a large country with a lower per capita income than the rest of Europe could harm the other 27 states' should be taken seriously. 'In the next three to four years, an assessment of the consequences will be needed—primarily for agricultural policy and cohesion funds. But solutions are possible, as demonstrated by the examples of Poland (remember the 'Polish plumber' ghost?) and Romania. And the benefits should be obvious,' Gentiloni added. Specifically, the burden on the EU budget can be reduced by employing various 'limiters' already enshrined in current legislation. For instance, when Spain joined the EU (then the European Economic Community) in 1986, its farmers did not immediately gain access to subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy. A similar transitional period could be established for Ukraine. Temporary restrictions could also be introduced to protect the labor markets and social security systems of EU member states. In the same column, Paolo Gentiloni dismissed other arguments against Kyiv's Euro-integration as unfounded, particularly those related to security: the claim that EU enlargement would be an 'act of aggression against Russia' and would provoke Vladimir Putin into further provocations. The position that Ukraine's EU accession cannot be considered until the war with Russia ends is held, for example, by Slovak President Peter Pellegrini. He is convinced that substantive accession negotiations can only begin after a just peace is achieved. Meanwhile, Gentiloni is confident: 'Ukraine's accession will be a significant strengthening of European defense and, consequently, an important factor in deterring future aggression.' Waiting in the Antechamber Amidst such European disagreements, various scenarios for Ukraine's integration are being discussed. In the spring of 2026, as 'Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty' (RFE/RL) revealed, 'discussion papers' circulated among EU capitals, containing proposals from various member states. For example, the French idea was to introduce the status of an 'integrated state'—'an accelerator towards membership, not a substitute for it.' This would involve participation in key EU institutions, but without voting rights, granting citizens symbolic benefits, and participation in EU funding programs—though not in key redistribution mechanisms like the Common Agricultural Policy and cohesion funds that channel money to poorer regions of the Union. Germany proposed 'associated membership,' also envisioning participation in EU institutions without voting rights, with 'associated commissioners without portfolios' and 'associated Members of the European Parliament.' Furthermore, it discussed the gradual integration of an 'associated member' into the EU's single market and granting it the option to utilize Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union (on mutual defense). While this cannot be considered a full replacement for NATO Article 5 or American guarantees for European peacekeeping forces in Ukraine, Kyiv's EU membership would thus complicate the calculations of Russian military strategists. The 'Motherland Monument' illuminated in the colors of the EU flag during Europe Day celebrations, Kyiv, Ukraine, May 9, 2026. Photo: Pavlo Bahmut / Ukrinform / ZUMA Press Wire / Scanpix / LETA. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, among others, has publicly spoken about the possibility of 'associated membership.' He explained that completing the accession process in the short term is impossible due to 'innumerable obstacles' and politically complex ratification procedures in several member states, whereas the option proposed by Berlin would bring tangible benefits to Kyiv and also serve as 'a strong political signal that Ukraine and its citizens urgently need in their ongoing struggle against Russian aggression.' There was also a Lithuanian document, which most forcefully argued that 'full membership must remain the sole ultimate goal of Ukraine's accession process.' Among its proposals was the idea that progress towards membership 'cannot be halted for reasons unrelated to accession criteria and must depend on objectively assessed reform results.' This would serve as protection against the threat of repeated blockades like Orbán's. One of the concepts discussed is the use of the status of a 'acceding state.' Formally, this status only arises after signing an accession treaty with the EU, but Vilnius proposes allowing its provisions to be applied much earlier. Another idea is to set 2030 as a 'conditional and achievement-based date for Ukraine's accession to the EU.' These proposals share a common theme: ushering Ukraine into the EU's 'anteroom.' Access to institutions—but without voting rights. Access to the market—but without major financial flows, the common agricultural policy, and cohesion funds. Essentially, membership without membership, beneficial to both sides and deferring the most difficult final stage of unanimous decision-making. Meanwhile, Kyiv fears getting stuck in this 'anteroom' for a long time and de facto gaining little. In a letter to the EU leadership, obtained by Reuters, Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated: 'We are defending Europe—fully, not partially or with half-measures.' According to him, 'it would be unfair if Ukraine were present in the EU but remained without a voice.' 'Now is the time to move forward with Ukraine's membership in a full and meaningful way,' Zelenskyy also added, referencing the removal of Viktor Orbán as an obstacle. The Ukrainian government believes that some negotiation chapters could be closed this year, and all without exception next year, after which preparations for the Accession Treaty can begin.