• Intention and Structure
• Morality Lowers the Threshold for Power
• Institutions Respond to Incentives, Not Motives
• The Paradox of the Good
• The Real Question

German version can be found here.

Hardly anyone steps forward and says: “We want to cause harm.” And by “hardly anyone” I mean no one. It always begins the same way: “We want to help.” “We want to protect.” “We want justice.” The problem is not the good intention behind something. That intention can be real and legitimate. The problem is what happens when good intentions turn into moral self-legitimation.

Between the two lies a fundamental difference.

§Intention and Structure

A good intention is an inner state.
Moral self-legitimation is a mechanism set in motion by a good intention.

It arises when an actor no longer measures their actions by effects or principles, but by their moral self-image. What matters is no longer whether an intervention is justified. What matters is that it is done “for the good.” Consider this: “the good” is always subjective and can be interpreted differently by every actor.

Psychologically, this is understandable. People want to be consistent. Whoever experiences themselves as morally good will interpret information in a way that preserves that self-image. Contradictions are rationalized. Harm is accepted as a necessary side effect.

On a small scale, this is more or less harmless and happens to all of us. We are not perfect. The danger begins where this dynamic becomes institutionally embedded.

§Morality Lowers the Threshold for Power

Open malice is visible. Moral superiority is not. It is invisible and expresses itself quietly.

Whoever openly seeks power is met with suspicion. Whoever acts in the name of the good, by contrast, receives trust. Morality functions like a soft-focus filter. It shifts the perception of coercion.

Taxes become solidarity.
Surveillance becomes security.
Censorship becomes responsibility.

The action remains the same. The language changes. And with the language, acceptance changes.

Consider the attacks of September 11, 2001. In their aftermath, far-reaching anti-terror laws were passed, sold as necessary protection. Many remain in force to this day. Or look at modern surveillance programs. They rarely emerge with the open goal of control, but in the name of “anti-money-laundering,” “child protection,” or “counterterrorism.” Almost no one argues for power. They argue for security.

Once a system is convinced that it is morally right, it begins to treat criticism not as an argument, but as a moral problem. Opponents are no longer wrong, but dangerous. Not mistaken, but unsupportive. Deviation becomes pathologized.

That makes resistance, dissent, or objection socially costly. And resistance is the natural corrective to power.

§Institutions Respond to Incentives, Not Motives

Here lies the economic core.

Individuals act from motives. Institutions act along incentive structures. A good intention may be sincere. But once it is translated into rules, budgets, and competencies, incentives take over. If moral narratives obscure the costs of political interventions, resistance to power concentration declines, regardless of the original intention.

A program in the name of justice may grow.
An intervention in the name of security may expand.
A state of exception in the name of protection may be prolonged.

When such a project fails, the goal itself is rarely questioned. The goal is usually genuinely noble, more security or more justice. What is questioned is the implementation. The logic runs as follows: It was not implemented consistently enough. Therefore more regulation. More control. More enforcement.

Moral projects rarely internalize failure. They externalize it. The blame lies with insufficient discipline, inadequate resources, or malicious opponents. The goal itself remains untouched.

This is how systems that see themselves as morally superior stabilize.

And this logic is not limited to state actors. Ideological movements, political camps, or morally charged corporations can also immunize themselves. Whoever believes they stand on the right side of history tends to scrutinize their own claims to power less critically.

§The Paradox of the Good

The greatest risk rarely comes from people who want evil.
It comes from people who cannot imagine that their actions might cause harm.

Whoever sees themselves as good considers themselves an exception to the rule. They believe they will use power responsibly. And precisely for that reason, they demand more of it.

Morality replaces self-limitation.

Yet every monopoly of force, every central authority, every institution with coercive power requires limitation. Not because its actors are inherently evil, but because incentives operate. And because power tends to expand.

Limitation means real counterforces. Separation of powers. Competition between institutions. Exit options. Decentralization. Mechanisms that function even when all participants are convinced they are acting morally right.

A good intention is not a safeguard against distorted incentives. Quite the opposite.

§The Real Question

The decisive question is not: Are the goals well intended?

But: What happens when those goals are enforced through coercion and morally immunize themselves in the process?

A system is not good because it wants good. It is robust when it remains limited even under moral high pressure. The higher the moral claim, the stricter the limitation of power must be. Anything else is an invitation to escalation in the name of the good.

And history shows: Violence that believes itself moral is particularly durable and particularly dangerous.